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INTRODUCTION

When a state’s court of last resort renders an opinion that abridges,
ignores, and renders meaningless an express provision of that state’s
constitution, then that court shall have itself effectuated an amendment to its
constitution erroneously and without the approval and longstanding support
of the electors of that state.1 This is what the Supreme Court of Florida did
in 2012 in the case of Telli v. Broward County,2 which held that counties
should be allowed “to govern themselves, including [enacting] term limits
[for] their officials, in accordance with their home rule authority.”3 It is
being interpreted to opine that charter counties may impose term limits
through their charters on any and all county officers—including the
Constitution’s County Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution, which includes the office of the
Tax Collector.4 This recent Supreme Court of Florida opinion receded
from—that is, determined that the Court would no longer abide by—its
previous opinion in Cook v. City of Jacksonville (Cook II),5 issued ten years
prior, which expressly and unambiguously held that charter counties could
not limit the terms of the Constitution’s five County Officers enumerated in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution.6
1.
See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
2.
94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
3.
Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
4.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
5.
823 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 2002).
6.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook v.
City of Jacksonville (Cook II), 823 So. 2d 86, 86 (Fla. 2002); City of Jacksonville v. Cook
(Cook I), 765 So. 2d 289, 293 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook
v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla.
2002).
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The decision in Telli, which is supported by scarce legal analysis, is
in direct conflict with the Florida Constitution.7 Telli represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of charter counties’ home rule power—as
limited by the Florida Constitution—and also a misunderstanding of the
status of the five County Officers created and established by article VIII,
section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution.8
Another article has been published regarding this case in 2013 by
Daniel S. Weinger, titled Stare Decisis Takes Another Blow in Telli v.
Broward County.9 We would like to note that we agree with Mr. Weinger’s
position regarding the past precedent leading up to Telli, and his discussion
of stare decisis.10 We do, however, respectfully disagree with his discussion
of operative language of the Constitutional provisions pertaining to “County
Officers” and “County Commissioners”—discussed more fully below.11
Furthermore, we note that Mr. Weinger’s article did not address several
important issues with the case.12
Florida is divided into sixty-seven county political subdivisions, each
served by one general purpose government entity—Board of County
Commissioners—and five specific purpose one-officer entities, the
Constitution’s County Officers: Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser,
Supervisor of Elections, and Clerk of Circuit Court.13 All county
governments have home rule power under the Florida Constitution,
regardless of whether they take form as a charter county government form of
home rule, or non-charter county government form of home rule.14 Home
rule—ever since 1968—is vested inherently in each county.15 However, the
Constitution still provides limitations on county home rule.16 There are two
7.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506, 512–13; Daniel S.
Weinger, Stare Decisis Takes Another Blow in Telli v. Broward County, 42 STETSON L. REV.
859, 859–60 (2013).
8.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506, 512–13; Weinger,
supra note 7, at 859, 868–69.
9.
Weinger, supra note 7, at 859, 868–73.
10.
Id. at 860–68.
11.
See infra text accompanying note 119. Interestingly enough, Mr. Weinger
served as co-appellate counsel for the Board of County Commissioners challenging the term
limit provision in the Telli case. Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505–06; Weinger, supra note 7, at 859.
12.
See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505–13; Weinger, supra note 7, at 868–73.
13.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), (c)–(d), (f)–(g) (noting unless one or more
offices in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) is abolished under applicable constitutional
authority). Although much of this article will focus on duties and provisions of the Tax
Collector, the broader implications are applicable to all five of the Constitution’s County
Officers. Id. See infra Parts II.C., III.A.–B.
14.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a), (f)–(g).
15.
See id. § 1(a).
16.
See id. § 1(f)–(g).
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categories of such limitations, which include those limits on non-charter
counties’ home rule in article VIII, section 1, subsection (f), and those limits
on charter counties’ home rule in article VIII, section 1, subsection (g).17
The Constitution’s five County Officers18—as created by and
established under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida
Constitution—have been imbued with sovereignty and maintain a status of
independence from the county government, the Board of County
Commissioners.19 These officers maintain sovereign plenary power to carry
out important state work assigned to them by general law to be performed
and carried out at the county level and to exercise reasonable discretion in
carrying out that work, not inconsistent with the express duties.20 These
officers are not subject to regulation or interference by the local county
government—the Board of County Commissioners.21 Therefore, any charter
provisions pertaining to the Constitution’s five County Officers will not be
enforceable, save for a provision establishing a different manner for their
selection—but being selected in a different manner does not change their
status as the Constitution’s County Officers.22
17.
Id.
18.
Id. § 1(d). It is important to understand the terms that we have chosen to
describe the five County Officers listed in, and created by, article VIII, section 1, subsection
(d) of the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). Throughout this article, we
refer to these officers as the “Constitution’s County Officers.” Id. This is because they are
created by the Constitution. Id. Some cases have referred to them as “Constitutional County
Officers,” “Constitutionally-authorized County Officers,” or some other related title. See,
e.g., Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418–19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla.
2012). We believe referring to these officers as either “Constitutional” or “Constitutionallyauthorized” is misleading. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418–19.
These titles have been used by the courts to distinguish the five article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d), county officers from a charter-created officer to whom the duties of the article
VIII, section 1, subsection (d) County Officer have been transferred, and which may retain the
same name and responsibilities. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). For a more detailed discussion
of the abolition of an article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) officer and the transfer of his or her
duties, resulting in a charter officer, see infra Part II.C. However, if a charter county follows
the correct procedures laid out in the Constitution under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d)
to abolish a Constitution-created “County Office” and transfers its duties to a charter-created
office, then the resulting charter office is also constitutional. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see
infra Part II.C. To avoid confusion, we refer to the article VIII, section 1, subsection (d)
“County Officers,” as created by the Constitution, as the “Constitution’s County Officers” or
“Constitution County Officer,” and to any charter-created office carrying out the same duties
after abolition and transfer as the “charter’s county officer.” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see
infra Parts II–V.
19.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).
20.
See id. § 1(f).
21.
Id.
22.
Id. § 1(d).
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A charter county may abolish one or more of the Constitution’s five
County Offices and transfer the duties performed by that office to a charter
office—either charter-elected or charter-appointed.23 For example, in the
Miami-Dade, Broward, and Volusia county political subdivisions, the
Constitution’s County Tax Collector—even though it may be referred to by
the same name under the charter—no longer exists.24 The charter’s
appointed Tax Collector now exists in its place in these counties, and this
charter office may be regulated to its fullest extent by the local government,
not inconsistent with the state duties established under Chapter 197 of the
Florida Statutes,25 and other applicable general law.26
The recent Supreme Court of Florida decision in Telli is in direct
contradiction with the above-summarized provisions of the Florida
Constitution.27 First, it fails to acknowledge the important limitations placed
on counties’ home rule power under the Constitution.28 Second, it
undermines completely the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers
by holding that charter counties may term limit any and all county officers
through their charters—even the Constitution’s County Officers—when
those offices have not been first abolished under the county charter.29
Accordingly, the lower court decision from the Fourth District Court
of Appeal in the case should have been affirmed, but on different grounds:
(1) because charter counties have broad authority over their Board of County
Commissioners and any of their charter-elected or charter-appointed officers
under their charters, including the authority to set term limits on the charters’
officers—including County Commissioners—and; (2) because counties do
not have the authority to regulate or interfere with the Constitution’s five
County Officers and thus do not have the power to term limit any one of the
Constitution’s County Officers whose office has not been abolished and
duties transferred to a charter-created office.30 Regardless of what the
23.
Id.
24.
DADE COUNTY HOME RULE CHARTER art. IX, § 9.01(A) (2012); BROWARD
COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 3.06(a) (2010); VOLUSIA COUNTY CHARTER art.VI, § 601.1(1)(a)
(2002); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
25.
FLA. STAT. § 197.332(2) (2014); see also DADE COUNTY HOME RULE
CHARTER art. IX, § 9.01; BROWARD COUNTY CHARTER art. III, § 3.06; VOLUSIA COUNTY
CHARTER art.VI, § 601.1.
26.
Weinger, supra note 7, at 862–63.
27.
Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g), with Telli v. Broward Cnty.,
94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
28.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 507; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g).
29.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(g).
30.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Snipes v.
Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward
Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012).
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Supreme Court of Florida held in the Telli opinion, county charter term limits
are not effective as to the Constitution’s County Officers.31
The following sections of this article will explore the preceding
analysis in depth.32 Part II will include important background on county
governance under the Florida Constitution, including the development of the
county home rule in Florida, the difference between charter and non-charter
county governance, and the status that our Florida Constitution gives to the
five Constitution County Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d), as well as the relationship between charter and non-charter
counties and the Constitution’s County Officers in each of their respective
counties.33 Part III will include an in-depth analysis of the Supreme Court of
Florida decision in Telli, and how that decision misinterprets county home
rule and ignores the status of the Constitution’s County Officers.34 Part IV
includes a discussion of some possible pathways of review.35
II.

BACKGROUND ON COUNTY GOVERNANCE UNDER THE FLORIDA
CONSTITUTION

The Florida Constitution provides that the state shall be divided into
political subdivisions called counties.36 The Constitution leaves it up to the
Florida Legislature to determine the number and boundaries of such
counties.37 Currently, there are sixty-seven counties in Florida.38
The Constitution also establishes that there shall be one county
government in each county political subdivision and provides that such
county governments exercise home rule power, either in the form of a noncharter county government39 or charter county government.40 However, the
Constitution also provides that there shall be six more distinct government
entities that shall be integral to that county’s political subdivision.41 These
include one collegial, general purpose entity in the form of the Board of

31.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
32.
See infra Parts II–IV.
33.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); infra Part II.
34.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; infra Part III.
35.
See infra Part IV.
36.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) (“The state shall be divided by law into
political subdivisions called counties.”).
37.
Id. (“Counties may be created, abolished or changed by law, with
provision for payment or apportionment of the public debt.”).
38.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 7 (2014).
39.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (f).
40.
Id. § 1(g).
41.
Id. § 1(d)–(e).
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County Commissioners42 and each of the five distinct one-officer, special
purpose entities, which include: Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser,
Supervisor of Elections, and Clerk of Court.43 These five, one-officer,
special purpose entities are created by the Florida Constitution—labeled
“County Officers”—and exist in every county political subdivision in
Florida; even in counties that have adopted charters, unless any charter
county has by charter provision abolished such an office and transferred its
duties to either a charter-elected or charter-appointed office.44
A.

1968 Constitution and the Shift in Counties’ Home Rule

“Home rule” generally refers to the “allocati[on] [of] a measure of
autonomy to a local government.”45 In other words, a local government that
has home rule power governs its own local affairs and does not have to seek
legislative authority for what it does.46 Prior to the 1968 Constitution,
counties in Florida derived home rule authority only as directly granted from
the Florida Legislature “through [the] passage of local bills,”47 and did not
have any independent or inherent powers of self-government.48 This
previous form of home rule in Florida was commonly referred to as Dillon’s
Rule.49 Based on the increasing population and growth needs of the people

42.
Id. § 1(e).
43.
Id. § 1(d).
44.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). There are certain limited ways, provided by
the Constitution, in which a charter county government may alter or abolish one or more of
these six county government entities, which will be discussed in Part II.C.1–3. See discussion
infra Part II.C.1–3.
45.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 850 (10th ed. 2014). The verbatim definition
in Black’s Law Dictionary is “[a] state legislative provision or action allocating a measure of
autonomy to a local government, conditional on its acceptance of certain terms.” Id. This
definition is somewhat misleading because, as discussed infra, in Florida, home rule power is
allocated under the State’s constitution, and therefore, is not an allocation of power from the
legislature, but an inherent power based on the consent of the people to be governed. See
discussion infra Part III.A.
46.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f)–(g); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 45, at 850.
47.
C. Wayne Alford & John H. Wolf, Comment, Constitutional Revision:
County Home Rule in Florida—The Need for Expansion, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 282, 282–83
(1966).
48.
Mark J. Wolff, Home Rule in Florida: A Critical Appraisal, 19 STETSON
L. REV. 853, 859 (1990).
49.
See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 169, 221 (1983) (discussing Dillon’s Rule, under which “local government[s
only] consisted of delegated or enumerated powers,” and thus characterizing “local
governments as creatures of the state legislature”).
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of Florida,50 and the increasing demands that the passage of local bills were
placing on the Legislature,51 the people of Florida passed the 1968
Constitution which includes express provisions addressing the home rule
power of county political subdivisions.52 The fundamental force of these
provisions of the 1968 Constitution meant that counties in Florida have
inherent governing power and no longer have to request a specific law from
the Florida Legislature to justify or authorize local county action.53 Broad as
this power may be, the Constitution still limits this inherent power with
different limitations for non-charter home rule and charter county home
rule.54
B.

The Difference Between Charter Counties and Non-Charter
Counties Under the Florida Constitution

All sixty-seven county political subdivisions in Florida possess home
rule power inherently, regardless of whether they have a charter or not.55
Under the 1968 Constitution, non-charter counties possess “such power of
self-government as is provided by general56 or special law57 . . . [and] [t]he
[B]oard of [C]ounty [C]ommissioners . . . may enact . . . county ordinances
not inconsistent with general or special law.”58 Relatedly, charter county
50.
See Wolff, supra note 48, at 854 (“It is a practical response to persistent
increases in demand for fundamental services such as water, sewage, transportation, zoning,
and police and fire protection, precipitated by steadily increasing populations . . . .”).
51.
See, e.g., Alford & Wolf, supra note 47, at 283 (stating that “[i]n 1965, the
Florida Legislature passed 1186 special and local bills,” dwarfing the number of general bills
it passed, at a mere 586).
52.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f), (g).
53.
See Wolff, supra note 48, at 861–62.
54.
Id. at 881; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f), (g).
55.
Wolff, supra note 48, at 880.
56.
Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Classic Mile, Inc., 541 So. 2d 1155, 1157
(Fla. 1989). A general law is one that “operates universally throughout the state, uniformly
upon subjects as they may exist throughout the state, or uniformly within a permissible
classification.” Id. (citing State ex rel. Landis v. Harris, 163 So. 237, 240 (Fla. 1934) (en
banc)).
57.
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 12(g). The Constitution defines a “special law” as a
special or local law. Id.
“[A] special law is one relating to, or designed to operate upon, particular persons
or things, or one that purports to operate upon classified persons or things when
classification is not permissible or the classification adopted is illegal; a local law is
one relating to, or designed to, operate only in a specifically indicated part of the
State, or one that purports to operate within classified territory when classification
is not permissible or the classification is illegal.”

City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 148 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Landis, 163 So. at 240
(emphasis omitted)).
58.
FLA. CONST. art VIII, § 1(f).
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governments possess “all powers of local self-government not inconsistent
with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors,” and
the Board of County Commissioners “may enact county ordinances not
inconsistent with general law.”59
Fundamentally, all counties—whether charter or non-charter—
possess inherent home rule power, and the only fundamental difference
between the home rule power of charter counties and non-charter counties is
the limitations placed upon them.60 For all counties in Florida, home rule
power is limited by both general law enactments of the Florida Legislature
and the provisions of the Florida Constitution; but in non-charter counties,
home rule is also limited further by special law enactments of the Florida
Legislature.61
The Florida Legislature has provided broad powers of local selfgovernance to all counties through general law by enacting the provisions of
chapter 125 of the Florida Statutes.62 Essentially, chapter 125 of the Florida
Statutes operates as a quasi-default charter for non-charter counties, but is
used in practice by charter counties as well.63 The provisions that exist for
non-charter counties under chapter 125 are very broad and non-restrictive.64
In essence, under current law, there are several things that counties
can accomplish under the charter county government structure that either
cannot be accomplished, or can only be accomplished indirectly, under noncharter county government structure.65 Examples include:
1)
Citizen recall enabling voters of the county to vote to
remove members of the Board of County Commissioners;66
2)
Citizen initiatives to vote on proposed ordinances;67
59.
Id. § 1(g) (emphasis added). This distinction between powers of selfgovernment and local self-government has not been defined. See id. However, we would
argue that it means that non-charter home rule is limited to self-government, and charter home
rule has a further limitation in that it is limited to local self-government. Id. Therefore, a
charter cannot write anything that is not truly local in nature. Id.
60.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f)–(g).
61.
Id. § 1(g); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 45, at 850; see also FLA.
STAT. ch. 125 (2014). Those special law enactments passed by the Florida Legislature will
only apply to charter counties if the voters in the county also pass it by referendum. FLA.
CONST. art. III, § 10. “Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of local
self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the
electors.” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g) (emphasis added).
62.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 125.
63.
See id.
64.
See id.; 081-7 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 24 (1981).
65.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 125.
66.
See id. § 100.361(1).
67.
See id. § 125.66(4)(b)(1).
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3)
Non-partisan elections of the Board of County
Commissioners;68
4)
Term limits for the Board of County Commissioners;69
5)
Change in the length of terms for the Board of County
Commissioners;70
6)
Change in the districts represented by each County
Commissioner, including at-large districts;71
7)
County ordinances to prevail in the event of conflict
with and over municipal ordinances on the same subject;72
8)
Exclusive power in the county over community
redevelopment authorities with tax increment financing;73
9)
County authority to levy a municipal public service tax
outside of a city in the county;74
10)
Levy of a communication service tax at a higher rate;75
11)
Abolish any of the State Constitution’s County
Officers—Sheriff, Tax Collector, Property Appraiser, Supervisor
of Elections, and Clerk of Court—and then transfer the duties to
a charter-created office in order to put them under the control of
the Board of County Commissioners;76 and/or

68.
See 00-02 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 6 (2000).
69.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam). This
is in line with the holding of Telli, and an interpretation of article VIII, section 1, subsection
(e) of the Florida Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
However, the holding of Telli, with respect to term limits of the Constitution’s five County
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution, is
erroneous and in contradiction to the provisions and structure of the Florida Constitution. See
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513. For full discussion of this issue, see
infra Part III.B.
70.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (“Except when otherwise provided by
county charter, the governing body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners
composed of five or seven members serving staggered terms of four years.”) (emphasis
added).
71.
See FLA. STAT. § 124.01(4).
72.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(f) (For non-charter county governments “an
ordinance in conflict with a municipal ordinance shall not be effective within the municipality
to the extent of such conflict.”); id. § 1(g) (For charter county governments: “The charter
shall provide which shall prevail in the event of conflict between county and municipal
ordinances.”).
73.
See FLA. STAT. § 163.410.
74.
See id. § 166.231(1)(c).
75.
See id. § 202.19(1).
76.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); infra Part II.C.2.
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12)
Have special acts of the Legislature to be inapplicable
within the county unless approved by referendum.77
C.

Status of the Constitution’s “County Officers” (art. VIII, section 1,
subsection (d))

In Amos v. Mathews,78 a Supreme Court of Florida decision rendered
prior to the 1968 Constitution, the Court described the division of power and
duties of state and local officers as such:
It is fundamentally true that all local powers must have
their origin in a grant by the state which is the fountain and source
of authority. . . . [I]t is therefore the spirit of the Constitution, that
the performance of state functions shall be confided to state
officers; the performance of county functions of purely local
concern shall be confided to county officers. Save as is otherwise
clearly contemplated by the Constitution, there can be no
compromise with that principle, the origin of which is more
ancient than the Constitution itself.79

As noted above, prior to 1968, any and all county officers had the
power to govern local affairs only to the extent that home rule power was
granted to them by the Legislature.80
However, that power structure changed as a result of the 1968
Constitution, which vested in non-charter counties such powers of selfgoverning by general or special law, and in charter counties “all powers of
local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law
approved by vote of the electors.”81 In essence, this change “denotes a broad
empowerment of local authorities to . . . rule[] in matters of genuine local
concern,” and “shift[ed] [to] locus of decision-making power back to those
in the best position to assess those needs, freeing the state legislature to
concentrate on the issues that have a genuine statewide impact.”82

77.
See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 10; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g) (“Counties
operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not
inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors.”)
(emphasis added).
78.
126 So. 308 (Fla. 1930).
79.
Id. at 320.
80.
See FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III, § 27; Louis C. Deal, Constitutional
Home Rule of Unchartered Counties—Fantasy or Fact?, 56 FLA. B. J. 469, 469 (1982); Wolff,
supra note 48, at 859–60.
81.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g).
82.
Wolff, supra note 48, at 854 (emphasis added).
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Thus, the division of state and local powers under the 1968
Constitution allows for local regulation of purely local officers, and state
regulation of state officers.83 The Constitution’s County Officers listed in
and created only by article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), hold an
independent status in our state and Constitution.84 They are not local officers
with purely local duties as defined in Amos, but rather they are the state
Constitution’s sovereign County Officers with plenary power to implement
important state duties under state law and state rule on the local level.85
Although the five officers listed in article VIII, section 1, subsection
(d) are labeled County Officers, they are the Constitution’s County Officers
in and for each county political subdivision and they hold a constitutional
sovereign status.86 This sovereign status is of special consequence and
benefit to Floridians because of the important state work that these
Constitution County Officers perform on the county level, which is an
overriding State interest and—notwithstanding dicta in court and Attorney
General opinions—is not county business.87 The sovereign status of these
officers is well explained in Demings v. Orange County Citizens Review
Board88 as follows:
[U]nder Florida’s [C]onstitution, certain responsibilities of local
governance are separately entrusted to independent constitutional
officers who, at least in non-charter counties [who have not
abolished the Constitution’s County Officers], are not accountable
to the county’s governing board, but derive their power directly

83.
Amos, 126 So. at 320; Deal, supra note 80, at 469; Wolff, supra note 48,
at 859–60; see also FLA CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
84.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
85.
See id. § 1(g); Amos, 126 So. at 308, 320. The best example of state
duties performed by the tax collectors is property tax collection. See FLA. STAT. § 197.603
(2014) (“The Legislature finds that the state has a strong interest in ensuring due process and
public confidence in a uniform, fair, efficient, and accountable collection of property taxes by
county tax collectors. . . . The Legislature intends that the property tax collection authorized
by this chapter under [section] 9(a), [a]rt. VII of the State Constitution be free from the
influence or the appearance of influence of the local governments that levy property taxes and
receive property tax revenues.” (emphasis added)). Other state duties include: Title, tag, and
driver’s license services, sale of hunting and fishing licenses, collection of other taxes on the
local level, including those levied by state agencies. FLA. STAT. §§ 320.03, 322.135,
379.352(4).
86.
Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
87.
Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
88.
15 So. 3d 604 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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from the state. These officers are independently accountable to the
electorate unless otherwise provided by law.89

In this context, the term local governance refers to the important
state duties performed locally by the Constitution’s County Officers elected
in each county’s political subdivision.90 The sovereign independence of the
Constitution’s County Officers is important and is set up by our Constitution
to eliminate even the appearance—much less the reality—of local influence
on the important state work performed by these officers on the county
level.91 The independence and election of the Constitution’s County Officers
maintains service and accountability only to the electorate in the local county
political subdivision and not to the interests of the local general purpose
collegial governing body that would benefit from exercising undue influence
and political control over these offices to the detriment of the people and to
the detriment of the people’s interest in due process, unfettered even, by the
appearance of influence by those who tax and spend.92
The Constitution’s five County Officers have been imbued with
sovereignty.93 Sovereignty refers to the supreme political authority of an
independent state;94 or, in other words, a state’s “authority and . . . right to
govern itself.”95 In the United States, the fifty individual states have retained
all of their common law sovereign powers, save those that were relinquished
to the federal government.96 In Florida, state officers are imbued with a
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 606 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See id.
See FLA. STAT. § 197.603.

The Legislature finds that the state has a strong interest in ensuring due process and
public confidence in a uniform, fair, efficient, and accountable collection of
property taxes by county tax collectors. Therefore, tax collections shall be
supervised by the Department of Revenue pursuant to [section] 195.002(1). The
Legislature intends that the property tax collection authorized by this chapter under
[section] 9(a), [article] VII of the State Constitution be free from the influence or
the appearance of influence of the local governments that levy property taxes and
receive property tax revenues.

Id.
92.
See id.; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606; John B. Anderson et al., Presidential
Elections—The Right to Vote and Access to the Ballot, 29 NOVA L. REV. 571, 580–81 (2005).
93.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 610–11.
94.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1612 (10th ed. 2014) (“The supreme political
authority of an independent state.”).
95.
Sovereignty Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/sovereignty (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (“[A] country’s independent
authority and the right to govern itself.”).
96.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass’n,
2009) (“[T]he State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they
before had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States.”);
Anderson et al., supra note 92, at 580–81.
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portion of state sovereignty.97 Similarly, the state Constitution’s County
Officers, including the County Tax Collectors, are also imbued with state
sovereignty.98 The Supreme Court of Florida has described the relationship
between the state and its officers as such:
“The term office implies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign
power to, and possession of it by, the person filling the office; a
public office being an agency for the state, and the person whose
duty it is to perform the agency being a public officer. The term
embraces the idea of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties, and
has respect to a permanent public trust to be exercised [on] behalf
of government, and not to a merely transient, occasional, or
incidental employment.
A person, in the service of the
government, who derives his position from a duly and legally
authorized election or appointment, whose duties are continuous in
their nature, and defined by rules prescribed by government, and
not by contract, consisting of the exercise of important public
powers, trusts, or duties, as a part of the regular administration of
the government, the place and the duties remaining, though the
incumbent dies or is changed, . . . is a public officer . . . every
office, in the constitutional meaning of the term, impl[ies] an
authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power, either in
making, executing, or administering the laws.”99

Therefore, the Constitution’s five County Officers have been imbued
with the sovereign authority of the state and, as such, shall carry out their
duties on behalf of the people of the State of Florida, free from local
influence and interference.100
1.

No Charter Regulation of, or Interference with, the Florida
Constitution’s Five Independent County Officers

Because of the sovereign independence of the Constitution’s article
VIII, section 1, subsection (d) County Officers, and the important public
policy reasons for maintaining such independence, the general purpose
collegial local county government—made up of the Board of County
Commissioners—cannot regulate or interfere with a Constitution’s County
97.
State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 22 So. 721, 723 (Fla. 1897).
98.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722. This state
sovereignty is also abolished when the Constitution’s County Office is abolished by a county
charter. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). For a more detailed discussion, see infra Part
II.C.2.
99.
Clyatt, 22 So. at 723 (emphasis added).
100.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722.
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Officer in any way, even in a charter county.101 The Constitution does state
one very limited way in which a county charter can regulate the
Constitution’s County Officers.102 Under the Constitution, article VIII,
section 1, subsection (d), Officers are to be “elected by the electors of each
county;” in other words, this is the default manner in which Constitution
County Officers are chosen.103 Alternatively, the Constitution also states that
“when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of the
electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner
therein specified.”104 This limited exception would allow a charter county—
under its charter or by special act approved by the voters in the county—to
change the manner or method in which the Constitution’s County Officers
are chosen.105 An example is that one or more of these five Constitution
County Officers could be chosen by the majority of the local Board of
County Commissioners.106 However, this exception is limited expressly, in
that, even if a charter county changes the manner in which the Constitution’s
County Officers are chosen, they still remain the Constitution’s County
Officers, with plenary power and sovereign authority, and therefore shall not
be subject to the control of the county government.107
2.
In Order to Have Charter Regulation and Control, the Constitution’s
County Office Must Be Abolished, and Its Duties Transferred to a Charter’s
County Office, Either Charter-Appointed or Charter-Elected
The Constitution also allows a charter county—through its charter,
or through a special act approved by the charter county voters—to abolish
completely one or more of the Constitution’s article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d) County Officers, and transfer the duties of that office to a
charter-created office.108 At that point, the Constitution’s office, which was
101.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Clyatt, 22 So. at 722; 081-7 Fla. Op.
Att’y Gen. 21 (1981) (stating that County Officers retain their status as constitutional County
Officers unless abolished by charter).
102.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
103.
Id.
104.
Id. (emphasis added).
105.
Id.
106.
Id.; see also In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 313 So. 2d 717, 721 (Fla.
1975).
107.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); In re Advisory Op. to Governor, 313 So.
2d at 720–21.
108.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see also In re Advisory Op. to Governor,
313 So. 2d. at 720 (“There shall be elected by the electors of each county, for terms of four
years, a sheriff, a tax collector, [a property appraiser], a supervisor of elections, and a clerk of
the circuit court; except, when provided by county charter or special law approved by vote of
the electors of the county, any county officer may be chosen in another manner therein
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abolished, is no longer the Constitution’s County Office—even though the
new county charter office may use the same name—and therefore no longer
enjoys the same independence and plenary power of a sovereign office to
carry out the important state duties delegated by the Legislature with
insulation from influence of the local government.109 The office is thus
transformed into a non-sovereign charter county office—either elected or
appointed—and is open to complete regulation and control by the county
government.110
It is important to note though, that abolition of one or more of the
Constitution’s five County Offices and the transfer of each office’s duties to
a charter-created office are not by any means mandatory for counties that
possess charters.111 Rather, it is an option that can be exercised.112 This
concept was well explained by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Demings,
when it stated: “In charter counties, the electorate has an option of either
maintaining these independent constitutional offices or abolishing them and
transferring their responsibilities to the board of the charter county or to local
offices created by the charter.”113 Thus, as long as the Constitution’s County
Office is maintained in a charter county and has not been abolished and its
duties transferred—using express language of abolition and transfer—the
county government is without the power to regulate the office, except to the

specified, or any county office may be abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by
general law are transferred to another office.”) (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1(d)).
109.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings v. Orange Cnty. Citizens
Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 606 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
110.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Dade Cnty. v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822,
823–24 (Fla. 1963) (holding that “although it may be bad government,” Dade County had the
power to regulate its charter sheriff under the provisions of its county home rule charter); State
ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So. 2d 312, 316 (Fla. 1961) (stating that charter tax assessor
retained all the same duties as a constitutional tax assessor under the charter, the only
difference was that “his political life and death depend upon the county commissioners”);
Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606. Additionally, section 125.63 of the Florida Statutes also indicates
that before proposing a charter, a charter commission be formed which “shall conduct a
comprehensive study of the operation of county government and of the ways in which the
conduct of county government might be improved or reorganized.” FLA. STAT. § 125.63
(2014). While there is no similar specific requirement for adoption of proposed charter
amendments, this provision does indicate to us that charter governments should only make
changes upon a finding that such changes will actually improve the conduct and operation of
state and county government on the county level. See id.
111.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
112.
See id.
113.
Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606 (emphasis added); see also FLA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 1(d).
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limited extent of dictating the manner in which the Constitution’s County
Officer will be chosen.114
It is helpful to understand the terminology used in this discussion
and related case law. The Constitution is the organic base jurisdictional
authority created by the people.115 Any officer created by it—for example,
Governor, Legislator, or the Tax Collector—is the Constitution’s officer.116
It is a Constitution office, not a charter office.117 If, in a county charter, the
Constitution’s County Office of Tax Collector, Sheriff, Property Appraiser,
Supervisor of Elections, or Clerk of Court is abolished, and its duties
transferred to a charter-elected or charter-appointed office, then the
Constitution’s office is gone and the replacement office is the charter’s
office.118 If the Constitution’s substantive procedural requirements are
followed, then the charter’s office was created constitutionally, but
nonetheless is no longer the Constitution’s County Officer—and thus, no
longer enjoys the independence and plenary power of a state sovereign
officer.119
3.

Charter Counties Have Broader Power to Regulate Its County
Commissioners

Unlike the provisions pertaining to the Constitution’s five County
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), the provisions
pertaining to County Commissioners in article VIII, section 1, subsection (e),
are open to broader regulation through county charters.120 Although the two
provisions both contain the same operative language, “‘[e]xcept when
otherwise provided by county charter,’” the placement of that language is
important.121 In section 1, subsection (d), the operative language appears
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); see also Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
See id.; Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Demings, 15 So. 3d at 606.
Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e).

Commissioners. Except when otherwise provided by county charter, the governing
body of each county shall be a board of county commissioners composed of five or
seven members serving staggered terms of four years. After each decennial census
the board of county commissioners shall divide the county into districts of
contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable. One commissioner
residing in each district shall be elected as provided by law.

FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added).
121.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e); Weinger, supra note 7, at 869 (quoting
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 1(d)–(e)). One author, in a recently published article, argued that there
is no distinction between the levels of regulation by county charters of Constitution County
Officers and County Commissioners because the two Florida constitutional provisions contain
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after the language enumerating the Constitution’s five different County
Officers and their method of election and terms, and before the two specific
alteration provisions, discussed above in subsections (a) and (b).122 In
section 1, subsection (e), the operative language is placed at the beginning of
the entire provision, signaling a broader power to regulate, because any of
the provisions that follow may be altered by a county charter.123 This
wording is in stark contrast to section 1, subsection (d), where the placement
of the operative language indicates that only certain specific and limited
alterations can be made by a county charter.124
III.
A.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF TELLI V. BROWARD COUNTY

County Home Rule

The Supreme Court of Florida in Telli held that charter counties had
the power to term limit—or disqualify—any and all county officers.125 This
holding was founded upon the Court’s finding that its prior decision of City
of Jacksonville v. Cook (Cook I)126, “undermines the ability of counties to
govern themselves as that broad authority has been granted to them by home
rule power through the Florida Constitution.”127
Many court opinions and law review articles repeatedly refer to
counties’ home rule power under the 1968 Constitution as a grant of power,
but it is more properly characterized as an inherent, but limited power.128 In
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County,129 the Fourth District described the
origin of county home rule power.130 First, the court stated that:
[C]harter counties . . . derive their sovereign powers from the state
through [a]rticle VIII, [s]ection 1(g) [which states]: “Counties
operating under county charters shall have all powers of local selfthe exact same language “‘except[] when [otherwise] provided by county charter.’” Weinger,
supra note 7, at 869. However, this argument is incomplete as it failed to analyze placement
of the phrase. See Weinger, supra note 7, at 869–70.
122.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a)–(b), (d).
123.
Id. § 1(e).
124.
Id. § 1(d).
125.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
126.
765 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted,
Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d
86 (Fla. 2002).
127.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 505; Cook I, 765 So. 2d at 293.
128.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g); e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward Cnty.,
431 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
129.
431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
130.
Id. at 609.
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government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law
approved by the vote of the electors. The governing body of a
county operating under a charter may enact county ordinances not
inconsistent with general law.”131

The Court then went on to state that “[t]hrough this provision, the
people of Florida have vested broad home rule powers in charter counties
such as Broward County,” and that the counties possess all the powers of
self-government unless preempted by state general law, and that the power is
also limited by the Florida Constitution.132 The Second District echoed these
limitations on county home rule power in Pinellas County v. City of Largo.133
In one case predating the 1968 Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Florida—in describing the power of the Legislature under the Florida
Constitution—stated that “it should further be borne in mind that our State
Constitution is not a grant of power to the Legislature, but is a limitation
voluntarily imposed by the people themselves upon their inherent lawmaking
power.”134 Prior to the 1968 Constitution, counties only derived home rule
authority as directly granted from the Florida Legislature, and did not have
any independent powers of government.135 As such, the pre-1968 home rule
power is more properly referred to as a grant of home rule power, while the
post-1968 home rule is more properly referred to as an inherent power of
self-governance, limited by the Florida Constitution and general law.136
Therefore, charter counties can exercise all the powers of local selfgovernance, as long as such exercises are not inconsistent with the Florida
Constitution, or general law as passed by the Florida Legislature.137

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g)).
Id.; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g).
964 So. 2d 847, 853–54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 315 (Fla. 1930) (emphasis added).
Wolff, supra note 48, at 860; see also FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, §

27.
136.
Compare FLA. CONST. of 1885, art. III § 27, with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §
1(g). State constitutions themselves are seen as “limitations on the inherent sovereign power
of states created by the people of that state.” Mitchell W. Berger & Candice D. Tobin,
Election 2000: The Law of Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA L. REV. 647, 691 (2002). A
constitutional scheme such as that which exists in Florida, under which there is “‘a direct
constitutional devolution of substantive home rule powers [to a county] dependent only upon
the adoption of a home rule charter,’” is more properly characterized as a limitation upon
inherent power, rather than a grant of power. Williams, supra note 49, at 222.
137.
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504
(Fla. 2012).
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Supreme Court of Florida Decision

Oddly enough, the Supreme Court of Florida based its decision in
Telli on the fact that it agreed with Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II.138
However, Justice Anstead’s statement regarding county home rule power
does not support the Court’s conclusion:
I cannot agree with the majority that the Florida
Constitution prohibits charter counties from enacting term
limits for county officers. To the contrary, the constitution
explicitly grants broad authority to charter counties over
charter officers, and, consistent with that grant, imposes no
restrictions on a county’s authority to regulate those
officers.139

With the exception of calling county home rule power a grant,
Justice Anstead’s statement is correct.140 Charter counties have full authority
to regulate charter officers.141 Several cases have held so.142
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Snipes v. Telli143—the lower
court decision preceding Telli—alluded to this conclusion in its wellreasoned distinction between the Constitution’s County Officers, listed in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and County Commissioners, listed in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (e).144 However, the Supreme Court of
Florida in Telli completely steamrolled this distinction, paying little attention
or granting any lip service at all to the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s
analysis, simply noting that it was unworkable without much more
discussion.145 Accordingly, we must disagree firmly, but respectfully, with
the Supreme Court’s conclusion, as the distinction and holding of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal in Snipes—which is well thought-out and
supported—correctly reflects the status of the Constitution’s County
Officers, as opposed to a local charter’s county officers, namely County

138.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); see
also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 95–96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
139.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95 (Anstead, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
140.
See id.
141.
See Dade Cnty. v. Kelly, 153 So. 2d 822, 823–24 (Fla. 1963).
142.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; Demings v.
Orange Cnty. Citizens Review Bd., 15 So. 3d 604, 611 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
143.
67 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v.
Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012).
144.
Id. at 417–19; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 1(d)–(e).
145.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); see
also Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417–19; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–96.
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Commissioners, and logically aligns the procedural and substantive history
leading up to the Court’s previous decision in Cook II.146
1.

The Telli Decision is in Direct Contradiction to the Provisions of
Article VIII, Section 1, Subsection (d) of the Florida Constitution

As the constitutional provision currently stands, charter counties can
take no action to interfere with any of the Constitution’s County Officers
under article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), except as discussed above that a
county may choose a different manner in which such officers will be
chosen.147 This provision simply means that a charter county may use a
different procedure for choosing the Constitution’s County Officers.148
However, the option exists whereby the electors of the county may—either
by charter or special law—abolish the Constitution’s County Office when all
of the duties are transferred to another charter-created office, the charter’s
office.149 The county could then regulate the charter-created office however
it so pleases, as stated above by Justice Anstead because it is that charter’s
office, and not the Constitution’s Office.150 However, until such time as the
Constitution’s County Office is abolished and all of its duties transferred, a
charter county cannot interfere with the Constitution’s County Office and
therefore, any provisions in the county charter pertaining to the
Constitution’s County Officer would be unenforceable.151
The Cook II and Telli opinions—and their predecessors—analyze
and argue extensively over whether or not article VI, section 4, subsection
(b)152—which establishes that certain offices under the Constitution are term
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417–19.
081-7 Fla. Op. Att’y Gen. 21 (1981); see also discussion supra Part II.C.1.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
Id.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also supra Part

151.
152.

See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b).

III.B.
Section 4. Disqualifications.—
....
(b) No person may appear on the ballot for re-election to
any of the following offices:
(1) Florida representative,
(2) Florida senator,
(3) Florida Lieutenant governor,
(4) any office of the Florida cabinet,
(5) U.S. Representative from Florida, or
(6) U.S. Senator from Florida
if, by the end of the current term of office, the person will
have served—or, but for resignation, would have served—in
that office for eight consecutive years.
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limited—expressly establishes that all other offices within the Constitution
may not be term limited, by virtue of not being included in the article VI,
section 4, subsection (b) list.153 However, article VI, section 4, subsection
(b) is actually a moot point on this issue.154 Even assuming that this
provision did not exist in the Florida Constitution, or assuming that its
adverse implication does not apply to article VIII, section 1, subsection (d)
officers, a term limit provision within a county charter could not be
enforceable against any one of the Constitution’s article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d) County Officers if that office has not been abolished and its
duties transferred to a charter office, simply based on the fact that county
charters cannot regulate or interfere with the Constitution’s County
Officers.155
A contrary holding, such as that established in Telli, completely
undermines the distinction in the Florida Constitution between the
Constitution’s County Officers and a charter-created officer—the charter’s
office—that performs the same duties previously carried out by the
Constitution’s County Officers.156 The holding also completely undermines
and breaks down the status of the Constitution’s County Officers as officers
who perform important state work locally, and, because imbued with
sovereignty, are shielded from undue influence and control of the county,
and only accountable to the electorate.157
Placing term limits on any of the five Constitution County Officers
would be an interference with, and control over the Constitution’s County
Officer, in direct derogation of the Constitution.158 Although the Second
District Court of Appeal in Pinellas County v. Eight is Enough in
Pinellas159—one of the lower court consolidated cases preceding Cook II—
found that the charter term limit at issue in that case would not affect the
status, duties, or responsibilities of the Constitution’s County Officers,160 a
term limit would actually affect the status of the Constitution’s County
Id.
153.
Id.; Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512–513 (Fla 2012) (per
curium); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90, 94–95; Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 416–17 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011),
aff’d per curium, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012); Cook I, 765 So. 2d 289, 290, 293 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook v. City of Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184
(Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002).
154.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b).
155.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); supra Part II.C.2.
156.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13.
157.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13.
158.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512.
159.
775 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted, 786 So. 2d 1188
(Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002).
160.
Id. at 319; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2002).
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Officers, who enjoy sovereign authority and plenary power, separate from
the control of the county governing board.161 Allowing charter counties to
term limit the Constitution’s County Officers, gives the charter county’s
governing board a source of leverage and control over the Constitution’s
County Officers.162 For example, if a charter county’s governing board does
not agree with the actions of an incumbent Tax Collector, the charter
county’s governing board might attempt to pass a term limit provision in the
county’s charter, which would prohibit the incumbent Tax Collector from
being able to run for reelection the following term and remain in office.163
Additionally, the governing board might be able to maintain leverage over
the Constitution’s County Tax Collector by simply threatening to pass a
charter term limit if the Constitution’s County Tax Collector does not take
actions in its favor.164 This kind of interference and control is exactly what
was intended to be avoided by having the Constitution’s County Officers
maintain an independence and sovereignty separate from any possible
influence or control of the local county governing body.165
Furthermore, the holding in Cook II also renders the language in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d) that “‘any county office may be
abolished when all the duties of the office prescribed by general law are
transferred to another office,’” as mere surplusage.166 If counties, under their
charters, had full authority to regulate and control the Constitution’s County
Officers, there would be no need for the language regarding abolition and
transfer.167 Although charter counties have the power to impose term limits
on county officers once they have become the charter’s officers, and no
longer the Constitution’s sovereign County Officers, it is improper to
conclude, as Justice Anstead did, that this procedure can be side-stepped:
I can find no legal justification for concluding that charter counties
should not be allowed to ask their citizens to vote on eligibility
requirements of local elected officials, including term-limits, since
they could abolish the offices completely or decide to select the
officers in any manner of their choosing.168

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 90 (Fla. 2002) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §

1(d)).
167.
168.
art. VIII, § 1(d).
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Allowing charter counties to term limit the Constitution’s County
Officers before their offices have been abolished and transferred to a
charter’s office is an illegal means of achieving a result that would be legal
under different means, and allowing such regulation and control will upset
the balance of power struck by the Constitution.169 In a word, the Telli
decision is alarming in ignoring base provisions of the Florida
Constitution.170
a.

Additional Critiques of Reliance on Justice Anstead’s Dissent in
Cook II

The Supreme Court of Florida in Telli based its holding on its
agreement with Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II.171 Part of Justice
Anstead’s reason for finding that article VI, section 4, subsection (b) did not
prohibit charter counties from implementing term limits on any and all of its
county officers—the Constitution’s County Officers and County
Commissioners—was that the offices in that section for which term limits are
listed expressly are offices of statewide importance.172 As such, he
concluded that the provision should have no bearing whatsoever on local
officers.173 However, this statement fails to acknowledge the distinction
between the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers listed in and
created by article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and that of other local
officers who perform exclusively local duties—namely County
Commissioners—and the fact that the work that the Constitution’s five
County Officers perform is in fact work of statewide importance
implemented and carried out on the county level.174
Additionally, this distinction also undermines Justice Anstead’s
second reason for finding that article VI, section 4, subsection (b) cannot
prohibit the implementation of term limits in charter counties for all county
officers whether it be the Constitution’s County Officers, the charter’s

169.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
170.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504,
513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
171.
See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J.,
dissenting).
172.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b).
173.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b).
174.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 418 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla.
2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012).
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county officers, or County Commissioners.175 Justice Anstead noted that
“there is no wording in article VI, section 4, [subsection] (b)—or anywhere
else in the Florida Constitution or the Florida Statutes—that indicates that the
named officers in article VI, section 4, [subsection] (b) are subject to term
limits to the exclusion of all other government officers, state or local, in the
State of Florida.”176 However, there is also no wording in article VI, section
4, subsection (b) to indicate that the specific disqualifications and election
provisions should apply exclusively to those offices of specific statewide
importance.177 In fact, sections 6 and 7 of article VI contain wording
indicating that the provisions in those sections expressly apply only to
municipal or district elections and statewide elections, respectively.178 This
wording is evidence that the Constitution drafters know how to write
provisions expressly applicable to only certain offices and or elections, and if
they so intended for article VI, section 4, subsection (b) to apply only to
offices of statewide importance as defined by Justice Anstead, they would
have expressly noted that restriction.179
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion in Telli, and its
reliance on Justice Anstead’s dissent in Cook II, fails to acknowledge and
undermines the Constitution’s specific distinction that exists between the
Constitution’s five County Officers listed in article VIII, section 1,
subsection (d), and the County Commissioners listed in article VIII, section
1, subsection (e).180 The Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal made a
175.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b)(1)–(6); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418.
176.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b).
177.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504,
512 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
178.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 6–7.
Section 6. Municipal and district elections.—Registration
and elections in municipalities shall, and in other governmental entities
created by statute may, be provided by law.
Section 7. Campaign spending limits and funding of
campaigns for elective state-wide office.—It is the policy of this state to
provide for state-wide elections in which all qualified candidates may
compete effectively. A method of public financing for campaigns for
state-wide office shall be established by law. Spending limits shall be
established for such campaigns for candidates who use public funds in
their campaigns. The legislature shall provide funding for this
provision. General law implementing this paragraph shall be at least as
protective of effective competition by a candidate who uses public funds
as the general law in effect on January 1, 1998.

Id. (emphasis added).
179.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 96 (Anstead, J., dissenting); see also FLA. CONST.
art. VI, § 4(b)(1)–(6).
180.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e); Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Cook II, 823
So. 2d at 95–96 (Anstead, J., dissenting).
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detailed analysis of these two sets of offices in the lower court decision of
Snipes.181 First, the court noted that the structure of the two sets of offices is
distinctly different under article VIII, section 1 of the Florida Constitution,
specifically with regards to changes to be made by a county charter.182 The
court noted that “[t]he section 1, [subsection] (d) officers are established with
precise language . . . . [The section] establishe[d] that a county government
shall have certain named officers, and grants the county limited powers to
change the manner of electing those officers, or to abolish an office
altogether and transfer its duties to another county office.”183 In contrast,
“the section 1, [subsection] (e) commissioners are described as a default
option when a county charter does not provide otherwise.”184 Section 1,
subsection (d) requires each county to have the five Constitution County
Officers, and is followed by language that authorizes a limited way in which
a county by charter may abolish the Constitution’s County Office and
transfer its duties to a charter-created office, the charter’s office.185
Conversely, section 1, subsection (e) does not require that the composition of
the Board of County Commissioners be set up in the way enumerated in the
Constitution; it is simply a default.186 By beginning section 1, subsection (e)
with the words “‘[e]xcept when otherwise provided by county charter, . . . .’
[t]he language of the Constitution expressly cedes power to a county charter
when it comes to the creation of a county’s collegial governing body.”187
Additionally, the court went on to discuss the practicality of the
Constitution preferring statewide uniformity for section 1, subsection (d)
officers.188 This practicality argument is further bolstered by the fact that the
Constitution’s five County Officers perform important statewide work on the
county level, which is intended to be free of interference or influence of the

181.
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 417–19 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g
granted sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So.
3d 504 (Fla. 2012); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).
182.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
183.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
184.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e).
185.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417.
186.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e); see also Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417.
187.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 417 (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 1(e)).
188.
Id. at 418 (“Persons traveling and doing business between counties should
deal with a common set of section 1, [subsection] (d) county officers, i.e., sheriff, tax
collector, property appraiser, supervisor of elections, clerk of the circuit court, and should not
be forced to navigate byzantine bureaucracies to accomplish similar tasks. Likewise,
legislators seeking to regulate section 1, [subsection] (d) county officers should not be forced
to take a variety of different titles and job descriptions into account in order to achieve a single
legislative objective.”); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
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local county governing board.189 Conversely, the court notes that “these
reasons for statewide uniformity are less applicable to the county’s
[collegial] governing body,” whose duties “need not be kept uniform by the
Constitution, but may rather be fashioned to suit the particular wants and
needs of the voters of the county they serve.”190 The difference in status in
the Florida Constitution between these two groups of officers “reflects the
common sense conclusion that, as a matter of policy, the balance of state and
local interests favors statewide uniformity for the [Constitution’s five County
Officers], and local flexibility for the [governing Board of County
Commissioners].”191
The precise language in article VIII, section 1, subsection (e),
“[e]xcept when otherwise provided by county charter,” represents the shift in
power and authority that resulted from the 1968 Constitution denoting broad
county home rule powers.192 Accordingly, prior to this change, even County
Commissioners were considered constitution officers,193 the election and
qualifications of whom could not be changed.194 However, this consideration
is no longer true under the 1968 Constitution in charter counties that have
established the form of its governing Board of County Commissioners under
its charter, rather than utilizing the fallback option listed in article VIII,
section 1, subsection (e).195 Once a charter county decides to establish and to
regulate its governing board under its charter, the County Commissioners are
local charter county officers, who—as Justice Anstead pointed out in his
dissent in Cook II—the charter county has the power and authority to
regulate.196 It is under this distinction and analysis that the Fourth District
Court of Appeal in Snipes held that the holding of Cook II did not extend to
County Commissioners, and that charter term limits for those offices are
permissible under the Florida Constitution.197

189.
See supra Part II.C.
190.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).
191.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 418; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e).
192.
Compare FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e) (emphasis added), with FLA.
CONST., art. VIII, § 1(e) (amended 1973).
193.
State v. Walton Cnty., 112 So. 630, 632 (Fla. 1927) (“[T]he board of
county commissioners of each county are constitutional officers, and under the terms of the
Constitution their powers and duties shall be fixed and prescribed by the Legislature.”).
194.
See Wilson v. Newell, 223 So. 2d 734, 735 n.2 (Fla. 1969) (quoting FLA.
CONST. of 1885, art. VIII, § 5 (1943)).
195.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (e), (g).
196.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 95–96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting); see
also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e), (g).
197.
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504
(Fla. 2012); see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(c), (e); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95.
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However, the Supreme Court of Florida in its review of the Fourth
District Court of Appeal’s decision failed to even analyze this distinction.198
In its decision, the Court simply recapped the two lower court consolidated
decisions and its previous decision in Cook II, then simply noted that it no
longer agreed with its previous decision, and would recede from it because it
now agreed with Justice Anstead’s dissent.199 Rather than analyzing
specifically why the distinction drawn by the Fourth District Court of Appeal
was erroneous, the Court simply noted that it was unworkable and “would
undermine the ability to predict what offices may be included within the
scope of [Cook II’s] prohibition on term-limits and would result in apparent
inconsistencies between county officials.”200 However, we firmly and
respectfully disagree with the Court’s hasty, careless, unreasoned, and
alarming conclusion about the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding.201
Based on the procedural and substantive history of the previous decisions
involved in the Cook II case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s holding is
clear and logically aligns the past precedent.202
As correctly noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, the
holding of Cook II only expressly applied to the Constitution’s five County
Officers enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d).203 The first
case that Cook II reviewed was Cook I.204 This case was a challenge by the
Clerk of Court for Duval County to a City of Jacksonville charter term limit
provision.205 The second case was Eight is Enough in Pinellas.206 This case
198.
See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 512–13 (Fla. 2012) (per
curiam); Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 419.
199.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 95–96
(Arnstead, J., dissenting).
200.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95; Snipes, 67
So. 3d at 419.
201.
See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 419.
202.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 87–90; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416, 419.
203.
Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Cook II,
823 So. 2d at 94–95.
204.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 87; Snipes, 67 So. 3d at 416; see also Cook I, 765
So. 2d 289, 289 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (per curiam), reh’g granted, Cook v. City of
Jacksonville, 786 So. 2d 1184 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86 (Fla. 2002).
205.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 88; Cook I, 765 So. 2d at 290. The challenge was
to the City of Jacksonville Charter, rather than a county charter because under the Florida
Constitution, the City of Jacksonville currently operates “in the place of any or all county . . .
government[].” FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) n.1; Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 88. This section also
contains a similar provision as article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), regarding abolition of the
Constitution’s County Officers, which states: “No county office shall be abolished or
consolidated with another office without making provision for the performance of all state
duties now or hereafter prescribed by law to be performed by such county officer.” Compare
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6(e) n.1, with FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d). Contrary to the belief of
many—Duval County is not a charter county. See FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 6 n. 1. There is no
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began with a resident of the county seeking declaratory judgment that a
charter provision implementing term limits for the Constitution’s five County
Officers as well as the County Commissioners was invalid.207 The trial court
found the provisions valid and, thereafter, the Constitution’s five County
Officers intervened as plaintiffs.208 The trial court upheld the provision and
the resident, the Constitution County Officers, and the county itself,
appealed.209 The Second District affirmed the trial court.210 “The incumbent
[C]lerk of . . . [C]ourt, [T]ax [C]ollector, and [S]heriff petitioned [the
Supreme Court of Florida] for review, but the [B]oard of [C]ounty
[C]ommissioners did not.”211 The Fourth District in Snipes correctly noted
that the failure of the County Commissioners to petition for review of the
Second District’s decision was significant “because it had the effect of
removing that office from the holding of [Cook II].”212 Interestingly enough,
the Supreme Court of Florida conveniently failed to include this fact in its
opinion in Telli.213
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida in Cook II could not have
been more clear and express about the fact that it was only reviewing the
validity of term limit provisions on the Constitution’s five County Officers
enumerated in article VIII, section 1, subsection (d).214 The Court phrased
the issue in the case as such from the very outset of the opinion.215 Given the
foregoing analysis, we would firmly and respectfully disagree with the
careless and irresponsible conclusion of the Court in Telli, that unworkable
Duval County government. See id. There is no consolidated government, and if and when the
electors of Duval County vote in, or have an election to approve a county charter, the city of
Jacksonville, by operation of law, will no longer act in operation and in place of the county
government. See id.
206.
Pinellas Cnty. v. Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So. 2d 317, 317 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted, 786 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 2001), overruled by Cook II, 823 So. 2d
86 (Fla. 2002).
207.
Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 510 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
208.
Id. at 510–11; Eight is Enough in Pinellas, 775 So. 2d at 318.
209.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 510–11.
210.
Id. at 511.
211.
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted
sub nom. Telli v. Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504
(Fla. 2012).
212.
Id.; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 94–95 (Fla. 2002).
213.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 506–13.
214.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90–91; see also FLA. CONST. art. VIII § 1(d).
215.
Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90.
The issue we address in these consolidated cases is whether a charter
county may in its charter impose a “term limit” provision upon those county officer
positions which are authorized by article VIII, section 1, [subsection] (d), Florida
Constitution, where the charter county through its charter has not abolished those
county officer positions.

Id.
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confusion will result as to which officers the Cook II decision would
apply.216
This is not to say that even under Cook II, charter counties have no
power whatsoever to term limit its officers.217 Charter counties still have the
ability to abolish any of the Constitution’s five County Officers listed in
article VIII, section 1, subsection (d), and transfer the duties to a separate
charter-created office, which it could then term limit in the same manner that
it can term limit its charter governing board and any other charter officers.218
The officers would then be the charter’s non-sovereign county officers, and
no longer the Constitution’s sovereign County Officers.219 This distinction
was also made in Cook II, as the issue posed specifically addressed the
section 1, subsection (d), County Officers, “where the charter county through
its charter has not abolished those county officer positions.”220 The Court in
Cook II held that term limits could only be imposed on constitutional—that
is, not-yet-abolished—County Officers through an amendment to the
Constitution.221
IV.

PATHWAYS TO REVIEW: WHERE CAN WE GO FROM HERE?222

While the pathway for review in attempting to correct the Telli
decision is rather limited and bleak, there are some methods available by
which one could attempt to get the decision revisited and hopefully
overturned by the Supreme Court of Florida.223 It is important to note that a
state’s supreme court is the final and ultimate arbiter on issues of state law.224
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Florida is the final arbiter of the state
constitutional law issues involved in Telli, and the trial courts and district
courts of appeal are bound to follow the Telli decision until such time as it is
overruled by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court.225 However, this
does not mean that one could not argue a case on the same issue back up to
the Supreme Court of Florida, on the premise that the Telli decision was

216.
Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513; see also Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95.
217.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90.
218.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d)–(e), (g); Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 90, 94–95.
219.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d at 94–95.
220.
Id. at 90 (emphasis added).
221.
Id. at 94–95.
222.
This list of pathways to review is by no means all-inclusive.
223.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a); Telli v. Broward
Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
224.
E.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc. v. Nielsen, 116 F.3d 1406,
1413 (11th Cir. 1997).
225.
See Nielson, 116 F.3d at 1413; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
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decided erroneously and in direct derogation of the Florida Constitution.226
There are several different options for getting the issue back to the Supreme
Court of Florida.227
A.

Constitutional Amendment

One option would be for a constitutional amendment to be passed
which would clarify the status of the Constitution’s County Officers, and
make it explicit that no actions could be taken to interfere with—including
placing term limits on—the Constitution’s County Officers, until and unless
their offices have been abolished and duties transferred to a charter-created
office.228 The Florida Constitution sets out several different ways to propose
and pass amendments to the Florida Constitution.229 However, we believe
that a constitutional amendment is unnecessary. The Florida Constitution
does not need to be amended in this situation; its plain language simply
needs to be followed.230 We believe that the limited powers and authority of
charter counties to regulate or control the Constitution’s County Officers is
clear from the plain language of the Florida Constitution as it stands.231
B.

Review of District Court of Appeal Decision

The second option for getting back to the Supreme Court of Florida
would be through review of a district court of appeal decision.232 Under this
option, one would have to bring a case in a Florida circuit court.233 As noted
above, the Florida circuit courts are bound by Supreme Court precedence,
and so any circuit court would be bound to rule that charter term limits for
any or all of the Constitution’s County Officers are constitutionally
permissible based on Telli.234 However, an appeal could then be taken and
heard by a district court of appeal.235 The district court of appeal would also
be bound to follow Telli, and therefore would affirm the trial court’s
226.
See Weinger, supra note 7, at 868–71; see also Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
227.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(1)(A)(ii),
(a)(2)(A)–(B).
228.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d), (g).
229.
FLA. CONST. art. XI.
230.
See FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4(b); FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g).
231.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d).
232.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
Id. § 4(b)(3); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A).
233.
234.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b); Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513
(Fla. 2012) (per curiam).
235.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 4(b)(1) (“District courts of appeal shall have
jurisdiction to hear appeals, that may be taken as a matter of right, from final judgments or
orders of trial courts . . . .”).
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judgment.236 The party could then petition the Supreme Court of Florida for
review; however, the case would fall into the category of cases for which the
Supreme Court of Florida only has discretionary review,237 so there is no
guarantee that the Court would hear the case.238 It could just as easily decide
not to, based on the fact that it has just recently issued the Telli opinion.239
Alternatively, the Supreme Court of Florida would have discretion to
review the case if a district court of appeal certifies a question to be of great
public importance that it has passed upon.240 The Supreme Court of Florida
could also immediately hear a review of the trial court judgment—of which
appeal is pending—if a district court of appeal certifies the case “to be of
great public importance, or to have a great effect on the proper
administration of justice throughout the state, and certified to require
immediate resolution by the [S]upreme [C]ourt.”241
C.

Writ of Quo Warranto

A writ of quo warranto is “used to test the right of a person either to
hold an office . . . or to exercise some right or privilege.”242 Under the
Florida Statutes, a person who claims the right to hold public office may
bring a petition for writ of quo warranto if the Attorney General refuses to
bring the petition.243 The Supreme Court of Florida has jurisdiction to hear
petitions for writs of quo warranto, challenging the right of a person to hold
state office.244 The Supreme Court of Florida has previously held that the
title state officer under this provision “contemplates possession or use[] of a
certain portion of sovereignty for the benefit of the people.”245 Because the
Constitution’s County Officers are sovereign officers, they are also subject to

236.
See id.; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
237.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3). Under this option, the Supreme Court of
Florida could review the District Court’s decision based on the fact that it “expressly
construes a provision of the state or federal constitution, or that expressly affects a class of
constitutional or state officers.” Id. Because of the constitutional issues involved in the case,
conflict between more than one district is not necessary for discretionary Supreme Court
review. See id.
238.
See id.
239.
See Telli, 94 So. 3d at 513.
240.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
241.
Id. § 3(b)(5).
242.
Tracy Raffles Gunn, Original Proceedings in Florida’s Appellate Courts,
32 STETSON L. REV. 347, 354 (2003).
243.
FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2014).
244.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8) (The Supreme Court of Florida “[m]ay issue
writs of mandamus and quo warranto to state officers and state agencies.”).
245.
Ex parte Smith, 118 So. 306, 307 (Fla. 1928).
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a writ of quo warranto from the Supreme Court of Florida.246 Therefore, this
would be a viable method for getting this issue back to the Supreme Court of
Florida directly, but one would have to wait for several things to occur
before bringing such a petition.247
First, a charter county would have to pass a charter term limit
applicable to one or more of the Constitution’s County Officers.248 Second,
an incumbent Constitution County Officer would have to be denied the
ability to run in the next election following the passage of the charter term
limit.249 Third, and related, a new Constitution County Officer would be
elected and would take office.250 At this point, the incumbent Constitution
County Officer—who was denied the ability to run for office again—would
have the right to petition the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of quo
warranto, challenging the newly-elected Constitution County Officer’s right
to hold that office.251 The incumbent Constitution County Officer would
have a claim to that office because had the charter term limit provision not
been enacted—in derogation of the Florida Constitution—he or she would
have been able to run again, and possibly would have been reelected.252
However, the Supreme Court of Florida’s jurisdiction for hearing a petition
for a writ of quo warranto is discretionary as well, so again, there is no
guarantee that the Court would hear the petition.253
Similarly, because a writ of quo warranto can also be used to
challenge an exercise of authority derived from a public office,254 the writ
could also possibly be used to challenge the authority of a charter review
committee to consider and propose charter term limits for the Constitution’s
County Officers.255 However, the jurisdiction for this particular writ would
fall in the circuit court,256 the decision of which would then have to be
appealed up to a Florida district court of appeal—just like any other case—
and would not be guaranteed review by the Supreme Court of Florida.257

246.
247.
248.

See id.
See id.
See, e.g., Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 505–06 (Fla. 2012) (per

curiam).
249.
Id. at 506.
250.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(d); Telli, 74 So. 3d at 506.
251.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8); FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (2014); see also Ex
parte Smith, 118 So. at 307.
252.
See Cook II, 823 So. 2d 86, 96 (Fla. 2002) (Anstead, J., dissenting).
253.
FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8).
254.
See Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1338–39 (Fla. 1989).
255.
See Weinger, supra note 7, at 868.
256.
See FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(c)(3).
257.
See FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 3(b)(3), 4(b)(3); supra Parts II–IV.
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CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal’s decision and reasoning in Snipes should have been affirmed in
Telli.258 Under the Florida Constitution, charter counties have broad
authority to regulate their County Commissioners fully, and therefore, the
authority exists to set term limits for them within the county charter.259
Conversely, there is only very limited and specific authority for counties to
regulate the Constitution’s five County Officers under their charters.260 That
is, specifically, a county may only establish a different manner in which
these officers shall be chosen under the county charter; and as long as a
charter county has not abolished the Constitution’s County Office and
transferred its duties to a charter-created office—the charter’s office—it
remains the Constitution’s County Officer’s, and charter counties possess no
more power than non-charter counties to regulate them.261 This point of law
means that charter counties possess no more power than non-charter counties
to set term limits for the Constitution’s five County Officers.262
The Supreme Court of Florida’s decision in Telli failed to take into
account the status of the Constitution’s five County Officers, completely
abridging the distinction drawn by the Constitution between a Constitution’s
County Officer and a charter’s county officer, and therefore, illegally and
without authority or jurisdiction, has effectuated an amendment to the
Florida Constitution, which it does not possess the power to effectuate.263
Only the people of Florida can effectuate an amendment to the Florida
Constitution through an amendment election vote.264 The Telli opinion
unconstitutionally abridges the rights of both incumbent holders of the
Constitution’s County Offices and of the voters who may wish to vote for
those incumbent Constitution County Officers.265 For this reason, the
opinion is untenable, disconcerting, not judicially cognizant, devoid of
constitutional integrity, and, if enforced, precipitates needlessly an
258.
See Telli v. Broward Cnty., 94 So. 3d 504, 513 (Fla. 2012) (per curiam);
Snipes v. Telli, 67 So. 3d 415, 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), reh’g granted sub nom. Telli v.
Broward Cnty., 74 So. 3d 1084 (Fla. 2011), aff’d per curiam, 94 So. 3d 504 (Fla. 2012);
Weinger, supra note 7, at 860, 870.
259.
See FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(e), (g).
260.
Id. § 1(g).
261.
See id. § 1(e)–(g).
262.
See id. § 1(f)–(g).
263.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Weinger, supra
note 7, at 869–70.
264.
FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 5(b), (e).
265.
See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; Telli, 94 So. 3d at 512–13; Weinger, supra
note 7, at 868–70.
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unnervingly serious constitutional problem, which must be solved.266 There
is a dire need for the issue to make its way back to the Supreme Court of
Florida for reconsideration of the constitutional implications of the Telli
decision. If not revisited, there will soon be officers elected and sworn into
sovereign state office in derogation of the Florida Constitution. If the issue
does in fact make its way back to the discretionary jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court of Florida, one would hope that the Court would exercise its
discretion in favor of hearing the issue, if only to correct the dire
constitutional issues placed before it; and then, also to correct a careless and
unsupported opinion that is entirely inconsistent with the Court’s well-earned
respect as one of the best state supreme courts in the United States of
America.

266.
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INTRODUCTION

The Florida Legislature enacted a statute providing counsel to children
in certain categories in dependency cases, and also passed a statute removing
the nexus requirement to prove grounds for termination of parental rights.1
Both laws are a substantial departure from prior practice and contain serious
flaws, which are discussed in this survey.2 The Supreme Court of Florida ruled
on one case during the past year, interpreting Florida’s speedy trial rule in
juvenile delinquency cases.3 Intermediate appellate courts remained active both
in the delinquency area and in the dependency field.4 This survey reviews and
analyzes the new laws and the significant reported opinions in these areas.5

*
Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center.
This survey covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2013 through June 30, 2014.
The author thanks Law Review Subscriptions Editor, Richard Nelson, for his help in the
preparation of this survey.
1.
FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01305, .806(1)(f), (h) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f), (h)
(2013).
2.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01305, .806(1)(f), (h) (2014); FLA. STAT. § 39.806
(2013); infra Part VII.
3.
State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
4.
E.g., Weiand v. State, 129 So. 3d 434, 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
5.
See infra Parts I–V.
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DEPENDENCY

Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes and the Florida Juvenile Rules of
Civil Procedure provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard at multiple
points in the dependency proceeding, including sections of chapter 39 that
provide that, unless parental rights have been terminated, parents must be
notified of all proceedings and hearings involving the child.6 Despite the clear
language of chapter 39 and the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Second District
Court of Appeal was obligated to reverse in In re J.B. v. Department of
Children & Family Services7 because the trial court failed to give the parents
adequate notice and an opportunity to prepare for a permanency hearing.8 The
appeal involved a dependency proceeding in which the parents did not comply
with the case plan, and a scheduled judicial review was set.9 Before the hearing,
the Department, according to the appellate court, “apparently abandoned the
goal of reunification and decided to seek a permanent guardianship.”10 Because
the hearing was noticed as a judicial review and not a permanency hearing, the
parents knew nothing about the change in plans.11 In fact, “[f]orty-three pages
into the transcript—[according to the appellate court]—the Department first
explained that it actually wanted an order at the conclusion of [the] hearing
establishing a permanent guardianship and a termination of supervision.”12
Over the objections of the child’s father’s attorney, the trial court proceeded
with the matter, apparently not seeming to understand the impact of its ruling.13
The appellate court reversed.14
In dependency proceedings in Florida, by statute, the parties are: The
parents, the Department of Children and Families, the Guardian Ad Litem
(“GAL”) Program or a representative of the GAL Program if appointed, the
child, and the petitioner, whether the Department or someone else.15 Chapter 39
6.
FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1) (2014); FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.045(h); FLA. R. JUV. P.
8.225(f)(1) (providing notice). When these rules do not require specific notice, all parties will be
given reasonable notice of any hearings. FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1).
7.
130 So. 3d 753 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
8.
In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 754, 757; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.502(1); FLA. R.
JUV. P. 8.225(f)(1).
9.
In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 754.
10.
Id.
11.
Id. at 754–55.
12.
Id. at 755.
13.
Id. at 755–56.
14.
In re J.B., 130 So. 3d at 757.
15.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2014). For a discussion of the roles of the parties in
Florida see Michael J. Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, Providing Attorneys for Children in
Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings in Florida: The Issue Updated, 35
NOVA L. REV. 305, 323–32 (2011).
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also recognizes that in child welfare proceedings in Florida, a participant may
also be involved in the case.16 A participant is defined as a non-party who
receives notice of hearing and “includ[es] the actual custodian of the child, the
foster parents, . . . the legal custodian of the child, identified prospective
parents, and any other person whose participation may be in the best interest of
the child.”17 A mother of five children in D.C. v. J.M.18 filed a writ of certiorari
in the appellate court to quash a pre-trial order on the foster parent’s motion to
intervene.19 The trial court’s order provided that, in addition to the other
parties, the foster parent’s attorney would have the right to unfettered review of
all court files in the case.20 The mother, the GAL Program, and the attorney ad
litem for one of the half siblings all objected and joined in the writ.21 They
claimed an invasion of privacy rights by the third party foster parent.22
Recognizing that chapter 39 does not allow foster parents to receive every
record in a confidential dependency case and that the order departed from an
essential constitutional requirement, the appellate court granted the writ and
quashed the trial court order.23
In any dependency proceeding, of course, the petitioner must prove the
allegations contained in the petition by a preponderance of the evidence.24 In
H.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services,25 a father appealed from an
order adjudicating the children dependent based upon a finding of abuse, in that
there were bruises on one of his children’s left side as well as a purple loop
mark.26 The case arose when the children’s mother, who was separated from the
father, noticed the mark after the children returned from the father’s care.27
“The [court’s] expert, . . . a nurse practitioner with the University of Miami’s
Child Protection [Unit],28 testified that,” in her opinion, the “injury
‘represent[ed] child physical abuse.’”29 The problem was that there was no

16.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50).
17.
Id.
18.
133 So. 3d 1080 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
19.
Id. at 1081.
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.
Id.
23.
FLA. STAT. § 39.0132(3) (2014); D.C., 133 So. 3d at 1081–82.
24.
FLA. STAT. § 39.507(1)(b).
25.
141 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
26.
Id. at 243.
27.
Id. at 244.
28.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.303(1)(e). The Child Protection Units are
operated by the State’s Health Department to medically evaluate possible child abuse and neglect.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.303(1).
29.
H.C., 141 So. 3d at 244.
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evidence of who did it.30 As the appellate court explained, “the record is
completely devoid of any evidence that the [f]ather caused [the child’s]
injuries.”31 Thus, the court of appeals found that the petitioner, “the
Department, failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
[f]ather” probably was the person who inflicted the injuries, and, on that basis, it
reversed.32
An issue which regularly arises in the dependency context in Florida is
whether the neglect or abuse of one child is sufficient, in and of itself, to prove
that a parent’s other children are also dependent.33 The case law, going back
twenty years, requires that there must be a nexus between the injuries to one
child, or other neglect of that child, and proof that the other children are
dependent.34 This was the issue in W.R. v. Department of Children &
Families,35 a case in which “[a] father appeal[ed] [from] an order [declaring] his
. . . children dependent.”36 The appellate court affirmed as to one child, but
reversed as to the other.37 The finding by the trial court as to the second child
was based upon “one incident where the father struck the child,” but there was
no evidence of harm.38 There was not even a bruise.39 Relying on the body of
prior case law, the appellate court explained that, “[t]he trial court failed to
make any finding [with] regard[] to the risk of imminent abuse,” and failed to
show there was “a nexus between the parent’s abuse of the one child and the
risk of abuse of [the other] child.”40 Significantly, the Florida Legislature
statutorily removed the nexus requirement during the 2014 Legislative
Session.41 Whether the removal is constitutional is described in Part VII,
Legislative Changes.42

30.
Id. at 245.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
E.g., R.F. v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families (In re M.F.), 770 So. 2d 1189,
1193 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
34.
Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.
1991); W.R. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 137 So. 3d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2014); C.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re S.M.), 997 So. 2d 513, 515 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2008).
35.
137 So. 3d 1078 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
36.
Id. at 1079.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
W.R., 137 So. 3d at 1079–80.
41.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f) (2014), with FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f)
(2013).
42.
See infra Part VII.
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As noted earlier, foster parents can be participants in dependency
proceedings.43 As the recipients of children who are in the state-operated foster
care system, foster parents are required to comply with licensing regulations.44
In Sanders v. Department of Children & Families,45 foster parents appealed
from a decision of the Department of Children and Families revoking their
foster care license on the basis of a hearing officer’s recommendation.46 The
case arose from the foster parents’ employment of corporal punishment on a
foster child in their house.47 Admitting that they struck the child, causing a
bruise visible several days later, the foster parents on appeal claimed that the
action of the Department interfered with their religious curriculum or teachings
in violation of Florida law.48 The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
Department.49 It held that Florida law does not deprive “the Department of the
authority to prohibit corporal punishment,” and that appellants’ claim of
invasion of their religious rights must fail because they should not have entered
into the contract if they believed that the contract violated their constitutional
rights.50
During the course of a dependency proceeding, often after adjudication
and the disposition, a parent may make a motion for reunification.51 When the
parent does so, the court shall hold a hearing in which the “parent [is obligated
to] demonstrate that the safety, [welfare], and physical, mental, and emotional
health of the [parent’s] child” will not suffer from endangerment by the
change.52 In a rather simple case on appeal, A.M. v. Department of Children &
Families,53 a mother appealed from a trial court’s denial of a motion for
reunification.54 Apparently, there was no evidence in the record that the mother,
through counsel, actually moved for reunification.55 Nor was there an order

43.

FLA. STAT. § 39.01(50) (2014); see also supra notes 15–17 and accompanying

text.
44.
Sanders v. Dep’t Children & Families, 118 So. 3d 899, 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2013); see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b).
45.
118 So. 3d 899 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
46.
Id. at 900.
47.
Id.
48.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b).
49.
Sanders, 118 So. 3d at 901; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b).
50.
Sanders, 118 So. 3d at 901; see also FLA. STAT. § 409.175(1)(b).
51.
FLA. STAT. § 39.621(9).
52.
Id.
53.
118 So. 3d 998 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
54.
Id. at 998.
55.
Id.
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deciding the motion for reunification in the record.56 For these simple reasons,
the appellate court upheld the decision below.57
III.

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

The issue of the failure of parents to appear at termination of parental
rights proceedings has come up in appellate court on numerous occasions in
Florida.58 Under Florida law, it is possible for a court to enter a consent to the
termination of parental rights.59 However, while the Florida statute governing
the failure to appear may be grounds for termination of parental rights,60 the
question remains as to the circumstances underlying the failure to appear,
including the possibility that the parent appeared on one of several days in the
proceeding.61 In C.S. v. Department of Children & Families,62 the mother and
father appealed from a judgment terminating their parental rights on the basis of
the entry of a consent when they failed to appear.63 The appellate court
affirmed, finding that the court did not rule solely on the basis of the failure to
appear, but also on the facts of the case.64 The appellate court also noted that
“[t]he trial court found the mother’s excuse for [not appearing] not to be
credible.”65 However, there was a very strong dissent by Judge Warner.66
Apparently, “the parents appeared on the first two days of the adjudicatory
hearing and failed to appear on the third day, [which was] scheduled three
months later.”67 Relying on case law holding that a consent should not be
entered where a parent does not appear at part of the hearing, Judge Warner
would have granted the appeal on that ground.68

56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 998–99.
58.
See J.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 9 So. 3d 34, 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2009); Michael J. Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, 38 NOVA L. REV. 81, 86–87 (2013)
[hereinafter Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law,
37 NOVA L. REV. 333, 342–46 (2013) [hereinafter Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law].
59.
FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2014); see also J.M., 9 So. 3d at 36.
60.
FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d).
61.
See Nickerson v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 718 So. 2d 373, 373–74 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
62.
124 So. 3d 978 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied,
135 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2014).
63.
Id. at 979.
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 980.
66.
Id. (Warner, J., dissenting).
67.
C.S., 124 So. 3d at 980 (Warner, J., dissenting).
68.
Id.
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Florida provides for termination of parental rights on numerous
grounds—abuse, neglect, and abandonment.69 Abandonment, as defined in the
Florida Statutes, is a situation where the parent “has made no significant
contribution to the child’s care and maintenance.”70 It includes a lack of
frequent contact with the child where marginal efforts or token visits are not
enough.71 In S.L. v. Department of Children and Families,72 a mother appealed
from an adjudication terminating her parental rights on grounds of continuing
abuse, neglect, or abandonment.73 The appellate court affirmed in part and
reversed in part, finding that the trial court erred in basing the termination on
abandonment.74 Looking at the facts, the appellate court held that the mother
had at least twenty-six visits over a one-year period with her children, and that
record contained “testimony indicat[ing] there may have been other visits . . .
not memorialized in . . . Department records.”75 There was also evidence of
telephone communications and provision of clothing, shoes, snacks, food, and
other gifts.76 In a second case, J.E. v. Department of Children and Families,77
the appellate court affirmed a finding of abandonment by the father by clear and
convincing evidence.78 The court found that he failed to demonstrate financial
ability to support the children or the capacity to do so, having last paid support
three months prior to the trial.79 In addition, his visitation was infrequent and
irregular, causing the child not to see her father as a parent.80 Finally, the court
affirmed because the parent failed to substantially comply with the case plan, a
separate ground for termination of parental rights.81 The problem with the
Florida Statute, as evidenced by the two cases described above, is that the
language in the law is imprecise, containing no timeframes or other specific
elements in the test of abandonment.82
Termination of parental rights in Florida, as in other jurisdictions,
requires first, a finding by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for

69.
FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1) (2014).
70.
Id. § 39.01(1).
71.
Id.
72.
120 So. 3d 75 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
73.
Id. at 76.
74.
Id. at 77.
75.
Id.
76.
Id.
77.
126 So. 3d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
78.
Id. at 428.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id. at 430; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e)(1) (2014).
82.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(e); S.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 120 So.
3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam); J.E., 126 So. 3d at 428.
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termination exist83 and second, that termination is in the manifest best interests
of the child.84 Third, in Florida, termination must be the least restrictive
alternative.85 In the case K.D. v. Department of Children & Family Services (In
re Z.C. II),86 parents appealed a final judgment terminating parental rights to
twin sons.87 The case had previously been on appeal.88 In the first decision, the
appellate court held that since the trial court elected not to terminate parental
rights, it could not immediately place the children in a permanent
guardianship.89 Thus, the case went back to the trial court on questions of the
least alternative means and manifest best interest.90 What brought the case back
to the appellate court was the question of whether the trial court was obligated
to consider new circumstances in determining whether termination was in the
best interest of the children.91 Reviewing the facts of the case, the appellate
court reversed and remanded again, finding that it could not say for certain that
the trial court would not have decided that the circumstances warranted an
adjudication of dependency instead of termination of parental rights as a matter
of best interests of the child.92
Finally, in A.J. v. Department of Children & Families,93 the appellate
court reversed as to the failure of the trial court to make proper findings as to
the grounds for termination of parental rights.94 Specifically, the appellate court
found that there was no substantial evidence of significant harm to the sons, and
was further “troubled by the court’s finding[] that the parents could not provide
the children with necessities, [as] [t]here was no testimony establishing the
parents’ financial situation and . . . no evidence that [they] could not . . . provide
for their children.”95 In fact, the trial court denied the mother’s attorney the
right to shed light on another issue—the children’s referral to therapy by their
mother—on grounds that the question was irrelevant.96 The trial court further
83.
FLA. STAT. § 39.809(1); see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D)(f) (2014).
84.
FLA. STAT. § 39.810; see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/1(1)(D)(m-1).
85.
Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla.
1991); K.D. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. (In re Z.C. II), 132 So. 3d 877, 879 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.6012(3)(d).
86.
132 So. 3d 877 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
87.
Id. at 878.
88.
Dep’t of Children & Family Servs. v. K.D. (In re Z.C. I), 88 So. 3d 977, 979
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (en banc).
89.
Id. at 988–89.
90.
Id. at 989.
91.
In re Z.C. II, 132 So. 3d at 879.
92.
Id. at 879–80.
93.
126 So. 3d 1212 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam). This was a 2012
case that was reported in 2013.
94.
Id. at 1215.
95.
Id.
96.
Id. at 1214.
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compounded its errors by relying on “hearsay accounts regarding one of the
young[] boys and one of the father’s daughters acting out sexually.”97
IV.

STATUS OFFENSES—CHILDREN IN NEED OF SERVICES

Chapter 984, entitled “Children and Families in Need of Services,”
deals with status offenders.98 A “child in need of services” concerns children
who have committed an act, which if committed by an adult would not be a
crime.99 Under Florida law, this includes children who persistently run away,
are “habitually truant from school,” and who “persistently disobey[] the
reasonable and lawful demands of [their] parents.”100 This statute begins with
the following statement of purpose:
To provide judicial and other procedures to assure due
process through which children and other interested parties are
assured fair hearings by a respectful and respected court or other
tribunal[s] and the recognition, protection, and enforcement of their
constitutional and other legal rights, while ensuring that public safety
interests and the authority and dignity of the courts are adequately
protected.101

It appears clear from the Second District Court of Appeal ruling in
Moyers v. State102 that the trial court failed to comply with the enabling
language of the statute.103 In that case, a father “appeal[ed] two orders finding
him in indirect criminal contempt for failing to comply with truancy orders” that
obligated him to ensure that his daughter attended school.104 According to the
appellate court, there was no evidence presented at the first of two hearings
regarding an order to show cause, and that the evidence presented at the second
hearing showed only that the father’s daughter had been absent or departed from
school on several days.105 In fact, according to the appellate court, what the
evidence did show was that the child’s medical condition caused her not to
attend school for several days.106 There was no evidence of the father’s willful

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/5

Id.
See FLA. STAT. § 984.01 (2014).
See id. § 984.03(9).
Id. § 984.03(9)(a)–(c).
Id. § 984.01(1)(a).
127 So. 3d 827 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 828; see also FLA. STAT. § 984.01(1)(a).
Moyers, 127 So. 3d at 827–28.
Id. at 828.
Id.
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failure to assure the child’s attendance.107 Rather, according to the appellate
court, “[t]he truancy . . . judge improperly acted as the judge and the prosecutor,
and the evidence was insufficient to establish Mr. Moyers’ willful
noncompliance with the truancy court’s order[].”108 Seeing “the truancy judge’s
improper role in the proceedings as prosecut[or], and because” there was no
evidence to support the finding, the appellate court reversed.109 In so doing, it
recognized that it had previously ruled in exactly the same fashion in a prior
case involving the same trial judge.110
An important question of the proximity of the status offense to a
delinquency offense arose recently in M.J. v. State.111 In that case, a juvenile
appealed from an adjudication of delinquency.112 The claim was that the trial
court had denied the juvenile’s “motion to suppress his confession . . . from
what [was] claim[ed] [to be] an illegal detention for loitering and prowling.”113
Under the facts of the case, the court determined that the motion should have
been suppressed because the reasonable stop of the juvenile by the police was
for truancy, and thus, there was no “probable cause to arrest the juvenile for
loitering and prowling.”114 According to the appellate court, during mid-day
hours, a deputy sheriff noticed a juvenile “in front of a house in a high crime
area.”115 The officer knew from prior dealings that the juvenile should have
been in school.116 When the officer made a U-turn in his vehicle, the juvenile
ran away, and the officer subsequently found the juvenile “lying along the
concrete wall inside the porch” of the house.117 The officer then read the
juvenile his Miranda rights and subsequently the juvenile confessed to a
burglary.118 The appeals court found that the police officer saw the juvenile and
“suspected him of being a truant, not . . . committing a crime.”119 Thus, there
was no probable cause for the arrest for loitering and prowling.120

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Moyers, 127 So. 3d at 828.
Id. (referencing Sockwell v. State, 123 So. 3d 585, 592 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.

2012)).
111.
121 So. 3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review denied, 133 So.
3d 528 (Fla. 2014).
112.
Id. at 1153.
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
Id.
116.
M.J., 121 So. 3d at 1153.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 1155.
120.
Id.
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JUVENILE DELINQUENCY

The issue before the Supreme Court of Florida during this survey year
was the question of proper interpretation of the speedy trial rule in delinquency
cases.121 The specific issue in State v. S.A.122 was how to compute what is
referred to as the speedy trial rule’s recapture window.123 The issue arose from
a conflict in two of the district courts of appeal.124 In S.A., the appellate issue
arose when the juvenile “filed a notice of expiration of speedy trial and a motion
seeking discharge under the speedy trial rule.”125 The motion required
application of the trial rule’s recapture window found in the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure.126 The recapture rule says that “[n]o later than [five] days
from the date of the filing of [the] motion for discharge, the court [is obligated
to] hold a hearing on the motion.”127 Then, “unless the court finds that one of
the reasons set forth in subdivision (d) [of the rule] exists . . . the respondent
[must] be brought to trial within [ten] days” and if not, and “through no fault of
the respondent, the respondent [is] . . . discharged.”128 The specific technical
question was whether the rule provides for one fifteen-day time period based
upon the five- and ten-day provisions, or whether the calculation of the
recapture window is based upon two separate, but interrelated time periods of
five and ten days.129 Analyzing the legislative history—and over a dissent and
two concurrences—the plurality ruling was “that the recapture window is
comprised of two separate time periods.”130
The Supreme Court of the United States’ rulings in Miller v. Alabama131
and Graham v. Florida132 have generated a growing body of interpretive case
law in Florida and in other jurisdictions.133 In Mason v. State,134 the specific
question the appellate court dealt with was if the application of Miller, which
121.
See State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
122.
133 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
123.
Id. at 507.
124.
Id.; see also State v. S.A., 96 So. 3d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2012), reh’g granted, 2013 Fla. Lexis 881 (Fla. 2013), quashed, 133 So. 3d 506 (Fla. 2014); State
v. McFarland, 747 So. 2d 481, 483 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
125.
S.A., 133 So. 3d at 507.
126.
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3); S.A., 133 So. 3d at 507–08.
127.
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3); S.A., 133 So. 3d at 508.
128.
FLA. R. JUV. P. 8.090(m)(3).
129.
S.A., 133 So. 3d at 509.
130.
Id.
131.
No. 10-9646, slip op. (U.S. June 25, 2012).
132.
560 U.S. 48 (2010).
133.
See Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2; Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; 1 MICHAEL J.
DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT ¶ 5.03(13)(e)(iii) (2014).
134.
134 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/5

56

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

48

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

had held that a sentencing law “requir[ing] a mandatory sentence of life in
prison without . . . parole for a juvenile, [was violative of] the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”135 In the
Mason case, the juvenile “negotiated [a] plea to second-degree murder . . . and
received life in prison with a fifteen-year mandatory minimum as a [violent
habitual] felony offender.”136 Because the statute under which the juvenile was
punished did not contain a requirement of mandatory life in prison without
parole, Miller did not apply, according to the appellate court.137 Although the
court employed discretion at the trial level to impose a higher sentence than it
could have, nothing indicated that the court did not take Mason’s youth into
account when determining the sentence.138 The appellate court thus affirmed.139
In Weiand v. State,140 the juvenile appealed an order denying his motion
for post-conviction relief.141 Based upon the defendant’s pro se appeal, the
intermediate appellate court held that the sentence of life in prison without
parole on kidnapping and robbery convictions was illegal under Graham v.
State.142 Applying Graham, the appellate court held that “the Supreme Court
[of the United States] created a bright-line rule . . . that a defendant . . . under
eighteen, when” he or she commits a “non-homicide offense [could not] be
sentenced to life without parole.”143
Lack of probable cause for an arrest of a juvenile for loitering,
described in the M.J. case above, has arisen on several occasions in the
appellate courts.144 Thus, in C.C. v. State,145 a juvenile “was adjudicated
delinquent on charge[s] of loitering and prowling,” appealed the adjudication,
and the appellate court reversed, finding there was a failure to establish a
completed offense of loitering and prowling.146 The case arose when police
officers in the City of Hollywood at about ten o’clock in the morning noticed a
135.
Id. at 500; see also Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2; DALE ET AL., supra note
133, at ¶ 5.03(13)(e)(iii).
136.
See Mason, 134 So. 3d at 500.
137.
Id.; see also Miller, No. 10-9646, slip op. at 2.
138.
See Mason, 134 So. 3d at 501.
139.
Id.
140.
129 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
141.
Id. at 434.
142.
Id. at 435; see also Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
143.
Weiand, 129 So. 3d at 435 (emphasis added); see also Graham, 560 U.S. at
82.
144.
See C.C. v. State, 137 So. 3d 466, 467 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, No. SC14-960, 2014 WL 4291798 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2014); M.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 1151,
1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2014); supra text
accompanying notes 111–20.
145.
137 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, No. SC14-960, 2014
WL 4291798 (Fla. Aug. 29, 2014).
146.
Id. at 467.
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juvenile who the officers believed should have been in school.147 “When the
officers stopped their patrol car [the respondent] and two other[s] . . . dropped
their backpacks in a bush and [tried to hide] behind a truck.”148 The officers
arrested the respondent, searched his backpack, and found a four-way lug
wrench and other tools.149 At trial, respondent moved to dismiss, which was
denied, and the defense then rested.150 The appellate court held “that the items
found . . . after [the] arrest should not have been admitted [as evidence] or
considered by the trial court because the offense of loitering and prowling [was
not] completed.”151 In fact, the appellate court held that, under the law, it must
be found that the respondent was loitering and prowling at a place and in a
manner not usual for law-abiding citizens, that loitering was under
circumstances that warranted alarm or concern for the safety of others, and that
these elements were completed prior to the arrest.152 Significantly, the appellate
court held that it was unable to distinguish the C.C. case from M.J.153
Recognizing the nearly identical facts, the court held that the State had failed to
prove that the elements of the offense occurred in the officers’ presence.154 It
thus reversed.155
In a third similar case, G.T. v. State,156 the juvenile appealed from a
conviction “for resisting an officer without violence when she refused to
[provide] the arresting officer [with] her name and personal information after
[she was] detained [on] suspicion of underage drinking and disorderly
intoxication.”157 In order to detain someone, the “officer must have reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity by” that individual.158 In this case, the State was
unable to demonstrate the facts that connected the child to an empty liquor
bottle or to show that the police officer “had more than an inchoate hunch that
this group of juveniles was the one [that] he had been dispatched to
investigate.”159 The only information that the officer had was that the juveniles
appeared to have “red [and] glossy eyes and slurred speech, [suggesting] to the
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
C.C., 137 So. 3d at 467.
151.
Id.
152.
Id. at 468–69 (quoting E.F. v. State, 110 So. 3d 101, 104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App.), review denied, 121 So. 3d 1038 (Fla. 2013)).
153.
Id. at 468; see also M.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 1151, 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2013), review denied, 133 So. 3d 528 (Fla. 2014).
154.
C.C., 137 So. 3d at 469.
155.
Id. at 469–70.
156.
120 So. 3d 141 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
157.
Id. at 142.
158.
Id. at 143.
159.
Id.
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officer that they were intoxicated.”160 However, the officer observed this after
he detained the juvenile.161 The court thus reversed.162
The fourth lack of reasonable suspicion case is A.R. v. State.163 In this
case, the act of delinquency alleged was resisting an officer without violence.164
“Boynton Beach police were ‘investigating a . . . crime that [may have] taken
place’ in a public park.”165 When officers arrived, the appellant turned away
and started to run.166 The officer yelled at the individual to stop a number of
times, and the youth ultimately gave up and surrendered.167 The juvenile’s
argument on appeal was that the police investigation of the crime could not be
the basis to legally detain a person where there was no reasonable suspicion of
probable cause as to that individual.168 Running away—the court held based on
prior case law—“is not sufficient to establish [a] reasonable suspicion where
there is no evidence to demonstrate that the flight took place in a high crime
area.”169 Further, there was no showing that the flight obstructed the officers in
the lawful execution of their duties.170 The court thus reversed.171
Issues of detention, ranging from home detention through secure
detention, appear regularly in the appellate case law.172 The issue in H.D. v.
Shore173 was whether a child could be held in secure detention based upon a
prior arrest for burglary of a dwelling and grand theft offenses, which by
themselves did not score sufficiently on Florida’s Risk Assessment Instrument
(“RAI”) for secure detention, but when the juvenile failed to go to school, the
father reported the violation and the court then ordered secure detention.174 The
appellate court ruled that Florida’s juvenile detention statute does not provide a
court with the authority to order secure detention solely on the basis of a
violation of a pre-adjudication home detention.175 The appellate court then
explained that the remedy for such a violation was indirect contempt.176
160.
Id.
161.
G.T., 120 So. 3d at 143.
162.
Id. at 143–44.
163.
127 So. 3d 650, 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
164.
Id.
165.
Id.
166.
Id.
167.
Id. at 652–53.
168.
A.R., 127 So. 3d at 653.
169.
Id. at 654.
170.
Id.
171.
Id. at 655.
172.
Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 93; see, e.g., H.D. v.
Shore, 134 So. 3d 1062, 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
173.
134 So. 3d 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
174.
Id. at 1062–63.
175.
Id. at 1063; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.255 (2014).
176.
H.D., 134 So. 3d at 1063.
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Therefore, the appellate court held that as the child did not score enough points
under Florida’s RAI for secure detention, and there were no findings to depart
from the RAI, secure detention was improper.177 The court thus granted the writ
of habeas corpus.178 It should be noted that the court in H.D. disagreed with the
court in K.T.E. v. Lofthiem,179 that section 985.265(1) of the Florida Statutes
“provides an independent basis for ordering secure detention” under the facts in
the H.D. case.180
Evidentiary issues are not usually part of this juvenile survey as they
are generic to any variety of litigation settings.181 However, a recent Fourth
District Court of Appeal case, T.D.W. v. State182 is worthy of discussion as it
deals with best evidence.183 The issue before the court was “whether [the]
appellant was [properly] identified as one of the three boys who burgl[arized] a
home.”184 His “identification was based in part on the [detective’s]
testimony.”185 The detective testified that “she saw [the appellant] on a
surveillance videotape [that] she [had] viewed outside the courtroom.”186
However, the “identification did not appear on the copy of the surveillance
video offered into evidence at trial.”187 Florida Rule of Evidence 90.952
provides in relevant part that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, an
original writing, recording, or photograph is required in order to prove the
contents of the writing, recording, or photograph.”188 Known as the Best
Evidence Rule, unless an exception may be shown, “‘the testimony of [the]
witness . . . [regarding] the contents of the original is inadmissible.’”189 Finding
that the error was not harmless, citing similar case law, the appellate court
reversed.190
The issue of whether Second Amendment constitutional rights apply to
juveniles was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in L.S. v. State.191 A
177.
Id. at 1064.
178.
Id. at 1062, 1064.
179.
915 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
180.
H.D., 134 So. 3d. at 1063–64; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.265(1); K.T.E., 915
So. 2d at 769–70.
181.
See Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 84.
182.
137 So. 3d 574 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
183.
Id. at 575.
184.
Id.
185.
Id.
186.
Id.
187.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 575.
188.
FLA. STAT. § 90.952 (2014).
189.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 576; see also FLA. STAT. § 90.952.
190.
T.D.W., 137 So. 3d at 577–78; see also McKeehan v. State, 838 So. 2d 1257,
1261 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
191.
120 So. 3d 55, 58 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
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juvenile was adjudicated delinquent based upon “carrying a concealed firearm,
grand theft of a firearm, improper exhibition of a firearm, [and] resisting arrest
without violence [as well as] possession of a firearm by a minor.”192 The
appellate court reversed as to all adjudications with the exception of carrying a
concealed firearm.193 As to that adjudication, the minor argued that he had a
right under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution to carry
the firearm as there is no juvenile exception in the Amendment.194 The
appellate court held that the constitutional rights of children are not equated
with those of adults on the basis of the juvenile’s “inability to make decisions in
an informed and mature manner.”195 Citing basic United States Constitutional
law, the court held that while the Second Amendment does not mention
juveniles, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized limitations on
the right to bear arms.196 The court also commented that the constitutional
rights of children under the Florida Constitution are not the same as adults, as
well as under the laws of other states.197 The court therefore affirmed the
adjudication of possession of firearms by a minor.198
Florida provides that incompetency may be grounds under which a
proceeding to determine delinquency may not proceed and that ultimately the
charges under certain circumstances may be dismissed.199 The basis for
incompetence may be age, immaturity, a mental illness, intellectual disability,
or autism.200 The question before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in D.B. v.
State,201 was whether dismissal of a delinquency petition was mandated as the
juvenile had been declared incompetent more than three years earlier and
remained incompetent.202 Under the Florida Statutes, and pursuant to due
process principles, a juvenile may not be tried while incompetent.203 The
statutes also provide a jurisdictional limit on how long the court may retain
jurisdiction.204 Here, under the statute and as conceded by the State, dismissal
was warranted.205
192.
Id. at 56.
193.
Id. at 59.
194.
Id. at 58; see also U.S. CONST. amend. II.
195.
L.S., 120 So. 3d at 58.
196.
U.S. CONST. amend. II.; but see In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla.),
withdrawn, 1989 Lexis 1226 (Fla. 1989).
197.
L.S., 120 So. 3d at 59.
198.
Id.
199.
FLA. STAT. § 985.19(1), (5)(c) (2014).
200.
See id. § 985.19(2), (3)(a).
201.
120 So. 3d 71 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
202.
Id. at 72.
203.
Id. at 73; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.19(1).
204.
FLA. STAT. § 985.19(5)(c).
205.
D.B., 120 So. 3d at 72.
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The issue of waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles is a very common
issue that arises in the appellate courts all over the country.206 That issue was
before the appellate court in J.X. v. State.207 In that case, a juvenile appealed the
denial of his motion to suppress statements he provided to the police after being
given his Miranda warnings, which he then waived.208 The juvenile was
seventeen and was summoned to the police station with his mother.209 There
was a suspicion that he had been involved in burglaries.210 As soon as he was
advised that he had been asked to come to the police station because of the two
residential burglaries, he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel.211 The
police officer “closed his case file and terminated the interview.”212 However,
after the detective said he was going to speak to the juvenile’s brother, the
mother encouraged the appellant to cooperate.213 After the juvenile reinitiated
contact with the officer, the officer advised the juvenile again of his Miranda
rights, giving him the form containing the full recitation and orally advising
him.214 The juvenile then confessed.215 The appellate court held that when the
juvenile reinstituted contact with the police—where there was no threat of
coercion and where the juvenile did not ask for a lawyer—the waiver was free,
voluntary, and knowing.216 It then affirmed the denial of the motion to
suppress.217
Florida’s delinquency statute provides a number of dispositional
alternatives including probation, restitution, community service, revocation of
driver’s licenses, and attendance at school.218 Restitution issues often come up
before the appellate courts on proper application of the Florida Statute.219 In
T.J.J. v. State,220 a juvenile appealed an order of disposition—including
restitution—after he admitted to a burglary of a dwelling.221 The issue was that
the restitution order included a payment for “items not listed in the original
206.
E.g., J.X. v. State, 125 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also
DALE ET AL., supra note 133, at ¶ 5.03(7).
207.
125 So. 3d 364, 365 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
208.
Id. at 365.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
J.X., 125 So. 3d at 365.
213.
Id.
214.
Id.
215.
Id.
216.
Id. at 367.
217.
J.X., 125 So. 3d at 367.
218.
FLA. STAT. § 985.455(1)–(2) (2014).
219.
Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 94.
220.
121 So. 3d 635 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
221.
Id. at 637.
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charging document.”222 The amount of restitution was “$2718, or more than
twice what the charging document,” set forth.223 The appeals court reversed for
failure to comply with the statute, which provides that restitution is based upon
the charging document.224
In V.A.C. v. State,225 the issue involving an order of restitution dealt
with a jurisdictional problem.226 In that case, the juvenile turned nineteen, and a
notice of hearing to establish restitution was filed after the juvenile’s nineteenth
birthday.227 As a result, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction.228 Having
reserved jurisdiction on the issue of restitution prior to the juvenile’s nineteenth
birthday, the trial court could have dealt with the matter.229 However, the “court
erred in ordering restitution after it lost jurisdiction.”230
If there is an allegation that a juvenile has violated probation, under
Florida law, the state may file a petition for violation of probation.231 In S.M. v.
State,232 the juvenile appealed the dispositional order which found her guilty of
violation of probation on the grounds that the juvenile had been ordered to leave
the courtroom to privately speak to her grandmother, and because the State
presented only hearsay evidence by the juvenile’s probation officer to support
the allegation.233 The appellate court held that “[w]hile ‘[h]earsay is admissible
in a revocation hearing,’” it cannot be the sole basis for the finding; in the case
at bar that was all the evidence.234 Thus, “there was insufficient evidence to
revoke the . . . probation on the two allegations contained [in] the petition.”235
Furthermore, “juveniles have a constitutional right to be present at all critical
stages of the proceeding[],” unless waived by the child himself or herself.236
Because “the juvenile did not personally waive her right to be present” and
because events took place while the juvenile was out of the courtroom—only to
be back to hear the disposition—the court also reversed.237
222.
Id.
223.
Id.
224.
Id.
225.
136 So. 3d 612 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
226.
Id. at 613.
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
229.
Id.
230.
V.A.C., 136 So. 3d at 614.
231.
FLA. STAT. § 985.439(1)(b) (2014).
232.
138 So. 3d 1156 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
233.
Id. at 1157, 1159.
234.
Id. at 1159 (quoting McNealy v. State, 479 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1985)).
235.
Id.
236.
Id. at 1159–60 (quoting J.R. v. State, 953 So. 2d 690, 691 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2007) (per curiam)).
237.
S.M., 138 So. 3d at 1160.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

63

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

2014]

2014 SURVEY OF JUVENILE LAW

55

Another dispositional issue that comes up on occasion is the question of
the specifics of special conditions of juvenile probation.238 In T.J.J., in addition
to ordering “restitution for items not [contained] in the . . . charging document,
[t]he [trial] court also imposed [as] a special condition of . . . probation that the
[respondent] not associate with persons under supervision, members of gangs,
or whose contact [was] prohibited by the juvenile’s probation officer, parent or
guardian.”239 The appellate court reversed as to this condition of probation
finding that nothing in the Florida Statutes or the Rules of Juvenile Procedure
contained a “blanket prohibition of willful contact” with certain individuals.240
The rules’ “special condition [dealt with] prohibiting contact with the
victim[s].”241 Furthermore, the appellate court held that “the condition must be
related to the crime committed.”242 Finally, the appellate court held that “the
condition [was] invalid for vagueness and overbreadth.”243
Another example of police interaction with a juvenile during school
hours and their handling of them is R.A.S. v. State.244 In that case, a juvenile
appealed from a delinquency adjudication for “possession of marijuana and
drug paraphernalia” having unsuccessfully sought to suppress the evidence.245
A police officer was driving through the respondent’s neighborhood trying to
find him because the youngster had been reported absent from school.246 When
“[t]he deputy located [the student] and asked him to come over to talk to him,”
the student said he was on his way to school.247 The deputy offered to give the
student a ride to school, which the student accepted.248 The deputy then told the
youngster to empty his pockets, indicating that he was doing a weapons patdown.249 In so doing, the officer—realizing the student failed to entirely empty
his pockets—felt an item, which turned out to be a plastic bag of marijuana.250
The appellate court held that ordering someone to empty his pockets under these
circumstances was an unauthorized full search.251 “The deputy did not have . . .
238.
T.J.J. v. State, 121 So. 3d 635, 637 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2013); see also
FLA. STAT. § 985.435 (2014).
239.
T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 637.
240.
Id. at 638–39; see also FLA. STAT. § 985.435; FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.947.
241.
T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 638; see also FLA. R. JUV. P. Form 8.947.
242.
T.J.J., 121 So. 3d at 638 (citing Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734, 734–35 (Fla.
1993)).
243.
Id.
244.
141 So. 3d 687, 689 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
Id.
248.
Id.
249.
R.A.S., 141 So. 3d at 689.
250.
Id.
251.
Id.
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reason to [believe] that [the youngster] was carrying a weapon or contraband.
Thus, the initial search had no legal basis.”252 The court recognized that the
police officer did have the right to conduct the pat-down for weapons.253 But
when an officer takes a truant into custody, as here, “the only concern is for
officer safety,” which means the concern is about a weapon.254 Thus, the
appellate court reversed.255
Florida law provides a form of amnesty or immunity for school students
who divulge information related to the supplying of controlled substances if the
events giving rise to the incident “occurred on property other than public school
property.”256 In State v. E.M.,257 the State appealed the trial court’s granting of
the respondent juvenile’s motion in limine to preclude statements to school
officials.258 The case arose out of an internal suspension resulting from a
violation of the school dress code.259 The student told the school security
officials that he was out of dress code because “his uniform shirt was ‘messed
up.’”260 When the security officer asked the youngster to show the officer the
shirt and when the juvenile “opened his backpack to take out [his] shirt, [the]
[s]ecurity [officials] smelled the odor of marijuana.”261 As a result, the juvenile
admitted that he had the marijuana, which the security officer found in the
backpack.262 The State alleged two counts—possession of marijuana with intent
to deliver at the nearest school and marijuana subsequently found in the
juvenile’s home.263 As a matter of statutory interpretation, the appellate court
held that the immunity statute did not apply because the student did not fall
within the category of one who “divulges information leading to the arrest and
conviction of the person who supplied the controlled substance to him.”264
Rather, the student fell into the second category which did not receive the same
protection—which is to say inadmissibly of incriminating statements—as in the
first category.265 The appellate court therefore reversed.266

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
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Id.
Id. at 690.
R.A.S., 141 So. 3d at 690.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 1006.09(2)(a) (2014).
141 So. 3d 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
Id.
E.M., 141 So. 3d at 683.
Id.
Id. at 685 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1006.09(2)(a)(2014)).
Id.
Id. at 686.
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OTHER MATTERS

The role of Florida’s well-funded GAL Program has been discussed in
this law review on several occasions.267 In Turnier v. Stockman,268 the issue of
whether a guardian ad litem could be appointed arose in the context of a chapter
61 custody matter commenced as a paternity proceeding.269 The case
transferred from St. Johns County to Miami-Dade County, involved with whom
a deaf minor child should live, where both of the parents were deaf.270 The trial
court considered appointing a GAL, but ultimately did not.271 The mother
appealed, arguing that it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to appoint
a GAL for the child.272 The appellate court held that there was no requirement
to appoint a guardian in the proceeding below because the Florida Legislature
in, chapter 61, did not make the appointment mandatory, but rather
discretionary.273
The question of liability of what are known in Florida as the lead
agencies—the organizations to which the Department of Children and Families
outsource the provision of foster care and related services—was before the First
District Court of Appeal.274 The case—a wrongful death action arising out of
the death of a child in foster care—was brought against Partnership for Strong
Families, the community-based provider in several counties in the state.275 The
appellate court affirmed summary judgment for the provider, finding it owed no
duty to the child because the trial court had terminated protective supervision,
and thus the “negligence could not be the proximate cause of” the child’s
death.276 The death had occurred as a result of the action of the child’s father to
whom the child had been returned.277 Finding that the alleged negligence was
also unforeseeable, the appellate court affirmed the grant of the motion for
summary judgment.278 Thus, Castello v. Partnership for Strong Families,

267.
See, e.g., Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 323–32.
268.
139 So. 3d 397 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014),.
269.
Id. at 398–400; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.401 (2014).
270.
Turnier, 139 So. 3d at 398.
271.
Id. at 399.
272.
Id. at 400.
273.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 61.401.
274.
Castello v. P’ship for Strong Families, Inc., 117 So. 3d 62, 63–64 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 139 So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2014); see also FLA. STAT.
§ 39.0016(1)(b).
275.
Castello, 117 So. 3d at 63.
276.
Id. at 63–64.
277.
Id. at 63.
278.
Id. at 63–64.
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Inc.279 mirrors the Supreme Court of the United States ruling in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services.280
Domestic violence matters unrelated to dependency proceedings can
also involve juveniles.281 Cannon v. Thomas282 is such a case.283 A student
appealed from a trial court order “granting a permanent injunction for protection
against repeat violence” arising out of the appellant child’s attack upon the
appellee child.284 The injunction was granted based upon a factual
determination that the appellant “brutally battered [a]ppellee’s daughter,
slamming her head against a concrete wall” near a convenience store.285 The
problem, according to the appellate court, is that the Florida statute requires two
incidents of violence in order to protect the minor child.286 Thus, while
recognizing the severity of the attack, as a matter of statutory construction, the
appellate court was obligated to vacate the injunction for protection against the
violence.287
VII.

LEGISLATIVE CHANGES

This year’s legislative changes in juvenile law demonstrate a new
emphasis on prevention and intervention,288 a commitment to utilizing trauma
informed care,289 and revised standards for detention centers.290 The Legislature
also increased protections for juvenile offenders by adding criminal penalties
for willful neglect on the part of Department of Juvenile Justice (“DJJ”)
employees.291 In dependency, the Legislature addressed a longstanding issue
relating to termination of parental rights for prospective child abuse, reversing
twenty years of case law that required a nexus between prior abuse and current
risk.292 The Legislature has also created a right to counsel for special needs
children in dependency actions.293 Other changes include new provisions for
279.
117 So. 3d 62 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam), review denied, 139
So. 3d 884 (Fla. 2014).
280.
489 U.S. 189, 203 (1989); Castello, 117 So. 3d at 64.
281.
See FLA. STAT. § 784.046(2)(a) (2014).
282.
133 So. 3d 634 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
283.
Id. at 635.
284.
Id.
285.
Id.
286.
FLA. STAT. § 784.046(1)(b); Cannon, 133 So. 3d at 635, 640.
287.
Cannon, 133 So. 3d at 635, 640.
288.
FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a).
289.
Id. §§ 985.02(8), .03(52).
290.
Id. §§ 985.02(5), .03(44).
291.
Id. § 985.702(2)(a).
292.
See id. § 39.806(1)(f); Padgett v. Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577
So. 2d 565, 571 (Fla. 1991).
293.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3).
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addressing cases of medical neglect,294 and new provisions for reporting and
addressing deaths of children in department care.295 The Legislature also
extended the scope of the relative caregiver program to include non-relative
caregivers.296 On a lighter note, the Legislature has mandated a program to help
children in department care obtain their driver’s licenses.297
A.

Juvenile Delinquency Statutory Changes

This year, the Legislature has introduced a shift in the declared purpose
of the juvenile justice system by emphasizing the role of prevention,
intervention, treatment, and the importance of children’s families and
community support systems.298 To this end, the Legislature added section
985.17 of the Florida Statutes, describing the need for prevention services to
“decrease recidivism by addressing the needs of at-risk youth and their
families.”299 The new statute directs the DJJ to “develop the capacity for local
communities to serve their youth [through] engag[ing] faith and community
based organizations to provide” various volunteer services such as “chaplaincy
services, crisis intervention counseling, mentoring, and tutoring.”300 The statute
directs the DJJ to provide services such as literacy and recreation programs
targeted specifically at certain at-risk youth.301
The Legislature has also added an emphasis on trauma informed care
recognizing the role that trauma, such as “violence, physical or sexual abuse,
neglect, [and] medical difficulties,” plays in the child’s life.302 The DJJ is
directed to provide services to “be more supportive and avoid retraumatization,
[through] trauma-specific interventions that are designed . . . to facilitate
healing.”303
The shift toward prevention through family and community
involvement is also apparent in new guidelines for detention facilities.304
Facilities are to be placed close to the home communities of children they serve
to encourage family involvement.305 Further evidencing the transition to more

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
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Id. § 39.3068.
Id. § 39.201(3).
Id. § 39.5085(1)(a), (2)(a)(3).
Id. § 409.1454(1)–(2).
See FLA. STAT. § 985.01(1)(a), (e).
Id. § 985.17(1).
Id. § 985.17(2)–(2)(a).
Id. § 985.17(3)(a).
Id. § 985.03(52); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 985.02(8), .601(3)(a).
FLA. STAT. § 985.02(8).
Id. § 985.02(5).
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individualized services is the reduction of the maximum number of beds
allowed in facilities from 165 to 90.306
Lastly, the Legislature has filled a significant gap in protection of
juvenile offenders from harm at the hands of DJJ employees, volunteers, and
interns.307 Although the Florida Statutes provided criminal penalties for sexual
abuse of children within the juvenile justice system, there was no such provision
for employees alleged to have neglected a youth in the department’s custody.308
Although such incidences are uncommon, one recent highly publicized event
illustrated the need for legislative change.309 In 2011, an eighteen-year-old in
the department’s custody died of a brain hemorrhage after “guards refused to
call 911 for more than six hours” because they thought the young person was
faking.310 Unfortunately, the guards could not be charged with child neglect
because the person was eighteen and no longer legally a child.311 To address
instances such as this, the Legislature amended section 985.701 of the Florida
Statutes to define ‘“[j]uvenile offender’ [as a] person of any age . . . detained . . .
or committed to the custody of the department,” and created section 985.702
which makes “[w]illful and malicious neglect of a juvenile offender” a felony
offense.312 In addition, violation of these provisions is grounds for dismissal
and permanent disqualification from employment in the juvenile justice
system.313 Section 985.702 also imposes a duty on DJJ employees to report
instances of neglect and makes failure to do so a first-degree misdemeanor.314
B.

Dependency Statutory Changes

Perhaps the most significant practical change in substantive dependency
law was the legislative abrogation of the nexus test established by the Supreme
Court of Florida in Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative
Services315 in 1991.316 The Padgett nexus test—which has been applied for over
306.
FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 3 (Fla.
2014); see also FLA. STAT. § 985.02(5)(c).
307.
FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17–18, see also FLA. STAT. § 985.702.
308.
FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17.
309.
Id.; Ana M. Valdes, Parents of Teen Who Died in Detention to Sue State,
PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 14, 2012, at B1.
310.
Lisa Rab, DJJ Supervisor Thought Eric Perez Was “Faking” As He Died in
Juvie Lockup, Officer Testifies, THE PULP (Mar. 9, 2012, 12:42 PM), http://
blogs.browardpalmbeach.com/pulp/2012/03/djj_eric_perez_death_grand_jury_report.php; see
also Valdes, supra note 309.
311.
Rab, supra note 310; see also FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 7055, at 17.
312.
FLA. STAT. §§ 985.701(1)(a)(1)(c), .702(2)(a)–(b).
313.
Id. § 985.702(2)(c).
314.
Id. § 985.702(3), (4)(a)–(b).
315.
577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
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two decades317— mandated that termination of parental rights (“TPR”) based
upon the abuse of sibling or another child in the family must be predicated upon
a showing of a nexus between the harm to the other child, and imminent risk of
harm to the current child.318 The Legislature has eliminated this nexus
requirement in part, amending section 39.806 of the Florida Statutes to specify
that no proof of a nexus between prior conduct and potential harm to a sibling is
required in cases of prior egregious conduct, or those related to homicide of a
child or the other parent.319 Similarly, conviction of crime “that requires [a]
parent to register as a sexual predator” has been added as a grounds for TPR.320
Although several organizations provide attorney representation to
dependent children in some parts of the state on a limited basis, the Legislature
has recognized that children with special needs have a particular need for legal
representation.321 For this reason, the Legislature has extended a right to legal
representation for dependent children with certain special needs.322
Specifically, an attorney shall be provided for a child who is subject to any
proceeding under chapter 39 who resides or is being considered for placement
in a skilled nursing home or residential treatment center, is prescribed but
declines assent to psychotropic medication, has a developmental disability, or is
a victim of human trafficking.323
There is a series of serious infirmities in the new statute.324 First, it
leaves unrepresented many children with equally serious needs, as well as the
vast majority of the over twenty-eight thousand children who are before the
dependency court.325 There are several constitutional reasons why all these
other children are entitled to counsel.326 The fact that they are treated
316.
Id. at 57; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f); Fla. Prof’l Staff of the Comm.
On Appropriations, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666, Reg. Sess., at 19 (2014).
317.
Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 85.
318.
Padgett, 577 So. 2d at 571; Dale, 2013 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note
58, at 85.
319.
FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(f), (h).
320.
Id. § 39.806(1)(n). Research discloses no legislative history for these
changes. FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2013).
321.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(1)(a)(2). The legislation is a response to a 2012
warning issued by the United States Department of Justice threatening a law suit against the State
of Florida regarding Americans with Disabilities Act violations concerning severely disabled
children housed in nursing homes throughout the state. FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB
561, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 3 (2014).
322.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(3).
323.
Id.
324.
See id. § 39.01305(1)–(9).
325.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311, 353; DCF Quick Facts, FLA.
DEP’T OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, http://www.dcfstate.fl.us/general-information/quick-facts/cw
(last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
326.
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 350–53.
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differently than those provided with lawyers raises a question of equal
protection.327 The failure to provide counsel at all to most children in Florida in
these cases may also be a denial of procedural due process.328
Second, the new law appropriates five million dollars to pay for lawyers
to represent the children.329 However, it says that, first, efforts must be made to
find volunteer lawyers.330 This itself is a problem because volunteer lawyers
have never been able to represent even a significant fraction of the children
before the dependency court.331 The decision to provide lawyers for children is
first made by the attorneys for the Department of Children and Families.332 The
law thus creates an ethical issue for department lawyers.333 Pursuant to the
Florida Rules of Professional Responsibility, the decision of whether a party
should be entitled to counsel is being made by a lawyer for another party.334
Moreover, the system for locating and training lawyers to represent children is
left to the GAL Program.335 This creates a similar ethical problem.336 Thus, one
party is training and choosing those lawyers who will represent another party.337
Third, the legislature never explained why the excess of thirty million
dollars that it has expended to fund the GAL Program every year is not adequate
to represent these children.338 Of course—as discussed in two articles by this
author in the Nova Law Review339—the first part of the answer may be that the
327.
Id.
328.
Id. at 311, 353.
329.
FLA. H.R., FINAL BILL ANALYSIS, CS/HB 561, Reg. Leg. Sess., at 4 (2014).
330.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(4)(a) (2014).
331.
See U. FLA. LEVIN COLL. LAW CTR. ON CHILDREN & FAMILIES & FLA’S
CHILDREN FIRST, LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF DEPENDENT CHILDREN 6 (2012). The failure to fund
volunteer lawyers to represent children is compounded by the influx of approximately 53,000
undocumented children into the United States and the efforts of bar associations to fund lawyers
for them. Melvin Felix & Mike Clary, Deutsch Vows to Fight for Undocumented Kids, SUN
SENTINEL (Dec. 18, 2014, 8:42 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/flundocumented-minors-folo-20141218-story.html; Mara Gay, As Child Immigrants Await Fate, a
Race for Counsel, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2014, at A19; Jan Pudlow, Florida Lawyers Stand with
Unaccompanied Minors, FLA. B. NEWS, Oct. 1, 2014, at 1. Legal Aid Societies are overwhelmed
by need for pro bono lawyers to meet need of unaccompanied immigrant children. Gay, supra
note 331.
332.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01305(6); Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 308 n.10.
333.
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 308 n.10, 352–53.
334.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.14(b); see also Dale & Reidenberg, supra note
15, at 311, 353.
335.
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 323.
336.
See id. at 308 n.10, 323.
337.
See id.
338.
Id. at 362. The complete budget from all sources is actually higher. See
Michael Dale & Louis M. Reidenberg, The Kids Aren’t Alright: Every Child Should Have an
Attorney in Child Welfare Proceedings in Florida, 36 NOVA. L. REV. 345, 356, (2012).
339.
See Dale, 2012 Survey of Juvenile Law, supra note 58, at 338–39; Dale &
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GAL Program in Florida does not represent the legal interests of children in
dependency and termination of parental rights cases.340 The GAL Program is
not the child’s lawyer.341 Rather, the GAL Program, a party to dependency and
TPR cases in Florida, only represents the child’s best interests.342 The child, of
course, is a separate party in Florida.343 So the GAL Program’s lawyers cannot
ethically represent another party—the child.344 The second part of the answer
may be that, while the GAL Program describes itself as guardian angels, it tries
to be the child’s friend, has 145 lawyers on staff, and actually only represents
the best interests of half the children before the court; it is legally, ethically, and
structurally incapable of solving the complex legal problems of the children
before the dependency court.345
Until this year, chapter 39 did not contain any special provisions for
dealing with cases of medical neglect or those involving children with complex
medical needs.346 Because of this, “parents [could] be found . . . neglectful or
abusive [where the] observed problems [were] related to insufficient services or
a natural change in medical conditions.”347 To correct these shortcomings and
to ensure children are maintained in a minimally restrictive and nurturing
environment, provisions were added to ensure that reports of medical neglect
will be investigated by persons with specialized training,348 and a child
protective team investigating such a case must consult with a physician with
experience treating children with the same condition.349 The goal of these
changes is to use a family-centered approach to allow children to remain at
home where the parents are willing and able to meet the child’s medical needs
with services.350
Although this survey can only address a limited number of statutory
changes, there are several additional provisions that require mention.351 First,
the legislature has created multiple procedures and protocols related to the
Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311.
340.
Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 311; see also FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM
PROGRAM, FLA. GUARDIAN AD LITEM 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 5 (2009), available at
http://www.guardianadlitem.org/documents/GAL-2009AnnualReport.pdf.
341.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 310–11, 327.
342.
Id. at 311, 327.
343.
See id. at 311.
344.
R. REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.7(a)(2); see also FLA. STAT. § 39.01(51) (2014).
345.
See Dale & Reidenberg, supra note 15, at 327, 330, 353.
346.
FLA. STAT. § 39.01(41)–(43); Fla. Prof’l Staff of the Comm. on
Appropriation, Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666, Reg. Sess., at 12 (2014).
347.
Fla. Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 1666 at 12.
348.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.3068(1).
349.
See id. § 39.303(1).
350.
Id. § 39.3068(2).
351.
See supra Part V.
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investigation and reporting of deaths and other incidents, involving children
either in the care of, or who have been investigated by, the department.352 The
relative caregiver program—which provides financial assistance to family
members willing to care for a dependent child—was extended to assist persons
who are not related to the child by blood or marriage.353 A three-year pilot
program was established to pay for the costs associated with obtaining a driver’s
license—including insurance—for children in foster care.354 Finally, multiple
provisions were added to increase the overall competence of child welfare
personnel, with an emphasis on increasing the number of employees with
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in social work.355
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Legislature made substantial changes in the juvenile delinquency
and child welfare law.356 In the latter area, several of the changes contain major
constitutional infirmities.357 The Supreme Court of Florida heard only one
juvenile law case involving a statutory analysis of the speedy trial rule.358 And
finally, the intermediate appellate courts contained their long-standing approach
to significant oversight of trial court rulings in both delinquency and child
welfare areas.359

352.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.2015 (1).
353.
Id. § 39.5085(2)(a)(3).
354.
Id. § 409.1454(2).
355.
Id. § 402.403(1)–(6).
356.
See supra Part I.
357.
See supra Part V.
358.
State v. S.A., 133 So. 3d 506, 507 (Fla. 2014) (per curiam).
359.
See, e.g., S.L. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 120 So. 3d 75, 77 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (per curiam).
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As the use of technology and social media websites rise every day,
so do the number of people who fall victim to revenge pornography.1 Social
media websites, like Instagram, which as of December 2013 had seventy-five
million daily users and as of March 2014 approximately sixty million photos
uploaded a day, can easily be used as a platform to post explicit photos of ex-

*
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1.
Casey Martinez, An Argument for States to Outlaw ‘Revenge Porn’ and
for Congress to Amend 47 U.S.C. § 230: How Our Current Laws Do Little to Protect Victims,
14 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 236, 237–38 (2014).
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lovers.2 Even more troubling, is the startup of websites such as IsAnyoneUp,
which allow people to submit explicit images, sometimes accompanied by
the victim’s name, phone number, address, and links to their social media
profiles.3 Some of these websites even charge the individuals fees in order to
remove their images from the website. 4 Twenty-seven-year-old Kevin
Christopher Bollaert started the website UGotPosted, which facilitated more
than ten thousand explicit images of individuals without their consent, and
charged each individual as much as three hundred and fifty dollars to remove
the explicit content.5 State legislatures are slowly beginning to realize the
need to outlaw the posting of explicit images on social media sites, as the
resulting harm to victims can include years of harassment and shame.6
Revenge pornography—which is also known as non-consensual
pornography—is the “distribution of sexually graphic images of individuals
without their consent.”7 Specifically, revenge pornography refers to “images
originally obtained with consent . . . within the context of a private or
confidential relationship, . . . [such as between] intimate partner[s], [which
are] later distribute[d] . . . without consent.”8 “As of July 18, 2014, thirteen
states—New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, Utah, Wisconsin,
Virginia, Georgia, Arizona, Maryland, Colorado, and Hawaii—have passed
laws that treat nonconsensual pornography as a crime in itself . . . .”9 This
Comment aims to persuade readers that the Florida Legislature needs to

2.
Craig Smith, By the Numbers: 100+ Interesting Instagram Statistics,
DIGITAL MARKETING RAMBLINGS, http://expandedramblings.com/index.php/importantinstagram-stats/#.VBH8-vldWdR (last updated Dec. 14, 2014).
3.
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn,
49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345, 350–51 (2014); Martinez, supra note 1, at 238; Amanda
Levendowski, Note, Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn, 3 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. &
ENT. L. 422, 423–24 (2014); Lindsey Bever, Fighting Back Against ‘Revenge Porn,’ WASH.
POST, (April 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/
04/28/fighting-back-against-revenge-porn. IsAnyoneUp’s creator earned himself the title of
“ʻthe most hated man on the Internet.’” Bever, supra note 3; see also Levendowski supra
note 3, at 423.
4.
California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn Operator,
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW, Mar. 2014, at 22, 22.
5.
Id. at 22–23.
6.
See Martinez, supra note 1, at 239–244; Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing
Revenge Porn: Frequently Asked Questions, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK 3 (unpublished
working paper, Oct. 9, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2337998.
7.
Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 346.
8.
Id. Revenge pornography also includes images retrieved without consent,
such as by hacking an individual’s phone or recording sexual acts by hidden cameras; but this
Comment will only focus on images obtained with consent as it is the most prevalent type of
revenge pornography. See id.; infra Parts II–III.
9.
Franks, supra note 6, at 3.
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follow the progression of the laws in these states, and enact its own laws to
ban revenge pornography.10
Part II of this Comment will discuss the rising trend of revenge
pornography and the increase in use of the platforms it is found on today.11
Part III of this Comment will examine what being a victim means for the
lives of those who fall victim to the posting of their intimate photographs.12
Part IV of this Comment will discuss the issues faced when proposing
revenge porn legislation, and will then examine the text of three states which
have enacted revenge porn statutes—New Jersey, California, and
Maryland.13 Part V of this Comment will compare the language of the failed
Florida bills—House Bill 475 and Senate Bill 532—to determine what could
be changed in order to help enact statutes that will ban the posting of revenge
porn in the state of Florida.14
II.

REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY: A RISING TREND

Revenge pornography has become more popular with the increased
use of social media sites, new photo sharing applications for smart phones,
and sexting.15 This Part of the Comment will be split into two parts.16 The
first part will discuss the role that social media websites—such as Facebook
and Instagram, and new photo and video applications for smartphones, like
Snapchat—play in the popularity of revenge pornography.17 The second part
discusses the popular trend among teens and young adults—sexting—which
many times leads to the posting of revenge pornography.18
A.

Social Media Websites

Adding to the sixty million photos uploaded onto Instagram
everyday, Facebook users are uploading approximately three hundred million

10.
See infra Part V.
11.
See infra Part II.
12.
See infra Part III.
13.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2014); H.D. 43, 2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2014); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14–9 (West 2014); see also infra Part IV.
14.
H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2014); see also infra Part V.
15.
Martinez, supra note 1, at 237; Nicole A. Poltash, Comment, Snapchat
and Sexting: A Snapshot of Baring Your Bare Essentials, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH., no. 4, 2013,
at 1, 4–5, 11.
16.
See infra Part II.A–B.
17.
See infra II.A.
18.
See infra II.B.
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photos to Facebook each day.19 Facebook alone has over 1.35 billion users.20
With hundreds of millions of photos being uploaded every day, the potential
for misuse heightens, and it becomes more and more unrealistic to expect
website administrators to catch the inappropriate images being posted. 21
Lawmakers have recently suggested that social media websites—like
Facebook and Instagram—need to begin “establish[ing] the identity of
people opening accounts to prevent . . . revenge porn[ography].”22 Although
verifying the identity of each user on a social media website might not be the
ultimate answer to ending the posting of non-consensual pornography, it is a
step in the right direction.23 It is less likely that individuals will engage in
unacceptable behavior if their identity is revealed, especially if they can be
traced to the information posted, unlike if an individual posted
anonymously.24 If allowed to post anonymously, individuals are less likely
to feel guilt, and might have a false sense of security that they might not get
into any trouble.25
In addition to the common use of these social media sites comes
Snapchat, “a mobile phone application that sends self-destructing
messages.”26 Snapchat allows users to send photos and videos, which are
deleted within seconds of the recipient viewing them.27 According to the
company, “‘[t]he data is completely deleted and could not be recalled even if
law enforcement came looking for [it].’”28 This description misguides users
though, as further investigation into the company’s privacy policy reveals:
“Although we attempt to delete image data as soon as possible after the
message is received and opened by the recipient . . . we cannot guarantee that
the message contents will be deleted in every case. . . . Messages, therefore,
are sent at the risk of the user.”29

19.
Poltash, supra note 15, at 2; Smith, supra note 2.
20.
Craig Smith, By the Numbers: 200+ Amazing Facebook User &
Demographic Statistics, DIGITAL MARKETING RAMBLINGS, http://expandedramblings.com/
index.php/by-the-numbers-17-amazing-facebook-stats/ (last updated Dec. 20, 2014).
21.
See Poltash, supra note 15, at 2; Julie Kay, “Revenge Porn” a Criminal
Act? Yes, If Groups Get Their Way, DAILY BUS. REV. (Aug. 6, 2014), https://
www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202666010714/Revenge-Porn-A-Criminal-Act-Yes-IfGroups-Get-Their-Way?SLreturn=20140811130411; Andrew Whitaker, Revenge Porn Sites
Must End Anonymity, THE SCOTSMAN, July 30, 2014, at 15.
22.
Whitaker, supra note 21.
23.
See id.
24.
See id.
25.
See id.
26.
Poltash, supra note 15, at 2.
27.
Id. at 2–3, 7.
28.
Id. at 3 (alteration in original).
29.
Id. at 8–9 (alteration in original).
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The loopholes do not end there.30 There is still a chance that the
recipient may take a screenshot of the image—a photo of the image seen on
the screen of a cellphone, which saves the received photo to their photo
album. 31 Even though the application will notify the sender that the
screenshot has been taken, once the photo is copied, the sender has little
control over what the recipient will do with the image.32 “In 2012 alone,
more than five billion messages were sent through Snapchat,” and its
popularity has increased since then, making it “‘the second-most popular free
photo and video app for the iPhone . . . just behind YouTube and ahead of
Instagram’” in February 2013.33 This increased popularity of the application
and the false sense of security that the images will disappear forever, make
Snapchat “‘the greatest tool for sexting since the front-facing camera.’” 34
Snapchat’s use for sexting was apparent at its inception—“the application is
rated for users twelve years of age and older due, in part, to ‘suggestive
themes’ and ‘mild sexual content or nudity,’” but the start-up of websites
such as Snapchat Sluts—“a website featuring photos of naked women that
were taken using Snapchat”—has provided even more proof.35
B.

Sexting

Minors and young adults are also exploring their sexuality in a more
dangerous way by leaving permanent traces of the “fruits of their
exploration” through sexting. 36 Sexting is defined as “‘[t]he practice of
sending or posting sexually suggestive text messages and images, including
nude or semi-nude photographs, via cellular phones . . . or over the
Internet.’”37 Most commonly, “a person takes a digital photo of himself or
herself and sends it via mobile phone as a text message.”38 “ʻ[A]ccording to
. . . the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, up to [eighty percent] of revenge porn
victims belong to this category,’” meaning they initially sent their explicit
images willingly.39 Recent surveys have shown that “ʻ[s]ending and posting
30.
Id. at 9.
31.
See Poltash, supra note 15, at 9.
32.
See id.
33.
Id. at 9–10 (alteration in original).
34.
Id. at 8–9, 11.
35.
Id. at 11–12.
36.
Elizabeth M. Ryan, Sexting: How the State Can Prevent a Moment of
Indiscretion from Leading to a Lifetime of Unintended Consequences for Minors and Young
Adults, 96 IOWA L. REV. 357, 363 (2010).
37.
Poltash, supra note 15, at 4 (quoting Verified Complaint at 5, Miller v.
Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634 (M.D. Pa. 2009)) (alteration in original).
38.
Id.
39.
Martinez, supra note 1, at 242.
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nude or semi-nude photos or videos starts at a young age and becomes even
more frequent as teens become young adults.’”40 In a “2012 survey of over
six hundred . . . high school students, . . . twenty percent . . . had sent a sext
[from their] cell phone,” and almost forty percent had received a sext. 41
“More than a quarter had forwarded a sext that they had received to
others.”42 Of the participants who had sent a sext, one third had sent the sext
“ʻdespite believing that there could be serious consequences.’”43 The real
consequence though, that teens and young adults need to keep in mind and
remember before they engage in the new trend of sexting, is the fact that
“once an individual transmits an image via cell phone or over the Internet, it
is virtually impossible to remove it.”44
Pictures received from sexting are the main source of explicit images
posted on social media websites or revenge pornography websites.45 Many
revenge porn websites were started to post these sext messages for the
entertainment of others.46 In February 2013, the students at Cypress Bay
High School in Weston, Florida, learned firsthand the dangers of teenage
sexting. 47 An anonymous web page filled with more than a dozen nude
pictures—apparently received through sexting—appeared online.48 Students
at Cypress Bay High identified many of the females as classmates, and some
of the pictures even listed the females’ names.49 The photos went viral after
the link was quickly shared through Twitter, with over four thousand
students viewing the website while still in school.50 It is believed that the
website was created by current Cypress Bay classmates.51
Mentioned earlier in this Comment, the revenge pornography
website, IsAnyoneUp, was one of the most successful—if not the most
successful—of the hundreds of sketchy sites before it shut down in 2013.52
40.
Poltash, supra note 15, at 5 (alteration in original).
41.
Id.
42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Ryan, supra note 36, at 363.
45.
See Poltash, supra note 15, at 14.
46.
See id. at 12; California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge
Porn Operator, supra note 4, at 22.
47.
See Michael Vasquez, Photos of Nude Teen Girls Linked to Cypress Bay
High School, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:17 AM), http://www.miamiherald.com/
incoming/article1947560.html.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id.
52.
Kelly Goff, Mother Vows to Make Revenge Pornography a Federal
Crime, INLAND VALLEY DAILY BULLETIN (Feb. 6, 2014), www.dailybulletin.com/generalnews/20140203/mother-vows-to-make-revenge-pornography-a-federal-crime.
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IsAnyoneUp would have three hundred fifty thousand page views a day.53
Hunter Moore, the website’s creator, would “post[] names, addresses, and
work information about the victims and urged followers—strangers to the
person posing—to taunt them.” 54 “Moore netted more than [thirteen
thousand dollars] a month in advertising revenue” through IsAnyoneUp.55
Hunter Moore decided to opt out of the website in 2013, after he learned that
the FBI was investigating him.56 It took two years to investigate Moore and
the website before any action was taken.57
With the popularity of IsAnyoneUp, more and more revenge
pornography websites began popping up. 58 One of these websites was
UGotPosted, which was created in December 2012. 59 This new revenge
pornography website not only suggested, but “required that the poster
include the subject’s full name, location, age, and Facebook profile link”
next to their explicit image. 60 Even worse, the website’s creator, Kevin
Christopher Bollaert, would charge the victims “a fee ranging from $299.99
to $350” to get their explicit images or videos removed from the site. 61
Bollaert created another website—ChangeMyReputation—to collect these
fees. 62 When a revenge porn victim would contact UGotPosted with a
request for their content to be removed, Bollaert would reply with a
ChangeMyReputation email address, offer to remove them for a fee, and then
the victim could pay using a PayPal account.63 Court documents obtained
from Bollaert’s ChangeMyReputation PayPal account showed that he earned
tens of thousands of dollars from the fees he charged the victims.64 Like
Hunter Moore, Bollaert also made a significant amount of money from
advertisers on his revenge porn site—nine hundred dollars a month to be
exact.65

53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Levendowski, supra note 3, at 423.
56.
Goff, supra note 52.
57.
See id.
58.
See California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn
Operator, supra note 4, at 23; Goff, supra note 52.
59.
California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn Operator,
supra note 4, at 23.
60.
Id. (emphasis added).
61.
Id.
62.
Id.
63.
Id.
64.
California Attorney General Announces Arrest of Revenge Porn Operator,
supra note 4, at 23.
65.
Id.; see also Levendowski, supra note 3 at 423.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/5

80

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

72

NOVA LAW REVIEW

III.

[Vol. 39

REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY: THE HARM

Once an image is shared without consent, the victim becomes sexual
entertainment for complete strangers.66 According to a survey from 2013,
which “included 1182 online interviews amongst American adults ages
[eighteen through fifty-four],” “one in ten former partners threaten to post
sexually explicit images of their exes online.”67 About sixty percent of those
scorned lovers follow through. 68 If uploaded to the Internet, the explicit
photograph can be viewed by thousands of people, continued to be shared on
multiple other websites, or even emailed to the victim’s family, employers,
or friends to further embarrass the victim.69 In some instances, the explicit
“image[s] can dominate the first several pages of hits on the victim’s name in
a search engine,” which has the potential to “destroy victims’ intimate
relationships, as well as their educational and employment opportunities.”70
In a “recent study, . . . colleges and universities [revealed that they] use
social-networking websites—a medium that commonly features primary- and
secondary-sexting images—to help evaluate applicants.”71 Explicit images
can be just as detrimental to “careers and future job prospects.” 72
“‘According to a recent survey by Microsoft, [seventy-five] percent of U.S.
recruiters and human-resource professionals report that their companies
require them to do online research about candidates, and many use a range of
sites when scrutinizing applicants, including . . . photo- and video-sharing
sites.’”73 More importantly, “‘[s]eventy percent of U.S. recruiters report that
they have rejected candidates because of information found online,’”74 a sad
reality for the victims who have images posted online without their consent
or knowledge; especially because it is unrealistic to expect employers to
“contact victims to see if they posted the nude photos of themselves or if
someone else did in violation of their trust.”75 “The ‘simple but regrettable
truth is that after consulting search results, employers [do not] call revenge
porn victims to schedule’ interviews or to extend offers.”76

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
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For other revenge porn victims, the consequences are much worse.77
Some victims endure stalking, harassment, bullying, psychological problems,
and in dire cases, suicide.78 “According to a study conducted by the Cyber
Civil Rights Initiative, over [eighty percent] of revenge porn victims
experience severe emotional distress and anxiety.”79 Much of this anxiety
comes from the fact that the victims’ explicit images are more often than not
accompanied by their personal information when posted on revenge porn
websites.80 “In a study of 1244 individuals, over [fifty percent] of victims
reported that their naked photos appeared next to their full name and social
network profile . . . .”81 Furthermore, “over [twenty percent] of [the] victims
reported that their e-mail addresses and telephone numbers appeared next to
their naked photos,” instilling a fear that strangers may confront the victims
offline, especially since some of the online interactions include sexual
demands.82
For teenagers and young adults who are victims of revenge
pornography, the consequences are more severe and tragic.83 From the onset,
the moment an explicit image is shared with those who are not meant to see
it, the continued existence of the idea of a permanent record of the image
will haunt young teens or adults for years to come.84 “‘[I]t is the fear of
exposure and the tension of keeping the act secret that seems to have the
most profound emotional repercussions.’”85 Other times, the harassment and
bullying once the image is shared is too much for teens and young adults to
handle.86 Hope Witsell was only thirteen years old when she took a topless
photograph of herself and sent it to a boy she liked.87 The boy then sent the
photograph to others, who then also forwarded the picture to further
recipients.88 This included students at her school and a nearby high school,
who began bullying her in person and over the Internet.89 To deal with the
harassment, Witsell began cutting herself. 90 In a heart-breaking turn of

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 350.
Id. at 350–51.
See Ryan, supra note 36, at 359.
Poltash, supra note 15, at 19.
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events, Hope Witsell took her own life.91 Eighteen-year-old Jessica Logan’s
life also ended too soon when she took her own life after falling into
depression over her shared nude image.92 Jessica sent her boyfriend a nude
photograph of herself when she was on vacation with her friends.93 When
their relationship ended, Jessica’s boyfriend shared her explicit photograph
with others, and the photo was distributed among “students at four different
high schools.”94 “Students at the four schools incessantly harassed Logan
about the photo, calling her a slut, whore, and other names in person, over
the phone, and over the Internet.”95
IV.

THE START OF BANNING REVENGE PORNOGRAPHY: RECENT
LEGISLATION

The fourth part of this Comment will be split into two separate
sections.96 The first section will explore the challenges faced when trying to
enact revenge porn legislation, while the second section will review the fairly
new revenge porn legislation passed in thirteen states. 97 While thirteen
states—New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, Utah, Wisconsin,
Virginia, Georgia, Arizona, Maryland, Colorado, and Hawaii—have passed
legislation, the public’s lack of empathy for revenge pornography victims
might be the reason why enacting legislation in many other states, including
Florida, has not been as successful.98
A.

Issues With Enacting Legislation

The main issue faced when trying to enact legislation to ban revenge
pornography, is the matter of consent.99 The public’s perception of the issue
seems to be one of the “victims ‘brought it upon themselves.’” 100 This
unfortunate lack of empathy towards revenge porn victims has been
illustrated in both scholarly commentary and in comment sections of any

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
infra Part V.
99.
100.
354.
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article or post on the topic.101 When online news articles on revenge porn are
posted—or when bloggers post about and discuss the topic—the comments
section will most likely include derogatory comments towards the victims.102
It is not uncommon to see comments stating that the victims are stupid or
slutty.103 The biggest reason for this response from the public is the fact that
the victims chose to take these photos and then willingly shared them with
other individuals.104
This disregard for harms undermining women’s
autonomy is closely tied to idiosyncratic, dangerous views about
consent with regard to sex. Some argue that a woman’s
consensual sharing of sexually explicit photos with a trusted
confidant should be taken as wide-ranging permission to share
them with the public. Said another way, a victim’s consent in one
context is taken as consent for other contexts. . . . While most
people today would rightly recoil at the suggestion that a woman’s
consent to sleep with one man can be taken as consent to sleep
with all of his friends, this is the very logic of revenge porn
apologists.105

Unfortunately, the lack of public sympathy is mostly harming young
girls.106 A recent study conducted by the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative found
that “[ninety percent] of [the individuals] victimized by revenge
porn[ography] were female.”107 The rise in popularity of sexting, has led to
the peer pressuring of young women—by friends or boyfriends—
encouraging them to take and send these explicit images.108 Other young
women believe that they need to participate in the trend to be cool.109 No
matter the public’s opinion, one minor mistake—especially at an age where
teenagers and young adults might not know any better—should not be a
justification for the years of harassment that these individuals will be forced
to endure.110

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
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Current Legislation

“‘People [do not] know where to start when they are a victim of
revenge porn . . . .’”111 Since the trend of sexting is fairly new, many victims
do not know whether they have any rights or any available remedies when
the recipient of their image or video shares it with others, or posts it
online. 112 “‘Having legislation that defines sexually explicit images and
repercussions of posting images without permission and not removing them
on request empowers the victim and hopefully leads to quick resolution in
many of these cases.’”113 Sexting and the recent advances in technology—
which have made the startup of revenge pornography websites to post
explicit content received through sexting incredibly simple for anybody who
owns a computer—has brought on new challenges which our generation is
only now beginning to tackle.114
Revenge porn victims have only recently come forward to
describe the grave harms they have suffered, including stalking,
loss of professional and educational opportunities, and
psychological damage. As with domestic violence and sexual
assault, victims of revenge porn suffer negative consequences for
speaking out, including the risk of increased harm. We are only
now beginning to get a sense of how large the problem of revenge
porn is now that brave, outspoken victims have opened a space for
others to tell their stories. The fact that nonconsensual porn so
often involves the Internet and social media, the public, law
enforcement, and the judiciary sometimes struggle to understand
the mechanics of the conduct and the devastation it can cause.115

In an effort to end the lifelong damaging outcomes suffered by the
victims of revenge pornography, state legislatures are beginning to take
innovative steps toward criminalizing the act.116 Currently, thirteen states—
New Jersey, Alaska, Texas, California, Idaho, Utah, Wisconsin, Virginia,
Georgia, Arizona, Maryland, Colorado, and Hawaii—have passed laws that

111.
Revision Legal to Testify May 6 Before Michigan Senate Judiciary
Committee on Issues, Recommendations for “Revenge Porn” Legislation, P.R. NEWSWIRE,
(May 5, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/revision-legal-to-testify-may-6before-michigan-senate-judiciary-committee-on-issues-recommendations-for-revenge-pornlegislation-258001681.html.
112.
See id.
113.
Id. (emphasis in original).
114.
See Franks, supra note 6, at 1.
115.
Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 347.
116.
See Franks, supra note 6, at 3.
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criminalize revenge pornography.117 Although experts in the field of cyber
harassment admit that the laws may be flawed and may not provide enough
protection—stating that “many of these laws suffer from narrow applicability
and/or constitutional infirmities”—they are still groundbreaking and an
improvement for victims who may not be able to receive any protection at
all.118
Revenge pornography is likely to violate state statutes for
harassment or invasion of privacy in many states, but police officers will
usually not act unless the explicit content posted involves a minor.119 When
the image involves a minor, child pornography laws come into play, which
are normally treated with more seriousness and urgency.120 Police tend to
turn away many revenge pornography victims who are young adults or
adults, because they cannot provide any evidence of physical harm. 121
Sometimes police officers embarrass or harass the victims themselves.122 It
is imperative that all revenge pornography victims receive protection because
the harm of harassment, “lost jobs, lost relationships, lost friendships, and in
extreme cases, physical harm,” is very real.123 The thirteen states that have
passed legislation banning the posting of nonconsensual pornography have
begun a groundbreaking movement that may take years to complete.124
1.

New Jersey

New Jersey Code 2C:14-9 was passed in New Jersey in 2003.125 The
statute “makes ‘it a felony to disclose a person’s nude or partially nude
image without that person’s consent.’” 126 Subsection (c) of the statute
specifically refers to the type of revenge pornography this Comment
discusses—instances in which an individual willingly shares the content with
one person they trust, but the content is then further distributed without their
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 1, 3; see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 240–41.
119.
Martinez, supra note 1, at 239.
120.
See Poltash, supra note 15, at 13.
121.
See Martinez, supra note 1, at 236–37 (illustrating the story of Annmarie
Chiarini, whose boyfriend coerced her to take explicit photographs of herself). After the
relationship ended, Chiarini’s boyfriend distributed her explicit photographs to strangers, her
friends, and her family. Id. She contacted the police, who “told her that no crime was
committed and there was nothing [that] they could do.” Id. at 236. The second time she
contacted the police, they “laughed [at her] and essentially blamed her for the incident.” Id. at
237.
122.
Id. at 237, 239.
123.
Martinez, supra note 1, at 251.
124.
Franks, supra note 6, at 3; see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 239–44.
125.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9 (West 2014).
126.
Martinez, supra note 1, at 239; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9.
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consent—whereas the other sections of the statute describe instances where
the individual engaging in the act is photographed or recorded without
permission.127 The section specifically reads:
c. An actor commits a crime of the third degree if, knowing that
he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he discloses any
photograph, film, videotape, recording or any other reproduction
of the image of another person whose intimate parts are exposed or
who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact,
unless that person has consented to such disclosure. For purposes
of this subsection, disclose means sell, manufacture, give, provide,
lend, trade, mail, deliver, transfer, publish, distribute, circulate,
disseminate, present, exhibit, advertise or offer. Notwithstanding
the provisions of subsection b of [New Jersey Statute] 2C:43-3, a
fine not to exceed $30,000 may be imposed for a violation of this
subsection.128

Subsection (d)(1) of the statute makes it “an affirmative defense to a
crime under this section that: [T]he actor posted or otherwise provided prior
notice to the person of the actor’s intent to engage in the conduct specified in
subsection a., b., or c.”129 Experts and lawmakers alike praise the “‘specific
definitions and affirmative defenses’” outlined in the statute, as they “‘guard
the statute against First Amendment overbreadth.’”130 The law has also been
complimented for treating the conduct seriously even though it was enacted
“well ahead of its time” and “years before any of the debate that surrounds
such laws today” began.131 Making the posting of revenge pornography a
felony also serves as a good deterrent for those who may not think that the
act is a serious offense.132 “New Jersey ‘gave the law enough teeth to serve
as a deterrent, threatening those convicted of posting lewd images or video of
someone without license or privilege with a third-degree crime, punishable
with a prison sentence of [three] to [five] years.’” 133 The lack of this
deterrent effect in many of the other states that have proposed legislation
may lead to the opinion that the legislation might not be effective, and
therefore, the proposed bill may ultimately fail to pass as law.134

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
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N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-9(1)(a)–(c).
Id. § 2C:14-9(1)(c).
Id. § 2C:14-9(1)(d)(1).
Martinez, supra note 1, at 240–41.
Id. at 241.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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California

California’s Senate Bill 255, which is now codified as section
647(j)(4) of the California Penal Code, became effective on October 1,
2013.135 The law “makes it a misdemeanor to ‘publish images of another
person without their consent “with the intent[] to cause . . . emotional
distress.”’”136 The California law finds someone guilty of disorderly conduct
if:
Any person who photographs or records by any means the
image of the intimate body part or parts of another identifiable
person, under circumstances where the parties agree or understand
that the image shall remain private, and the person subsequently
distributes the image taken, with the intent to cause serious
emotional distress, and the depicted person suffers serious
emotional distress.137

The initial issue with the California revenge pornography statute was
that it did not protect victims who had taken the images themselves and then
shared them with someone they trusted, who then shared them with third
party recipients without the victims’ consent. 138 As stated earlier in this
Comment, “up to [eighty percent] of revenge porn[ography] victims belong
to this category,” which is why it is the main focus of this Comment.139 The
law, therefore, did not punish anybody except the person who made the
recording.140 This meant that operators of revenge pornography websites and
third party redistributors of the image—who many times encourage the
posting of these images or engage in egging on viewers to harass the
victims—could not be charged under the law.141 On February 21, 2014, the
California Assembly Commission enrolled Bill 2643, which will expand the
Civil Code by prohibiting a person from posting explicit images of another
identifiable person that were intended to remain private. 142 This new
addition to the law

135.

CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4) (West 2014); Martinez, supra note 1, at

136.
647(j)(4)(A).
137.
138.
647(j)(4)(A).
139.
140.
141.
142.

Martinez supra note 1, at 241–42; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §

241.
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CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A).
Martinez, supra note 1, at 242–43; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §
Martinez, supra note 1, at 242; see also supra Parts I–II.
Martinez, supra note 1, at 243.
Id.
Assemb. 2643, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
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would create a private right of action against a person who
intentionally distributes a photograph or recorded image of another
that exposes the intimate body parts, as defined, of that person or
him or her engaged in specified sexual acts, without his or her
consent, knowing that the other person had a reasonable
expectation that the material would remain private, if specified
conditions are met.143

Another major issue with California law still remains though; the
criminal law requires that the defendant intended to cause the victim serious
emotional distress.144 This creates a problem for prosecutors who then need
to collect evidence to prove that victims have suffered emotional distress.145
The sexual nature involved with sexting and becoming a victim of revenge
pornography already makes victims reluctant to share their stories.146 Many
victims are too humiliated or afraid to speak out and would rather just have
the whole episode disappear, or at the very least remain anonymous.147 The
California criminal statute is also quite tame in its punishment compared to
other revenge porn statutes, which has a negative effect on its deterrent
factor.148
3.

Maryland

Scholars with an expertise in online cyber bullying and
harassment—and have extensive knowledge of revenge pornography—were
very excited about the proposed legislation aimed at criminalizing revenge
pornography in Maryland.149 Proposed House Bill 43 originally intended to
“bar[] the disclosure of a person’s sexually explicit or nude images ‘knowing
that the other person has not consented to the disclosure.’”150 The original
143.
Id.
144.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2014); Citron & Franks, supra
note 3, at 374.
145.
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A); Martinez, supra note 1, at 243.
146.
Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 358.
147.
See id.
148.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(k)–(l); Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 374.
The statute makes nonconsensual pornography a misdemeanor “punishable by up to six
months in prison and a [one thousand dollar] fine, up to one year in prison and a [two
thousand dollar] fine for a second offense,” whereas New Jersey’s revenge pornography
statute—and many other newly proposed statutes—makes the act punishable as a felony
imposed with greater jail time and heftier fines. Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 374;
Martinez, supra note 1, at 239–41.
149.
See Groundbreaking Revenge Porn Bill, THE ELM (Nov. 4, 2013), https://
elm.umaryland.edu/groundbreaking-internet-safety-bill/.
150.
Citron and Franks, supra note 3, at 372 (quoting H.D. 43, 2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2014)).
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legislative text of the bill was similar to New Jersey’s praised revenge
pornography statute due to its specific definitions, broad scope, and its
effective deterrent status in making the act of revenge pornography a
felony. 151 It was a positive move towards more states enacting effective
legislation to criminalize revenge pornography.152 Unfortunately, before it
was enacted on May 12, 2014, the legislative text of the bill was dramatically
changed.153 The enacted law—effective October 1, 2014—now reads:
(B)(1) This section does not apply to: (I) lawful and common
practices of law enforcement, the reporting of unlawful conduct, or
legal proceedings; or (II) situations involving voluntary exposure
in public or commercial settings. An interactive computer service,
as defined in 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2), is not liable under this section
for content provided by another person.
(C) A person may not intentionally cause serious emotional
distress to another by intentionally placing on the Internet a
photograph, film, videotape, recording, or any other reproduction
of the image of the other person that reveals the identity of the
other person with his or her intimate parts exposed or while
engaged in an act of sexual contact: (1) knowing that the other
person did not consent to the placement of the image on the
Internet, and (2) under circumstances in which the other person
had a reasonable expectation that the image would be kept private.
(D) A person who violates this section is guilty of a misdemeanor
and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding [two]
years or a fine not exceeding [five thousand dollars] or both.154

The enacted bill now requires the intent of causing emotional
distress to the victim—similar to the California revenge pornography

151.
See Md. H.D. 43; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 372–74.
152.
See Citron & Franks, supra note 3 at 372–74.
153.
Md. H.D. 43; MD. DEP’T OF LEGIS. SERVS., FISCAL & POLICY NOTE, H.D.
43, Reg. Sess., at 5 (2014).
154.
Md. H.D. 43. The original legislative attempt to pass Maryland revenge
pornography legislation read:
For the purpose of prohibiting a person from intentionally disclosing a
certain sexually explicit image of a certain other person, knowing that the other
person has not consented to the disclosure; providing penalties for a violation of
this Act; providing for the scope of this Act; providing that this Act does not affect
any legal or equitable right or remedy otherwise provided by law; defining certain
terms; and generally relating to the intentional disclosure of sexually explicit
images.

H.D. 64, 434th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2014).
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statute.155 The original attempt to pass revenge porn legislation only required
that a person intentionally disclose an image, “knowing that the other person
has not consented.”156 The enacted law has also lowered the severity of the
crime.157 The original attempt to pass revenge porn legislation would have
made the disclosure of sexually explicit images, without consent, a felony
with a punishment of up to five years of jail time and a significant fine.158
The enacted law lowered the degree of the crime to a misdemeanor.159 With
the law being classified as a lower degree crime, it means that the punishable
time of an offender must also be lowered.160 The Maryland law currently
allows up to two years of jail time and, in the most serious offenses, up to a
five thousand dollar maximum fine.161
There is still reason for lawmakers, and the public alike, to be
pleased with Maryland’s enacted revenge pornography statute. 162
Lawmakers have commended the second section of the bill, which lists
various exemptions of scenarios where the bill does not apply.163 Luckily for
them, the second section of the statute stayed intact with only relatively
minor changes.164 The statute provides that in certain scenarios—such as in
any situation that involves “lawful and common practices of law
enforcement, the reporting of unlawful conduct, or legal proceedings”—the
statute does not apply and the act engaged in cannot be considered a criminal
act.165 Scholars have argued that it is important for lawmakers to include
clear exemptions like these so that the proposed statutes can avoid First
Amendment overbreadth issues.166
155.
Md. H.D. 43; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(j)(4)(A) (West 2014).
156.
Md. H.D. 64.
157.
Compare Md. H.D. 64, with Md. H.D. 43.
158.
Md. H.D. 64.
159.
Md. H.D. 43.
160.
See Md. H.D. 43; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 373–74 (discussing
the different laws in states who have passed laws criminalizing revenge porn and the amount
punishable under each statute).
161.
Md. H.D. 43.
162.
See id.; Pat Warren, Bill Signed Into Law Making Revenge Porn a
Misdemeanor, CBS BALTIMORE LOCAL (May 15, 2014, 6:52 PM), http://Baltimore.
cbslocal.com/2014/05/15/bill-signed-into-law-making-revenge-porn-a-misdemeanor/.
163.
Md. H.D. 43; see also Warren, supra note 162.
164.
Md. H.D. 43.
165.
Id.
166.
Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388.
Revenge porn bills should include exemptions that guard against the
criminalization of disclosures concerning matters of public interest, such as the
Maryland, New York, and Wisconsin bills do. They should make clear that it is a
crime to distribute someone’s sexually explicit images if and only if those images
do not concern matters of public importance. . . . Such an exception would help
reflect the state of First Amendment doctrine; it would not alleviate overbreadth
problems.
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The fifth section of this Comment will specifically focus on the
current state of revenge pornography legislation in Florida, and aim at
convincing readers that revenge pornography should be criminalized in the
state of Florida.167 Recently, both Florida House Bill 475 and Florida Senate
Bill 532 failed to pass as law. 168 The proposed legislation aimed at
“prohibiting an individual from disclosing a sexually explicit image of an
identifiable person.”169 The first part of this section will outline both the
Florida House Bill 475 and Florida Senate Bill 532.170 The second part of
this section will discuss the suggestions of scholars who specialize in
revenge pornography, as applied to Florida’s proposed legislation, to help
legislative bodies draft new bills so the state can continue to move forward in
its efforts to criminalize revenge pornography.171
A.

Proposed Legislation

Legislation was proposed both in the Florida House of
Representatives and the Florida Senate to criminalize revenge pornography
in Florida.172 Unfortunately, both efforts failed.173 One issue—which will be
discussed in the second section of this part of the Comment—is that both
proposed bills required a showing of intent to harass the victim by posting
the explicit images.174 The statutes do have significant differences though,
which can be seen in the legislative text of the bills.175 Florida House Bill
475—which died in the Criminal Justice Subcommittee on May 2, 2014—
reads:
An act relating to the disclosure of sexually explicit
images . . . prohibiting an individual from disclosing a sexually
Id. (footnote omitted).
167.
See infra Part V.A–B.
168.
See H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2014); CS/CS/SB 532: Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images, FLORIDA SENATE,
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2014/0532 (last visited Jan. 2, 2015); HB 475:
Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images, FLORIDA SENATE, http://www.flsenate.gov/
Session/Bill/2014/0475 (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
169.
Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
170.
See infra Part V.A.
171.
See infra Part V.B.
172.
See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
173.
Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; CS/CS/SB 532: Disclosure of Sexually Explicit
Images, supra note 168; HB 475: Disclosure of Sexually Explicit Images, supra note 168.
174.
Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; see infra Part V.B.
175.
See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol39/iss1/5

92

et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue

84

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

explicit image of an identifiable person with the intent to harass
such person if the individual knows or should have known such
person did not consent to the disclosure.
....
(2) An individual may not intentionally and knowingly disclose . .
. sexually explicit image of an identifiable person or that contains
descriptive information in a form that conveys the personal
identification information . . . of the person to a social networking
service or a website, or by means of any other electronic medium,
with the intent to harass such person, if the individual knows or
should have known that the person depicted in . . . sexually explicit
image did not consent to such disclosure.
(3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), an individual who
violates this section commits a felony of the third degree . . . .
(b) An individual who is [eighteen] years of age or older at the
time he or she violates this section commits a felony of the second
degree . . . if the violation involves a sexually explicit image of an
individual who was younger than [sixteen] years of age at the time
the sexually explicit image was created.
....
(5) This section does not apply to the disclosure of a sexually
explicit image for:
(a) The reporting, investigation, and prosecution of an alleged
crime for law enforcement purposes.
(b) Voluntary and consensual purposes in public or commercial
settings.176

Section (1) of the bill, which was omitted from the recopying of the
statute into this Comment provided above, provides specific and detailed
definitions for the terms used within the proposed statute, such as disclose,
harass, identifiable person, and sexually explicit image.177 As stated in the
text, the Florida House Bill makes the violation of the revenge pornography
statute a felony.178
Unlike the Florida House Bill, the Florida Senate Bill makes the
offense of disclosing sexually explicit images a misdemeanor. 179 Florida
Senate Bill 532 reads:
An act relating to the disclosure of sexually explicit
images . . . prohibiting an individual from disclosing a sexually
explicit image of an identifiable person with the intent to harass
176.
177.
178.
179.
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such person if the individual knows or should have known such
person did not consent to the disclosure; providing criminal
penalties . . . requiring a court to order that a person convicted of
such offense be prohibited from having contact with the victim;
providing criminal penalties for a violation of such order;
providing that criminal penalties for certain offenses run
consecutively with a sentence imposed for a violation of [specific
provisions].
....
(3)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), an individual who
violates this section commits a second degree misdemeanor . . . .
(b) An individual who is older than [eighteen] years of age at the
time he or she violates this section commits a first degree
misdemeanor . . . if the violation involves a sexually explicit image
of an individual who was younger than [sixteen] years of age at the
time the sexually explicit image was created.180

The Senate-proposed bill provides specific definitions for the terms
disclose, harass, identifiable person, and sexually explicit image as well.181
Section 1 of the proposed legislation—intentionally left out of the recopying
of the statute above—also specifically mentions, as the House Bill does, that
“[a]n individual may not intentionally and knowingly disclose a sexually
explicit image of an identifiable person to a social networking service or a
website, or by means of any electronic medium.”182 This illustrates that both
of the proposed statutes are trying to specifically target the rising trend of
revenge pornography as it relates to posting these images on the Internet.183
Unlike House of Representatives Bill 475, which placed a heftier punishment
for violators of the statute, Senate Bill 532 provided that a violation of the
statute would amount to a misdemeanor.184 In Florida, a misdemeanor of the
first degree is punishable “by a definite term of imprisonment not exceeding
[one] year.”185 “A misdemeanor of the second degree [is punishable] by a
definite term of imprisonment not exceeding [sixty] days.”186 For a felony in
the second degree under House of Representatives Bill 475, one who
committed the act of sharing an explicit image involving a minor without
consent could have been punished “by a term of imprisonment not exceeding
[fifteen] years.” 187 Young adults and adults who fall in the category of
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
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Fla. S. 532 (emphasis added).
Id. § 1(1).
Id. § 1(2); see also Fla. H.R. 475 § 1(2).
See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
See Fla. H.R. 475 § 1(3); Fla. S. 532 § 1(3).
FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (2014).
Id. § 775.082(4)(b).
Id. § 775.082(3)(d); Fla. H.R. 475 § 1(3)(b).
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violating a felony in the third degree, could have been punished “by a term of
imprisonment not exceeding [five] years.”188 The fines that could have been
imposed range from five thousand dollars to ten thousand dollars for the
felonies, and five hundred dollars to one thousand dollars for the
misdemeanors.189
B.

Scholar Suggestions

Reviewing proposed legislation and analyzing the legislative text
against expert advice might help legislative bodies determine why the law
might have failed to pass. 190 At the very least, reading and analyzing
scholars’ advice may help lawmakers draft more applicable legislation that
has greater chances of being enacted into law, which is the ultimate goal.191
The main problem with House of Representatives Bill 475 and Senate Bill
532 was the malicious motive requirement.192 Both proposed bills required a
showing of intent to harass the victim by posting the explicit images. 193
When evaluating the California revenge pornography statute—which also
requires proof of a malicious motive that the defendants intended to inflict
serious emotional distress upon the victim—scholars and lawmakers alike
believed that it went too far:194
Such requirements misunderstand the gravamen of the
wrong—the disclosure of someone’s naked photographs
without the person’s consent and in violation of their
expectation that the image be kept private. Whether the
person making the disclosure is motivated by a desire to harm
a particular person, as opposed to a desire to entertain or
generate profit, should be irrelevant. Malicious motive
requirements are not demanded by the First Amendment and,
in fact, create an unprincipled and indefensible hierarchy of
perpetrators. What is essential is a statute’s goal of protecting
privacy, autonomy, and the fostering of private expression,
which the Court has recognized as legitimate grounds for
regulation.195
188.
FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(e), (9)(3)(d).
189.
Id. § 775.083(1)(b)–(e).
190.
See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 386–90.
191.
See id. at 386.
192.
See Fla. H.R. 475; S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); Citron &
Franks, supra note 3, at 387.
193.
Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
194.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(4)(A) (West 2014); see also Citron & Franks,
supra note 3, at 387.
195.
Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 387.
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Malicious motive requirements also make the case harder for
prosecutors who must charge the offenders. 196 As shown throughout this
Comment—and through many other scholarly articles that reiterate the
stories of victims—many are too ashamed to talk and are afraid to come
forward with their story.197 Victims want to hide from the shame posts found
online, not attribute their name further to the content.198
The requirement of intent to harass the victim may also discourage
law enforcement officers from acting when a revenge pornography victim
comes forward.199 The issue of what constitutes harassment and when the
violator passes the threshold to qualify the act as intending to harass, begins
again.200 The definition of harass—provided in both House Bill 475 and
Senate Bill 532—provides little help. 201 According to the proposed
legislation, “‘harass’ means to engage in conduct directed at a specific
person which causes substantial emotional distress to that person and serves
no legitimate purpose.” 202 “Revenge porn statutes might have a better
chance of withstanding overbreadth challenges if they require the state to
prove that the victims suffered harm.”203 Although it might help the statute
escape overbreadth challenges, the requirement of showing harm further
frustrates the issue of having revenge porn victims come forward and speak
out.204 Many victims are also afraid of what the person they are reporting
might forward to others, and openly speak about what they have been
through, as well as the harm that the offender has inflicted on them.205 It is
scary for victims to come forward and openly speak about what they have
been through as well as the harm that the offender has inflicted on them.206
The proposed legislation did a good job of providing clear and specific
definitions of key terms, though.207 Along with the important definitions of
harass and sexually explicit image, Florida legislators also included a
definition for the term disclose, which is very important in regards to revenge
196.
Id. at 369–70; see also Martinez, supra note 1, at 243.
197.
See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 347, 358.
198.
See id. at 358.
199.
Martinez, supra note 1, at 237; see also H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2014); S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014).
200.
See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
201.
See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
202.
Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
203.
Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388.
204.
See id. at 347.
205.
See id.; Martinez, supra note 1, at 236–37.
206.
Martinez, supra note 1, 236–37; see also Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at
367.
207.
See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
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pornography statutes.208 The legislative text defines disclose as “to publish,
post, distribute, exhibit, advertise, offer, or transfer, or cause to be published,
posted, distributed, exhibited, advertised, offered, or transferred.” 209 This
definition is excellent as it covers a wide range of scenarios that can
constitute revenge pornography and does not limit the act to a specific
transfer from one person to the other; it protects victims on a much larger
scale. 210 The proposed legislation also contained an exemption section,
similar to the praised section in Maryland’s revenge porn statute.211 Again,
lawmakers favor this type of clear exemption section because it helps avoid
First Amendment overbreadth issues.212
Another issue the proposed legislation in Florida most likely faced is
the extent of the penalty imposed upon violators.213
The ideal penalty for nonconsensual pornography is
another contested issue. If the conduct is categorized as a
mere misdemeanor, it risks sending the message that the harm
caused to victims is not that severe. Such categorization also
decreases incentives for law enforcement to dedicate the
resources necessary to adequately investigate such conduct.
At the same time, criminal laws that are more punitive will
face stricter examination and possible public resistance.
Although California’s categorization of revenge porn as a
misdemeanor sends a weak message to would-be perpetrators
and will be a less effective deterrent than a law like New
Jersey’s, [which categorizes revenge porn as a felony], it may
have aided the law’s passage.214

Lawmakers need to find a median point in categorizing legislation.215
The felony categorization of revenge pornography, with a penalty of
anywhere between five to fifteen years of jail time—although a good
deterrent—seems too extreme, and it casts a shadow of doubt that anybody
would actually be charged under the statute.216 On the other hand, under the
208.
Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388.
209.
Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
210.
See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388–89.
211.
Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 372–73; see
also MD. CODE ANN. Criminal Law § 3-809 (West 2014).
212.
See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 388.
213.
See Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532.
214.
Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 389.
215.
See id.
216.
See id. at 389–90 (discussing the importance of penalty categorization of
statutes, which can either make a proposed legislation successful, or be responsible for its
death); Martinez, supra note 1, at 241.
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proposed Senate Bill, it is possible for violators to get a sentence of up to one
year in jail, which seems like a slap on the wrist compared to revenge porn
statutes in other states.217 It is possible that legislators wondered if this law
would even be worth passing, as it is not likely to deter actors, especially
since police officers will probably not be willing to spend the needed time to
investigate the act for such a small offense.218 Although Florida’s proposed
legislation was a good starting point, it is clear that both bills were flawed.219
VI.

CONCLUSION

Revenge pornography is a rising trend that today’s generation needs
to face.220 Technological innovations have made it easier for individuals to
share private information with others with a simple click of a button.221 For
revenge porn victims, this private information is of the most sensitive kind—
sexually explicit images or videos of the individual.222 With the dramatic
increase of the popularity of sexting, teenagers, and young adults are the
main victims of revenge pornography.223 These young adults are haunted at
a young age because of one mistake that will likely “result[] in lost jobs, lost
relationships, lost friendships, and [possibly] physical harm.” 224 Thirteen
states have enacted revenge porn legislation and many have proposed bills in
review.225 The efforts of Florida Legislators to enact revenge pornography
have sadly failed, but lawmakers cannot stop trying.226 This Comment has
proven the rise in the number of acts leading to revenge pornography, has
shown the harms of revenge pornography faced by victims, and has analyzed
legislation in other states which may be of help preparing the next set of
proposed legislation. 227 The Florida Legislature’s attempts at enacting
revenge pornography were commendable, and the state continues to move
forward during this groundbreaking era in an effort to join other states in

217.
Fla. S. 532; see also FLA. STAT. § 775.082(4)(a) (2014); Citron & Franks,
supra note 3, at 389.
218.
See Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 361, 389.
219.
See H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); Fla. S. 532; Citron &
Franks, supra note 3, at 387–91.
220.
See Martinez, supra note 1, at 237; Poltash, supra note 15, at 5–6, 19.
221.
See Martinez, supra note 1, at 237–38, 245.
222.
Id. at 245.
223.
Id. at 251.
224.
Id.
225.
Franks, supra note 6, at 3; see also Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 371.
226.
See H.R. 475, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2014); S. 532, 2014 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2014); Kay, supra note 21.
227.
See supra Parts II–V.
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criminalizing this disgraceful act.228 “On July 30, 2014, the Miami Beach
Commission unanimously voted to pass a resolution urging the Florida
[L]egislature to enact legislation criminalizing . . . revenge
porn[ography].”229 The resolution was passed with the aid of Miami-Dade
Florida Association for Women Lawyers, whose main “mission [includes]
mak[ing] Florida the next state on [the] list” of the thirteen states that have
already passed revenge porn legislation. 230 It is impossible to draft the
perfect statute, but legislators could take the advice of experts and scholars in
the field of cyber harassment to help enact better revenge pornography
statutes that will provide victims with more protection, and will succeed at
becoming law.231

228.
Kay, supra note 21; see also Fla. H.R. 475; Fla. S. 532; Citron & Franks,
supra note 3, at 371.
229.
Press Release, Fla. Ass’n for Women Lawyers Miami-Dade Chapter, With
the Help of Miami-Dade FAWL, Miami Beach Comm’n Unanimously Votes to Pass
Resolution Urging Fla. Legislature to Criminalize “Revenge Porn” (July 30, 2014), available
at http://mdfawl.org/miami-beach-revenge-porn-resolution/; see also Kay, supra note 21.
230.
Press Release, Fla. Ass’n for Women Lawyers Miami-Dade Chapter,
supra note 229.
231.
See Citron & Franks, supra note 3, at 386, 390–91.
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INTRODUCTION

The digital after life1 has quickly become the brave new world of
probate law and estate planning.2 The reason for this is because as recently
as 2010, reports show that “[seventy-seven percent] of Americans use e-mail
or the [I]nternet, at least occasionally.”3 Yet, a similar study now reveals
that number has increased to show that eighty-seven percent of American
adults are now using the Internet.4 More significantly, while nearly nine out
of ten Americans from the ages of eighteen through forty-five use the
Internet,5 ninety-seven percent of young adults ages eighteen through
twenty-nine are regularly using the Internet.6 The Internet has become so
prevalent in society that fifty-nine percent of young adults ages eighteen
through twenty-nine cite the Internet as their primary source for news, both
nationally and internationally.7 Furthermore, research shows that nearly
eight out of ten young adults ages eighteen through twenty-four “have
created their own social networking profile.”8 With this expanding
popularity, words like selfie and social media have now been deeply
ingrained in our language,9 and it seems like social networking, e-mail, and
microblogging are here to stay;10 unfortunately, we are not.11 Therefore, this
1.
Dana Parks, Digital After Life—Social Media and the Deceased, SAN
DIEGO BURIAL AT SEA (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.sandiegoburialatsea.com/digital-after-life/.
2.
See Caitlin Dewey, What Happens to Your Facebook When You Die?,
WASH. POST (May 7, 2014, 5:20 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/
2014/05/07/what-happens-to-your-facebook-when-you-die/.
3.
PEW RES. CTR., MILLENNIALS: CONFIDENT. CONNECTED. OPEN TO
CHANGE., 27 (Paul Taylor & Scott Keeter eds., 2010), available at http:/
/www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/millennials-confident-connected-open-to-change.pdf.
4.
PEW RES. CTR., THE WEB AT 25 IN THE U.S.: THE OVERALL VERDICT: THE
INTERNET HAS BEEN A PLUS FOR SOCIETY AND AN ESPECIALLY GOOD THING FOR INDIVIDUAL
USERS 5 (2014), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/02/27/the-web-at-25-in-the-us/.
5.
See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 3, at 19, 27.
6.
PEW RES.CTR., supra note 4, at 5.
7.
See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 3, at 35.
8.
Id. at 29.
9.
Selfie
Definition,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/selfie (last visited Dec. 26, 2014) (selfie was first used in 2002 and
emphasizes the recent impact social networking has had on our culture); Social Media
Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/socialmedia
(last visited Dec. 26, 2014).
10.
See Dan Newman, 6 Reasons Social Media Is Your Secret Weapon in
Customer Service, ENTREPRENEUR (May 5, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/
article/233612.
11.
See Estate Planning: Protecting Your Digital Assets, ALLY BANK (May 9,
2014, 9:00 AM), http://community.ally.com/straight-talk/estate-planning-your-digital-assets/.
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continually debated legal question still exists: What happens to our digital
assets when we die?12
There is already an excellent foundation of legal discussion
developed around how digital property should be managed,13 what should
happen to an owner’s social media account when they die,14 as well as how a
Uniform Act may help state legislatures address the disposition of digital
property.15 This Comment will expand on this discussion by exploring how
some states, the Uniform Act, and other legal scholars have attempted to
address this legal issue in order to provide the groundwork for how the
Florida Legislature can effectively and fairly govern digital estate planning,
while staying ahead of the ever-increasing role that technology and social
media plays in our lives.16 Part II of this Comment will provide a general
overview of the types of digital assets and the problems that may arise when
digital assets become things of value.17 Part III will outline the existing state
legislative solutions and consider to what extent the Uniform Act provides
for digital estate planning, and examine the possible issues that follow.18
Part IV will discuss traditional estate planning in Florida and its silence in
addressing the fiduciaries’ responsibilities to maintain and administer the
decedent’s digital estate.19 Lastly, this Comment will conclude with
recommendations on how the Florida Legislature can improve on the current
legislative solutions and develop a sound foundation, keeping pace with the
ever changing technological world, and the legal issues arising out of digital
estate planning.20

12.
Id.
13.
See James D. Lamm et al., The Digital Death Conundrum: How Federal
and State Laws Prevent Fiduciaries from Managing Digital Property, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV.
385, 391–396 (2014).
14.
Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1644 (2012);
Damien McCallig, Note, Facebook After Death: An Evolving Policy in a Social Network, 22
INT’L. J.L. & INFO. TECH. 107, 108 (2014); Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our
Facebook Accounts When We Die?: Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media
Assets Postmortem, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 186 (2012).
15.
Samantha D. Haworth, Note, Laying Your Online Self to Rest: Evaluating
the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 535, 542 (2014).
16.
See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
17.
See discussion infra Part II.
18.
See discussion infra Part III.
19.
See discussion infra Part IV.
20.
See discussion infra Part V.
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HOW SOCIAL MEDIA BECOMES A DIGITAL ASSET

Seeing how the use of social media, online banking, e-mail, gaming,
and blogging accounts are growing at an astounding rate,21 there should not
be any surprise in the contemporaneous rise in legal questions.22 Some
reports estimate that by 2018, social networking accounts will increase from
3.6 billion to over 5.2 billion.23 One of the first social media platforms that
turned online sharing into a big business for its creative users and its
advertisers was YouTube.24 Some of YouTube’s most popular user accounts
boast upwards of one million dollars in revenue a year and over a billion
views worldwide.25
While the popularity of these sites and accounts rise, so does its
value to their users.26 One such social media platform, Vine, is also a social
media website that allows “millions of people [to] post [six]-second clips and
share them with the community.”27 Although Vine is only a year old, the
platform has generated enormous popularity with teens, young adults, and
advertisers.28 There are several Vine Stars29 that have gained millions of
followers.30 These social media celebrities use their pages as substantial
sources of income and in some cases can make upwards of two thousand

21.
Computer & Internet Trends in America, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 3,
2014), http://www.census.gov/library/infographics/computer_2014.html; Internet Usage and
Population Growth, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/am/us.htm
(last visited Dec. 26, 2014); e.g., Facebook Reports Second Quarter 2014 Results, FACEBOOK
(July 23, 2014), http://investor.fb.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=861599.
Facebook
reported over 1.32 billion monthly active users, “an increase of [fourteen percent] year-overyear.” Id.
22.
Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 387; Sherry, supra note 14, at 187.
23.
THE RADICATI GRP., INC., EMAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2014–2018 4 (Sara
Radicati ed., 2014).
24.
See About YouTube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/yt/about/ (last
visited Dec. 26, 2014).
25.
Harrison Jacobs, We Ranked YouTube’s Biggest Stars by How Much
Money They Make, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 10, 2014, 9:22 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
richest-youtube-stars-2014-3?op=1.
26.
See Alyson Shontell, Meet the Stars of Vine: These Kids Have Millions of
Followers and Make Eye-Popping Amounts of Money, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 8, 2014, 11:48
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/vine-stars-2014-3.
27.
Id.
28.
See id.
29.
Id.
30.
Jeff Beer, Vine Star Logan Paul Brings His Six-Second Creativity to New
Hanes Campaign, FAST COMPANY (July 20, 2014, 8:14 PM), http://www.fastcocreate.com/
3033265/vine-star-logan-paul-brings-his-six-second-creativity-to-new-hanes-campaign;
Shontell, supra note 26.
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dollars per re-Vine.31 Therefore, social media accounts can become so
popular that they generate businesses within themselves, drive revenue, and
become digital assets of their own.32
Surprisingly, on average, an everyday individual’s digital assets are
worth thirty-five thousand dollars to fifty-five thousand dollars.33 There is
no doubt that a digital asset can have real value.34 There are several
examples where digital assets can hold intellectual property rights, earn
revenue from advertisers, and even put a price on digital avatars in video
games.35 World of Warcraft is a gaming platform that has users purchase
online weapons, virtual resorts, and gaming currency through the digital
realm with real money.36 Several of World of Warcraft users have accounts
with avatars that are part of an online gaming community and worth
thousands of dollars.37
Furthermore, no one will deny the sentimental value that certain
digital media can have.38 Photos, e-mails, instant messages, and other
personal information could be some of the most important assets a family
will have after their loved one passes.39 This is becoming increasingly
noteworthy because more and more memorabilia are uploaded to a computer
or digital archive rather than physically placed in a photobook.40 Thus,
digital property can be important to protect and plan for, even if there is no
financial value.41
Undoubtedly, the first step would require us to properly define
digital assets and their characteristics.42

31.
Shontell, supra note 26. A re-Vine is where a user shares a sponsor’s
video simply by pressing the re-Vine button, and the user would be compensated for sharing
that video with his or her followers. See id.
32.
See Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 389–90; Shontell, supra note 26.
33.
Ashley Watkins, Comment, Digital Properties and Death: What Will
Your Heirs Have Access to After You Die?, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 193, 195, (2014); Evan Carroll,
How Much Are Your Digital Assets Worth? About $35,000, DIGITAL BEYOND (July 24, 2014),
http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2014/07/how-much-are-your-digital-assets-worth-about35000/.
34.
See Watkins, supra note 33, at 194–95.
35.
Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 389–90.
36.
See id. at 390.
37.
See id.; Watkins, supra note 33, at 195.
38.
Lamm et al., supra note 13, at 390–91.
39.
Id.
40.
Id. at 391.
41.
Id.
42.
See John Romano, A Working Definition of Digital Assets, DIGITAL
BEYOND (Sept. 1, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2011/09/a-workingdefinition-of-digital-assets/.
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[While] [t]he phrase digital asset is being used . . . we have yet to
come to a legally-accepted definition. A simple definition is that a
digital asset is content owned by an individual that is stored in
digital form. But this may not be broad enough to encompass all
the digital elements of an estate that have value. An expanded
definition includes online accounts.
So a more inclusive definition is that a digital asset is
digitally stored content or an online account owned by an
individual.43

Thus, when considering whether the account or its content is a
digital asset, we have to determine its “value . . . in the connections to other
online accounts or the money making potential.”44 The digital content,
which could be categorized as a digital asset, includes “images, photos,
videos, and text files.”45 Digital assets could be stored locally on the
individual’s computer or can be accessed through the cloud.46 Furthermore,
“[s]ome online accounts can be considered assets in and of themselves and
have value to [the] estate;” these include the aforementioned social media
profiles and e-mail accounts.47 While there are several different types of
digital files, each may be considered “intangible, personal property, as long
as they stay digital.”48
Generally, property can be separated into two categories: Real
property and personal property.49 The significance of whether or not they
stay digital can be an important distinction, because once a digital file such
as a photo is printed, it becomes tangible personal property.50 Interestingly,
over ninety-three percent of Americans are misinformed about what will
happen to their digital assets when they die.51 For this reason, it would be
helpful to briefly discuss the different types of digital assets.52

43.
Id.
44.
Id.
45.
Id.
46.
Id.
47.
Romano, supra note 42.
48.
Id.
49.
Nathan J. Dosch & Joseph W. Boucher, E-Legacy: Who Inherits Your
Digital Assets?, WIS. LAW., Dec. 2010, available at http://www.wisbar.org/
newspublications/wisconsinlawyer/pages/article.aspx?volume=83&issue=12&articleid=1907.
50.
See Romano, supra note 42.
51.
Evan Carroll, 93 Percent of Americans Unaware or Misinformed About
Digital Assets, DIGITAL BEYOND (Apr. 29, 2014, 7:54 PM), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/
2014/04/93-percent-of-americans-unaware-or-misinformed-about-digital-assets/.
52.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 193–96; see also discussion infra Part II.A.
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Pick Your Poison: The Types of Digital Assets and Digital Accounts

The reason for categorizing digital assets and digital accounts is
because each shares—at least on some level—an interconnectedness that is
unparalleled in respect to other types of property.53 It is important, however,
to note that there are differences between digital assets and digital accounts,
because the overlaps between the two often cause them to be used
interchangeably.54 Although the two blend together in discussion, they may
be treated differently under the law.55 Most, if not all, social media accounts
require an e-mail account to act as a backup for password changes and direct
communication to the user.56 Thus, e-mail is a fundamental piece to this
digital asset issue, as most users access most of their other accounts through
this service as well.57
Evan Carroll, co-founder of the Digital Beyond Blog—which
heavily influences this article and is a leading online resource for legal
discussion dealing with one’s digital estate—identifies “at least five types of
digital assets.”58 While this Comment will include the five digital assets
defined by Carroll, there are some other types of assets that would be helpful
if briefly discussed as well.59 The first is devices and data, which is the
decedent’s actual computer as well as what can be stored on it.60 The second
is e-mail, which includes continued access to the account and the messages
stored within them.61 Digital media accounts are third, and are an important
distinction from e-mail accounts because these are an expanding field of
digital assets, which include music, eBooks, apps, movies, and other forms
of digital media.62 The fourth type is cloud storage accounts, which are
online databases that store digital assets online.63 The fifth type, financial

53.
See Sherry, supra note 14, at 193–94.
54.
Watkins, supra note 33, at 198–99. This Comment also uses the term
digital asset interchangeably with digital account for the purpose of simplicity, but does
recognize the importance of distinguishing between the two. Id. at 199.
55.
Id. at 199.
56.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 196.
57.
See id.
58.
Id. at 194 (emphasis in original); see also Evan E. Carroll et al., Helping
Clients Reach Their Great Digital Beyond, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM (Sept. 1, 2011), http://
www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/helping-clients-reach-their-great-digitalbeyond-0.
59.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 194–96; see also Watkins, supra note 33, at 198–
200; infra Parts A.1–7.
60.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 194–95.
61.
Id. at 195.
62.
Watkins, supra note 33, at 206.
63.
Id. at 211.
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accounts, includes online banking, retirement, and insurance policies.64
Another to consider are business accounts.65 While these assets are a type of
online account, some personal businesses are run through accounts, like
eBay, and present separate difficulties of their own.66 Lastly, the final type
of accounts to be discussed are social media accounts and, while they are a
type of online account, they are a central focus to this Comment and require
a more in-depth analysis.67
1.

Devices and Data

Devices are easily recognized as the physical computer or other
tangible property—such as an external hard drive or flash drive—where
several digital files can be stored.68 These devices can and are normally
“‘distributed as part of the estate.’”69 Therefore, what separates digital assets
from the devices and data discussion is that e-mail, social media, business,
and financial accounts are “stored beyond [the] individual’s personal
devices.”70
2.

E-mail

E-mail has been referred to as the “crossover between local and
cloud-based storage” systems.71 The service is used for a variety of reasons
including business and personal communication with people all over the
world.72 Oftentimes, important aspects of the decedent’s life can be found in
his or her e-mail—including bills and other personal information—which
stresses the importance of having continued access to these accounts.73
Although content in e-mail ranges from personal photos and financial
records to intimate private conversations, it represents a real value and
deserves to be protected and managed like any other property.74

64.
Id. at 200.
65.
Id. at 212–13.
66.
Id.
67.
See Sherry, supra note 14, at 198; infra Part II.A.7.
68.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 197.
69.
Id.
70.
Id.
71.
Id.
72.
See Watkins, supra note 33, at 202.
73.
See Justin Atwater, Who Owns E-Mail? Do You Have the Right to Decide
the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 397, 399.
74.
See id. at 399–401.
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Digital Media

A decedent’s digital media collection can include a wide variety of
things.75 A common example would be a decedent’s iTunes account or
Amazon Kindle.76 Worth noting, however, iTunes only provides the user a
license for its product and is generally nontransferable.77 The first sale
doctrine in copyright law permits a lawful owner of a CD or book to sell this
material item.78 While this applies for a material copy, the digital copies of
those same songs or books may not be so easily disposed of.79 Even with
this restriction, there are other examples of digital media accounts—like
ReDigi—that allow digital songs and media to be sold or transferred on their
marketplace.80 There has recently been a movement by larger companies to
follow suit and join the selling and transfer of digital media, including iTunes
and Amazon.81 This area of digital assets is growing, and with the transition
from license to a digital media market, the future of these accounts becomes
more uncertain.82
4.

Cloud Storage Accounts

There are several new online accounts that offer storage in the
cloud.83 The appeal to storing media, documents, and other files in the cloud
is because these files can be accessed by several different devices, as long as
there is an internet connection.84 More popular examples of these types of
accounts include, “DropBox, SkyDrive, iCloud, or the Amazon Cloud
Drive.”85 Cloud storage accounts create similar problems as other digital
accounts for fiduciaries, including their ability to find these accounts and
these accounts limiting the accounts’ access and transferability in their terms
of service (“TOS”).86 As one scholar notes, “iCloud actually addresses death
specifically with a ‘No Right of Survivorship’ clause. This clause states that
‘[y]ou agree that your [a]ccount is non-transferable . . . . Upon receipt of a
75.
Watkins, supra note 33, at 206.
76.
See Jim Lamm, What Happens to Your Apple iTunes Music, Videos, and
eBooks When You Die?, DIGITAL PASSING (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.digitalpassing.com/
2012/09/04/apple-itunes-music-videos-ebooks-die/.
77.
Id. at 207; see also Watkins, supra note 33, at 207.
78.
Lamm, supra note 76.
79.
See Watkins, supra note 33, at 206–07.
80.
Id. at 208.
81.
See id. at 209.
82.
Id. at 210.
83.
See id. at 211.
84.
See Watkins, supra note 33, at 211.
85.
Id.
86.
Id.
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copy of a death certificate your [a]ccount may be terminated and all [c]ontent
within your [a]ccount deleted.’”87 Depending on the account, it seems like
these storage accounts—which may hold very important data such as
unpublished works, or personal communications—may not be able to be
accessed by the fiduciary or passed on to the decedent’s heirs.88
5.

Financial Accounts

Seemingly more familiar types of accounts are banking and
retirement accounts, which fall under the umbrella of financial accounts.89
Historically, these did not pose much of a problem because being able to
identify and access these accounts would mean waiting for the decedent’s
mail to come: 1) showing that the account exists and where to find it; and 2)
making it less difficult to get a court order to access the account.90 However,
recently more and more banking has gone paperless and the new age of
online banking makes managing expenses more convenient for the user, but
can cause a major problem for their heirs.91 Aside from being able to locate
these accounts, accessing them can be near impossible without having the
passwords or identification numbers.92 One benefit to a financial banking
account is that it is governed by the state law where the decedent lived, and
legislation may help with accessing the account from the bank or business,
which maintains the account.93
6.

Business Accounts

Certain accounts, such as eBay, PayPal, Amazon, and many of the
previously mentioned digital accounts, can be part of a decedent’s business.94
Some individuals may have developed and established a trusted eBay
account.95 Some lawyers may even keep client files in a Dropbox-type
service for their ease of sharing with partners.96 Even a domain name may

87.
Id.; iCloud Terms and Conditions, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legal/
icloud/en/terms.html (last updated Oct. 20, 2014).
88.
See Watkins, supra note 33, at 211.
89.
Id. at 200.
90.
See id. at 200–01.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 201.
93.
Watkins, supra note 33, at 201–02.
94.
See id. at 213.
95.
Naomi Cahn, Postmortem Life On-line, PROBATE & PROPERTY, July–Aug.
2011, at 36, 37.
96.
Id.
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be considered a business account that would qualify as a digital asset.97
While the same problems could potentially arise if a decedent used these
accounts for personal use, the fact that it is a business account creates a
different set of possible issues for the decedent’s heirs and fiduciary.98 For
example, under Florida law, it is the personal representative’s fiduciary
responsibility to maintain and efficiently manage the decedent’s estate.99
Therefore, the fiduciary would have to ensure that the business is maintained,
and the only way this would be possible is if the personal representative of
the estate knew about the business account and was able to access it.100
7.

Social Media Accounts

The popularity of social media accounts is uncontested.101 Billions
of people are utilizing websites, like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, Myspace,
Pinterest, and countless others, to post the most intimate details of their
personal lives on the internet.102 These websites allow users to create
accounts and develop personal profiles tailored just for them.103 The ability
to then share these profiles with friends, family, and your fifth grade science
teacher gives social media a defining feature.104 Social media has become so
popular that a recent study has shown that ninety-two percent of children in
the United States have an online presence by the age of two.105 On average,
a social media user at age thirty already has a digital fingerprint that can span
back fifteen years.106 One of the most important aspects of social media is
that it is increasingly popular amongst teens and young adults.107 This is a
considerable fact because most young adults may not draft a will in time to
properly plan for their estate.108 The fact that so many young adults are
97.
Id.
98.
Watkins, supra note 33, at 212–13.
99.
FLA. STAT. § 733.602(1) (2014).
100.
See Watkins, supra note 33, at 212–13.
101.
See Sherry, supra note 14, at 199–200; Watkins, supra note 33, at 203.
102.
Watkins, supra note 33, at 203–04.
103.
See Sherry, supra note 14, at 199–200.
104.
See Watkins, supra note 33, at 204.
105.
Jeff Bertolucci, Nine of Ten U.S. Kids Have Online Presence by Age Two,
Study Says, PC WORLD (Oct. 7, 2010, 2:45 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/207225/
nine_of_ten_us_kids_have_online_presence_by_age_two_study.html.
106.
Id. (“[T]he vast majority of children today will have online presence by
the time they are two-years-old—a presence that will continue to build throughout their whole
lives.”).
107.
See PEW RES. CTR., supra note 3, at 29.
108.
See Assoc. Press, Dealing with the Digital Afterlife, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH (July 17, 2014, 8:25AM), http://www.timesdispatch.com/business/dealing-with-thedigital-afterlife/article_773fa594-0dad-11e4-af88-001a4bcf6878.html.
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accumulating vast digital estates and are not properly planning for their
future is what creates so much confusion for their heirs, their fiduciary, and
the law once they die.109
As it may already be apparent, and although this Comment will later
discuss the subject, the distinction between personal and intangible property
can make a substantial difference because, “[d]epending upon the law in
your jurisdiction, this distinction . . . may have significant implications on
how clients grant executors access to these assets, what control the executor
has over these assets, and over the probate process itself.”110 As briefly
mentioned earlier, a major problem to consider is the need for the fiduciary
to identify, locate, and access assets that are only available through digital
means such as e-mail or other online servers.111 Other potential obstacles to
consider mentioned earlier—although slightly outside the scope of this
Comment—are copyright concerns.112 More importantly, if a fiduciary is
successful in accessing a particular digital asset, the fiduciary could come
across a host of other legal problems attempting to transfer the digital
asset.113
B.

Terms of Service: The Social Media Contract

The access and transferability of a digital asset incorporates different
aspects of property, contract, and probate law.114 An agreement between
online services and their users is “almost always governed by a contract of
adhesion.”115 The issues derive from the contractual agreement between the
user and the Internet service provider (“ISP”).116 Normally, for the user to
acquire a license for the service provided by the ISP, the user must adhere to
109.
See Jessica Hopper, Digital Afterlife: What Happens to Your Online
Accounts When You Die?, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2012, 7:53 AM), http://
rockcenter.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/06/01/11995859-digital-afterlife-what-happens-to-youronline-accounts-when-you-die?lite. Cahn explains:
‘When somebody dies, the person who is responsible for taking care of
the individual’s asset is supposed to be complying with what the individual wanted
and protecting the individual,’ Cahn said. ‘Because so many people have not
thought about this, we don’t know what the person actually wanted . . . we can all
imagine what’s in internet accounts. There may certainly be cases where the person
who died would not have wanted anyone to get anywhere near the person’s
account.’

Id. (alteration in original).
110.
Romano, supra note 42; see also infra Part III.
111.
Romano, supra note 42; see also supra Part II.A.6.
112.
Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; see also supra Part II.A.3.
113.
Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49.
114.
Id.
115.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 204.
116.
Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49.
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the TOS.117 In many instances, the TOS do not specify what will happen to
the account upon the user’s death.118 Additionally, TOS often include
language that makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to allow the user to
transfer their account to someone else, or even allow another person to
access their account.119 Therefore, the TOS may prevent a fiduciary from
being able to transfer or access the account.120 Herein lies the primary
question surrounding how a fiduciary can access a legitimate digital asset of
a decedent when the contract that the decedent originally agreed to did not
grant fiduciary access.121
More often than not, the user typically scans through “several
screens worth of legalese, and then registers by clicking [on] a box and
agreeing to the terms therein.”122 These terms—although they qualify as a
contract of adhesion—are routinely held up by the courts and are
enforceable.123 The TOS often dictate the law that is binding to the
agreement, but the question of which law would supersede the other is
unclear.124
While there is opportunity throughout social media, some platforms
have recently come across controversy in regard to who owns the rights to
the videos and pictures users post.125 The language in the TOS agreement on
Instagram raised many questions in regard to what license Instagram had
with its users’ pictures.126 The platform updated its TOS the very next
117.
Id.; see also Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last updated Nov. 15, 2013).
118.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 204.
119.
Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; see also Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities, supra note 117.
120.
Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; see also Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities, supra note 117.
121.
Dosch & Boucher, supra note 49; see also Statement of Rights and
Responsibilities, supra note 117.
122.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 204–05.
123.
Id. at 205.
124.
See id. (“Given that not all users are situated in California, then, ‘[i]t’s
questionable whether the estate laws of a decedent’s resident state would supersede the
contractual agreements with the various online services,’ irrespective of legislation
specifically addressing social-media assets.”); Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra
note 117.
125.
See Declan McCullagh, Instagram Says It Now Has the Right to Sell Your
Photos, CNET (Dec. 17, 2012, 9:54 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/instagram-says-it-nowhas-the-right-to-sell-your-photos/.
126.
See Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/
before–January-14-2013 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014). The TOS which caused the controversy
state:
Instagram does not claim any ownership rights in the text, files, images,
photos, video, sounds, musical works, works of authorship, applications, or any
other materials—collectively, Content—that you post on or through the Instagram
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day.127 The new TOS give Instagram the license to use a user’s content
“[s]ubject to your profile and privacy settings, [therefore], any User Content
that you make public [and] searchable by [another] User[] [is] subject to use
under . . . Instagram API.”128 Instagram’s TOS also “reserve the right to
refuse access to the [s]ervice to anyone for any reason at any time,”129
leading to a host of other potential legal questions.130
Facebook purchased Instagram for a cool one billion dollars in
2012.131 Facebook is by far the most popular social media platform on the
Internet, boasting an average of over 829 million daily active users.132 Even
with such a position, Facebook is another social media platform that has
shared in some controversy over their TOS.133 One recent feature, in
particular, that has aroused some serious questions is how an individual’s
account will be managed, if at all, after death.134 This feature, called
memorializing, is supposed to lock a deceased person’s account and keep
anyone from logging into it.135 Although Facebook maintains this is to

Services. By displaying or publishing—posting—any Content on or through the
Instagram Services, you hereby grant to Instagram a non-exclusive, fully paid and
royalty-free, worldwide, limited license to use, modify, delete from, add to,
publicly perform, publicly display, reproduce and translate such Content, including
without limitation distributing part or all of the Site in any media formats through
any media channels, except Content not shared publicly—private—will not be
distributed outside the Instagram Services.
Id.

127.
See McCullagh, supra note 125; Alia Papageorgiou, Instagram Will Own
Your Photos Starting Jan. 16 2013, NEW EUROPE (Dec. 19, 2012, 18:16),
http://www.neurope.eu/article/instagram-will-own-your-photos-starting-jan-16-2013; Kevin
Systrom, Updated Terms of Service Based on Your Feedback, INSTAGRAM,
http://blog.instagram.com/post/38421250999/updated-terms-of-service-based-on-yourfeedback (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
128.
Privacy Policy, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/privacy/
(last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
129.
Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, http://instagram.com/about/legal/terms/ (last
visited Dec. 30, 2014).
130.
See Lamm et. al., supra note 13, at 386–87.
131.
Evelyn M. Rusli, Facebook Buys Instagram for $1 Billion, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 9, 2012, 2:02 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/facebook-buys-instagramfor-1-billion/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
132.
Facebook Reports Second Quarter 2014 Results, supra note 21.
133.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 204–05.
134.
See Hopper, supra note 109; How Do I Report a Deceased Person or an
Account That Needs to be Memorialized?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/150486848354038 (last visited Dec. 30, 2014).
135.
How Do I Report a Deceased Person or an Account that Needs to be
Memorialized?, supra note 134.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

113

Nova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 5

2014]

SOCIAL MEDIA IS PERMANENT

105

protect the privacy of the deceased and their family and friends, there have
been some setbacks.136
Facebook has also been involved in litigation as a result of its
137
TOS.
After the suicide of Benjamin, Helen and Jay Stassen, the parents of
the departed, began intense litigation to gain access to their son’s Facebook
and e-mail accounts.138 Because of its policy, Facebook maintains that it will
not allow access by giving out the password to a dead person’s account.139
Although a local judge ordered Facebook to allow the parents of the
decedent access to his account, Facebook currently has not complied and
legally can appeal the decision.140 Facebook’s TOS restricts its users from
sharing their password with anyone else.141 Facebook’s TOS also restricts
the user from transferring their account to anyone without explicitly getting
permission in writing.142 If there is any violation of “the letter or spirit of
this [s]tatement, . . . we can stop providing all or part of Facebook to you.”143
One of the biggest concerns facing the loved ones left behind is often
trying to figure out what the deceased wanted to do with their social media
accounts.144 In most cases, “people [do not even] think about what will
happen to their online accounts when they die.”145 Internet companies also
take the position that users have a certain expectation of privacy and craft
their TOS to represent this.146 Unlike other online banking accounts that
users expect to be passed on when they die, social media accounts are
expected to be memorialized or deleted.147
While social media is in the midst of growing pains that are posing
their own set of problems, other types of online assets have had a chance to
grow out of their infancy.148 Google provides an e-mail service called
Gmail, whose TOS states that it will, in certain circumstances, release
136.
See Evan Carroll, Deceased Man Returns on Facebook, DIGITAL BEYOND
(July 21, 2014), http://www.thedigitalbeyond.com/2014/07/deceased-man-returns-onfacebook/; Hopper, supra note 109; How Do I Report a Deceased Person or an Account that
Needs to be Memorialized?, supra note 134.
137.
Hopper, supra note 109.
138.
Id.
139.
See id.
140.
Id.
141.
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 117.
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
Hopper, supra note 109.
145.
Id.
146.
Id.
147.
Id.
148.
See id. (“According to Google’s web site [sic], in rare cases, they may
provide the content of a deceased person’s account to an authorized representative of the
person.”).
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information through the “legal process or enforceable governmental
request.”149 Yahoo, on the other hand, has recently changed its policy to
align similarly with other e-mail service providers due to one of the most
discussed and often cited cases of digital assets and ownership rights.150
Justin Ellsworth, a trained demolition expert for the United States
Marines, was killed in Al Anbar, Iraq while inspecting a roadside bomb.151
Justin utilized e-mail as a primary means to communicate with his friends
and family.152 However, Justin died intestate with no spouse or child,
leaving his parents as next of kin.153 Justin’s father, John, then attempted to
retrieve Justin’s e-mails from Yahoo, but the ISP initially refused to comply
with his request.154 At the time, Yahoo’s TOS did not allow the company to
provide “e-mail passwords to anyone [except] for the account holder.”155
John argued under the theory that e-mail accounts are personal property and
should pass just like other property through intestacy laws.156 Yahoo would
eventually concede, but not before conditioning their compliance with a
court order that would require them to provide Justin’s father with the emails.157 Yahoo delivered the contents of Justin’s e-mail to his father John in
a CD despite the fact that Yahoo refused to change its policy prohibiting the
ISP from disclosing their users’ e-mails.158
This case highlights the difficulty and uncertainty surrounding
digital assets of the deceased and the TOS of the service providers.159 Some
experts suggest that the real legal battle will be between the “[TOS]
declaring that users have no right of survivorship, and newly enacted state
laws like Oklahoma’s, declaring that social-media accounts may pass like
tangible property to beneficiaries and heirs.”160 This conflict, as previously
discussed, touches on several issues with state laws and the TOS which
149.
Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/
www.google.com/en/us/intl/en/policies/privacy/google_privacy_policy_en.pdf (last updated
Dec. 19, 2014).
150.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 198; see also Privacy Policy, YAHOO, https://
info.yahoo.com/privacy/us/yahoo/ (last updated Sept. 25, 2014).
151.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 214.
152.
Id.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.; Stefanie Olsen, Yahoo Releases E-mail of Deceased Marine, CNET
(Apr. 21, 2005, 12:39 PM), http://news.cnet.com/yahoo-releases-e-mail-of-deceasedmarine/2100-1038_3-5680025.html.
155.
Olsen, supra note 154.
156.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 214.
157.
Id.
158.
Olsen, supra note 154.
159.
See id.
160.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 215 (referencing a February 1, 2012 telephone
interview with Evan Carroll, Co-founder of The Digital Beyond blog).
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dictate what law governs their terms.161 Couple this with the fact that there is
little to no case law to help structure these new legislative attempts to remedy
the digital asset uncertainty creates more questions than answers for the
decedents’ families.162
III.

HITS AND MISSES: HOW SOME LEGISLATURES FELL BEHIND THE
TECHNOLOGY

There are currently seven states that have enacted laws specifically
designed to help fiduciaries manage online accounts.163 Several other states,
including Florida, are currently in the process of introducing legislation that
will consider and address fiduciary access to digital access.164 While these
are the first attempts at state legislatures creating answers for the digital asset
uncertainty, experts believe that several states’ digital asset “laws are too
limited in scope.”165 On July 16, 2014, the Uniform Law Commission
(“ULC”) passed the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act
(“UFADAA”).166 This was the result of an ongoing effort to help guide
fiduciaries and provide access to digital assets so that they can properly
administer the decedent’s estate “while respecting the privacy and intent of
the account holder.”167 The following discussion of the current state laws
governing fiduciary access will include: Connecticut,168 Idaho,169 Indiana,170
Nevada,171 Oklahoma,172 Rhode Island,173 and Virginia.174

161.
Id. at 215–16.
162.
See id.
163.
Jim Lamm, August 2013 List of State Laws and Proposals Regarding
Fiduciary Access to Digital Property During Incapacity or After Death, DIGITAL PASSING
(Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2013/08/30/august-2013-list-state-lawsproposals-fiduciary-access-digital-property-incapacity-death/.
164.
Id.
165.
See id.
166.
Jim Lamm, Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (UFADAA),
DIGITAL PASSING (July 16, 2014), http://www.digitalpassing.com/2014/07/16/uniformfiduciary-access-digital-assets-act-ufadaa/.
167.
Id.
168.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2014).
169.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715 (2014).
170.
IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2014).
171.
NEV. REV. STAT. § 143.188 (2014).
172.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2014).
173.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3 (2014).
174.
VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-110 (2014).
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The States

As previously mentioned, several states have created legislation that
is intended to help fiduciaries and their heirs deal with digital assets.175
While state legislatures draft and implement these new laws, they must take
into account several factors “including: (1) passwords; (2) encryption; (3)
federal and state criminal laws that penalize unauthorized access to
computers and data—including the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act—and;
(4) federal and state data privacy laws, including the Stored Communications
Act.”176
1.

Connecticut

Connecticut’s statute begins by defining an e-mail service provider
as any person who is an intermediary between the sending and receiving of
e-mail between users.177 The statute further defines an e-mail account as all
electronic information that is recorded and stored as it relates to the user and
the service provider.178 Connecticut then requires the e-mail service provider
to provide copies of the content in the deceased user’s e-mail account so long
as the executor of the estate can provide: A written request for copies of the
e-mail content, a death certificate, and “a certified copy of the certificate of
appointment as executor or administrator;” or an order from the court of
probate ruling that the court has jurisdiction over the estate of the
deceased.179 The statute ends with a catch–all stating that this section will
not require an ISP to disclose information that would conflict with applicable
federal law.180 The most obvious restriction to this statute is that it only
applies to e-mail and gives the fiduciary no control or instruction in regard to
social media accounts or other types of digital assets.181 The statute is too
limited in scope, and would need to be expanded to include assets, including
social media.182

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Published by NSUWorks, 2014

Lamm, supra note 163.
Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030, 2701 (2012).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a(a)(1) (2014).
Id. § 45a-334a(a)(2).
Id. § 45a-334a(b).
Id. § 45a-334a(c).
See id. § 45a-344a(a)–(c).
See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a(a)–(c); Lamm, supra note 163.
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Idaho

Idaho was one of the earliest states to enact legislation that grants a
personal representative authority over digital assets.183 The Idaho statute is
titled “Transactions Authorized for Personal Representatives: Exceptions”,
and the only relevant language to digital assets states that the personal
representative may “[t]ake control of, conduct, continue or terminate any
accounts of the decedent on any social networking website, any
microblogging or short message service website or any e-mail service
website.”184 The statute uses clear and concise language to include several
types of digital assets, but grants the personal representative the right to
continue a decedent’s social networking website, which may be in direct
conflict with certain social media accounts’ TOS.185
3.

Indiana

Under the Indiana statute, titled “Electronically Stored Documents of
Deceased”,186 the custodian, or individual that stores electronic documents of
another, shall provide any information or copies of any documents upon
written request or a certified order of the court.187 More interestingly, the
statute also prohibits the custodian from disposing of the stored documents
for two years after receiving the written request.188 This subsection of the
statute may also directly conflict with the TOS of the decedent’s service
providers.189 While the Indiana statute attempts to give broad power to the
fiduciary’s control over the decedent’s e-mail, it does not mention social
media or other digital assets.190
4.

Nevada

Nevada’s statute is one of the newer legislative attempts to reign in
the digital asset dilemma.191 Interestingly, this piece of legislation does not

183.

See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715 (2014); Sherry, supra note 14, at 216–

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-3-715(28).
See id.; e.g., iCloud Terms and Conditions, supra note 87.
IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1 (2014).
Id. § 29-1-13-1.1(b)(1)–(2).
Id. § 29-1-13-1.1(c).
See id.; e.g., iCloud Terms and Conditions, supra note 87.
See IND. CODE § 29-1-13-1.1.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 143.188 (2014); Lamm, supra note 163.

17.
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attempt to grant the personal representative access to the digital asset.192 The
statute states the following:
[A] personal representative has the power to direct the termination
of any account of the decedent, including, without limitation: (a)
[a]n account on any: (1) [s]ocial networking Internet website; (2)
[w]eb log service Internet website; (3) [m]icroblog service Internet
website; [or] (4) [s]hort message service Internet website; or (5)
[e]lectronic mail service Internet website; or (b) [a]ny similar
electronic or digital asset of the decedent.193

The statute, however, does not grant the personal representative
authority to terminate a bank account.194 Lastly, the final subsection to the
statute declares that the personal representative’s termination of the digital
assets does not violate the TOS or contractual obligations of the decedent
and the ISP.195
5.

Oklahoma

Oklahoma was the first state to enact any legislation that was
specifically designed to handle social media and the decedent’s digital assets
in regard to estate planning and probate.196 The statute currently reads, “[t]he
executor or administrator of an estate shall have the power, where otherwise
authorized, to take control of, conduct, continue, or terminate any accounts
of a deceased person on any social networking website, any microblogging
or short message service website or any e-mail service websites.”197 While
this has been in effect since 2010, there have not been any cases that would
require the court to interpret the statute.198
6.

Rhode Island

Rhode Island’s statute is very similar to Connecticut’s in that it only
requires the ISP to provide copies of the digitally stored documents.199
While Rhode Island’s language allows the personal representative to possibly

192.
See NEV. REV. STAT. § 143.188.
193.
Id. § 143.188(1).
194.
Id. § 143.188(2).
195.
Id. § 143.188(3).
196.
See Sherry, supra note 14, at 216.
197.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 269 (2014).
198.
Sherry, supra note 14, at 216.
199.
See Watkins, supra note 33, at 221. Compare R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-27-3
(2014), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-334a (2014).
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gain access to the decedent’s e-mail, it as well is too limited in scope because
it does not incorporate social media or any other type of digital asset.200
7.

Virginia

Currently, Virginia’s statute has the most unique take on addressing
the digital estate of the decedent because this statute only grants the
“personal representative of a deceased minor[]” power to control the TOS of
an online account.201 The Virginia statute never mentions an adult decedent,
which will lead the court to conclude the legislative intent was only to
address a minor’s digital estate.202 While the statute grants the personal
representative “the power to assume the minor’s [TOS] agreement for an
online account,” it is solely for the purpose of disclosing the contents of the
minor’s communication pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702.203
B.

The Answer? The Uniform Fiduciary Access To Digital Assets Act

Fiduciaries play a vital, often unglamorous, role in probate, acting on
behalf of deceased individuals.204 In most instances, “[f]iduciaries generally
have the same power over assets that an absolute owner would have,”
essentially stepping in the shoes of the decedent, even when dealing with his
or her digital assets.205 The UFADAA is the ULC’s attempt to address
several of the obstacles that arise for the fiduciary regarding digital assets; it
addresses four major types of fiduciaries, and provides these fiduciaries the
power to overcome obstacles that arise with digital estates.206 The Uniform
Act, although complete, will need to be refined before states can begin
considering incorporating it into their legislation.207 The question soon
becomes: What exactly would states be considering with this Act?208
The Uniform Act is intended to provide a “consistent . . . framework
to resolve conflict[] with state criminal laws, as well as supplementing
federal criminal and civil laws.”209 The first step of the UFADAA was

200.
201.
202.
203.
§ 64.2-110.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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simply defining a digital asset as a record that is electronic.210 This broad
definition is intended to include anything that can be stored digitally.211
Section 4 of the Act, titled “Access by Personal Representative to Digital
Assets of Decedent,” lays out the groundwork for the personal representative
to have authority to access the stored electronic communication of the
decedent; it also grants the personal representative access to “any other
digital asset in which at death the decedent had a right or interest.”212
Therefore, the Act is intending to permit the personal representative access to
all of the digital assets of the decedent, unless it would be prohibited by
applicable law.213
In the following sections, sections 5 through 7, the UFADAA
provides agents, conservators, and trustees the authority to manage and
access their principal’s, protected person’s, or successor’s digital assets.214
Section 5 is intended to establish that so long as the conservator is authorized
by the court, he may access the protected person’s digital assets.215 Section 5
is similar to section 4, as it also addresses the concerns of the ISP and is
structured so that it could incorporate all forms of digital assets.216 Section 6
establishes that unless otherwise explicitly stated in the power of attorney,
the agent has authority over all of the principal’s digital assets.217 Following
basic agency principles, there should not be any question as to the authority
granted by the principal to the agent.218 Section 7 of the UFADAA deals
with inter vivos transfers of digital assets, as well as testamentary transfers of
digital assets, and grants authority to the trustee to access and manage the
successor’s digital assets.219
Section 8 is potentially the most important provision in the
UFADAA because it provides specific authority to the fiduciary.220 In fact,
section 8(b) nullifies several of the issues previously brought up in this
comment regarding TOS.221 The language of section 8(b) reads:
(b) Unless an account holder, after [the effective date of
this [act]], agrees to a provision in a terms-of-service agreement
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
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limits a fiduciary’s access to a digital asset of the account holder
by an affirmative act separate from the account holder’s assent to
other provisions of the agreement:
(1) the provision is void as against the strong public policy of this
state.222

As this reads, the statute would trump any TOS agreements in light
of the strong public policy behind enforcing the statute.223 Section 8 has
another provision, which may be interesting if an ISP decides to enforce their
agreed upon TOS.224 Section 8(c) provides that the “choice-of-law provision
in a [TOS] agreement is unenforceable against a fiduciary acting under this
[act].”225 This portion of the UFADAA is intended to follow basic probate
law by recognizing the personal representative or other fiduciary stepping
into the shoes of the decedent and thus, would have the “same authority as
the account holder if the account holder were the one exercising the
authority.”226 Although section 8 is intended to authorize fiduciary authority,
it is carefully drafted so that it would not be in conflict with applicable law,
such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.227
Section 9 of the UFADAA enumerates how the fiduciary must
properly request access to the digital assets and that compliance is necessary
for access to digital property.228 It is important to note that section 9 is
reinforcing the premise that the personal representative’s power is limited to
what the original account holder would have if he still accessed the
account.229 Section 10 absolves the potential civil liability put on ISP for
complying with this Act; thus, section 10 provides immunity for them.230
Ultimately, this Act, if uniformly adopted, could clear up some of
the legal issues revolving around ISPs and their TOS.231 This Act can
potentially relieve ISP’s need to protect themselves through their TOS by
removing the risk involved with disclosing personal information through
lawful requests by fiduciaries.232 Furthermore, this Act could help secure

222.
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223.
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fiduciaries’ access to decedent’s personal information, while ensuring that
the decedent’s privacy and final wishes are protected.233
IV.

BRIDGING THE GAP: WHY FLORIDA NEEDS TO ADDRESS THE
DIGITAL ASSET QUESTION

The current Florida Probate Code grows from a legacy of legal
debate and discussion that has been ongoing since its inception.234 Florida
probate proceedings are entirely governed by statute, and the administration
of estates is governed by chapter 733, beginning with the venue for probate
proceedings235 and ending with the closing of estates.236 Under chapter 733,
Florida requires that a personal representative be appointed to administer the
decedent’s estate.237 Furthermore, the personal representative typically must
be a Florida resident, unless they are a lineal descendant or spouse.238 The
personal representative must not have been convicted of a felony, cannot be
under eighteen years of age, and must be mentally capable of performing
their duties.239
The personal representative in Florida is considered a fiduciary and
held to a certain standard of care.240 “A personal representative [must] settle
and [administer] the estate . . . accord[ing] [to] the terms of the decedent[]”
and must use the authority granted to him “for the best interests of interested
persons.”241 To help ensure the personal representative is acting in the best
interest of the parties, as long as the actions of the personal representative are
in accordance with administering the estate properly, he or she will not be
liable for those acts.242
Thus, the Florida Probate Code grants certain powers to the personal
representative,243 so they can adequately and efficiently administer the estate,
including the fiduciary duty to maintain the assets of the estate.244 The first
issue regarding digital assets can be found in the language of Florida Probate
Code chapter 733, which states:
233.
See UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT, Prefatory Note.
234.
See Henry A. Fenn & Edward F. Koren, The 1974 Florida Probate
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(1) All real and personal property of the decedent, except the
protected homestead, within [the] state and the rents, income,
issues, and profits from it shall be assets in the hands of the
personal representative:
(a) [f]or the payment of devises, family allowance, elective share,
estate and inheritance taxes, claims, charges, and expenses of the
administration and obligations of the decedent’s estate;
(b) [t]o enforce contribution and equalize advancement; [and]
(c) [f]or distribution.245

The language of the code does not mention intangible property.246
Furthermore, there is not a single mention of a digital asset.247 The silence in
the statute represents some of the problems that arise between a fiduciary’s
attempt to gain access and control of digital assets that would clearly violate
an ISP, such as Facebook’s TOS.248 The bulk of the previous discussion
regarding digital assets and the problems that arise in states with
fiduciaries—and how some states have attempted to address this issue—shed
light on the fact that the Florida Probate Code provides no protection to a
decedent’s digital estate, because through the language of the statute, digital
assets do not exist.249 Furthermore, the Florida Probate Code does not
currently authorize the fiduciary to access or control e-mail or other forms of
electronic communication.250 Having shown that digital property can hold
extraordinary sentimental value, and in some cases substantial financial
value,251 there is clearly a need for the Florida Probate Code to recognize
digital assets and provide a consistent framework for fiduciaries to access
these accounts and administer them accordingly.252
V.

CONCLUSION

It takes some time for legislatures to hammer out a permanent
solution to the issues that arise with digital estate planning and fiduciary

245.
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management.253 Legal scholars have presented several suggestions on how
to properly plan for a digital estate, including taking an inventory of all
accounts and listing all relevant user names and passwords.254 Other
suggestions include regularly backing up and expressly authorizing ISP to
disclose their information to their fiduciaries.255 This is, of course, when an
account holder has planned out his digital estate; however, when no plan
exists, a fiduciary should consult an attorney and so long as there is not a
criminal investigation, request and create copies of the content of the digital
property.256
While these suggestions are currently necessary in Florida, they
would not be if Florida would enact the UFADAA, at least in part.257 Florida
should establish a digital assets statute that gives direct access to the
decedents’ or incapacitated individuals’ guardian to electronic e-mail
communications, as well as any and all other digital assets, including social
media accounts.258 To help ensure there is not subsequent litigation, Florida
should adopt section 9 of the UFADAA, to ensure ISPs do not fear
subsequent civil litigation.259 Furthermore, Florida legislators should take
note of the prior states’ attempt at addressing the digital assets issues and
refrain from making theirs too limited in scope.260 Incorporating all digital
assets, including social media, would help ensure they do not end up with the
same latent ambiguity as Rhode Island, Virginia, and Connecticut.261 Lastly,
Florida legislators should strongly consider section 8 of the UFADAA.262
This section develops strong fiduciary authority while maintaining the
necessary responsibilities to ensure the decedent’s privacy is maintained and
their final wishes are respected.263
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